

Hegel's Shorter LOGIC

An
Introduction
and
Commentary

John Grier Hibben

and

Eric v.d. Luft

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Drei Schwestern, Güte, Heiterkeit, Verstand,
Du hast zu Deinen Parzen sie erkoren;
Sie sind's, die weben Deines Lebens Band.

Three sisters: goodness, cheerfulness, understanding;
You have chosen them to be your Fates;
These they are, who weave the thread of your life.

- Hegel, letter to an unknown, March 31, 1824



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Preface to This Edition

This work first appeared as *Hegel's "Logic": An Essay in Interpretation* (New York: Scribner's, 1902). At that time John Grier Hibben was the Stuart Professor of Logic at Princeton University and had already published *Inductive Logic* (Edinburgh: Blackwood; New York: Scribner's, 1896) and *The Problems of Philosophy* (New York: Scribner's, 1898). When I first read it as a graduate student in the 1970s, I believed that it was among the best short introductions to Hegel's *Encyclopedia Logic* - and indeed to Hegel in general - that I had yet read. I still consider it among the best. But it has long needed to be brought up to date. That is what this present version does.

Hegel wrote two "*Logics*": *The Science of Logic*, the so-called "greater" or "larger" *Logic*, a massive, two-volume, three-part work, and the so-called "lesser" or "shorter" *Logic*, which comprises the first of the three parts of his *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, an outline for his students. Hegel's *Science of Logic* is a complex work, mostly incomprehensible to those who have not first studied both the *Encyclopedia* and the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Indeed, at least one scholar - Kenley Dove in "Phenomenology and Systematic Philosophy," on pp. 28-29 of *Method and Speculation in Hegel's "Phenomenology,"*

edited by Merold Westphal (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities, 1982) - even sees the *Phenomenology* as a "manual of exercises" for understanding the *Science of Logic* and as an "introduction" to it. To do an adequate commentary on the *Science of Logic* would take volumes, and would be beyond the grasp of the beginning or undergraduate philosophy students for whom we write. Our book concerns only the shorter *Logic*, though with occasional references to the larger, mostly for the sake of clarification.

There are notable differences - and perhaps even some inconsistencies - not only between the *Encyclopedia Logic* and the *Science of Logic*, but also among the various editions of each work. Hegel published the first volume of the *Science of Logic* in 1812 and the second in 1816. The first three editions of the *Encyclopedia* appeared in 1817, 1827, and 1830. There were major changes in the *Encyclopedia* from 1817 to 1827, but only minor changes from 1827 to 1830. Hegel finished revising the first volume of the *Science of Logic* just a week before his death in 1831, and in so doing incorporated many changes. For example, his idea of "existence" (*Dasein*) evolved markedly and his concern with Kant's categories decreased. He never had a chance to revise the second volume. Our text here is the 1830 *Encyclopedia*.

In this commentary, the word "Logic," capitalized and not italicized, refers to the system of Hegel's logic as presented in either of his two works on the subject; while "Logic," capitalized, italicized, and unqualified, refers to Hegel's shorter *Logic*. When the *Science of Logic* is meant, the context should make that clear. The word "logic," uncanceled, just means logic in the general sense, not necessarily Hegel's.

Hibben's brief commentary on Hegel's *Logic* remains a valuable introduction for students - nearly as valuable now as it was when it was written. It was ahead of its time in the sense that it emphasized the process rather than the result, i.e., the dialectical innovation rather than the achievement of the absolute. But perhaps its most attractive feature is that it reads like a meditation on, or a digression from, Hegel's *Logic*, rather than like a commentary or an exegesis. Hibben's interpretation, if not always accurate, is at least always plausible and defensible.

Naturally, I have several little quarrels with Hibben's presentation which have guided me in revising. It would be unfair to him not to mention this here along with my ideas for modernizing his text, if only so that readers will know that I am being forthright rather than sneaky in any latter-day distortion of his words or intentions. Primarily, I have sought to tone down the personalism which was popular in Hibben's time and is sometimes implicit in his work on

Hegel.

My main exegetical quarrel with Hibben concerns what I see as his typical understatement of the elevation of the third moment of a dialectical triad. What I mean by that will become clear in the text, but now let it suffice to say that Hibben's use of the phrase "positive reason" to describe the third aspect of a dialectical phase is unfortunate, insofar as it suggests the positivism which Hegel so strongly rejects throughout his works. Moreover, Hegel does not say "*positive Vernunft*" anywhere in those of his writings which he himself saw through the press. Accordingly, I have substituted "reconciling reason" for "positive reason" wherever it occurs.

Readers should notice that every instance of the words "abstract" and "concrete" in the text appears in scarequotes. This is my amendment to emphasize the key systematic point - which Hibben obviously knew but apparently failed to appreciate adequately or apply consistently - that for Hegel each of these two terms carries approximately the opposite of its ordinary, everyday meaning. Hegel wrote a short essay called "Wer Denkt Abstrakt?" ("Who Thinks Abstractly?") in which he explained that, in his technical vocabulary, "abstract" means one-sided, detached, out-of-context, or incomplete, while "concrete" means interrelated, mediated, in-context, or complete.

I have inserted Hegel's section numbers wherever applicable or helpful, modernized spelling and translations, inserted cross references to Hegel's other books, found the exact sources of epigraphs and quotations, written several explanatory digressions, and expanded the text to make it read more like a running commentary.

I have also added two chapters beyond Hibben's eighteen, which he had organized into four parts corresponding to the introduction and the three parts of Hegel's text. The first chapter, on the nature of philosophy in general, is new; and subsequent chapters have been renumbered accordingly. The other new chapter is the eighth, "Determinacy and Indeterminacy." Also, Hibben's eighteenth chapter now constitutes the whole of the new Part V, with a new emphasis on the transition from the Logic to the philosophies of nature and spirit rather than on the relation among these three.

Besides this preface and the two new chapters, the other major new element in this book is the second appendix, which lists and evaluates some of the secondary literature on Hegel's *Logic*, especially concentrating on works published since Hibben's time.

The commentary refers to four editions of Hegel's shorter *Logic*:

1. *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830)*, herausgegeben von Friedhelm Nicolin und Otto Pöggeler.

Philosophische Bibliothek, Band 33 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1969), pp. 33-197 - cited as "Enz."

2. *Hegel's Logic: Being Part I of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, translated by William Wallace with foreword by J.N. Findlay (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975) - cited as "HL"

3. *The Encyclopaedia Logic with the Zusätze: Part I of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences*, a new translation with introduction and notes by T.F. Geraets, W.A. Suchting, and H.S. Harris (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991) - cited as "EL"

4. *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline, Part 1: Logic*, translated and edited by Klaus Brinkmann and Daniel O. Dahlstrom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) - cited as "LBD."

Quotations (sometimes modified) are from *EL*, with references to the other three editions. Even though the *Zusätze* are not in *Enz.*, and some are not in *HL*, the corresponding page numbers for the appropriate sections are given anyway. Comparing translations of a difficult text can often help to break the code of the original.

Other frequent abbreviations for citing Hegel in the text are:

PhG = *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, edited by Johannes Hoffmeister, Philosophische Bibliothek 114 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1952).

PhS = *Phenomenology of Spirit*, translated by A.V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977).

SLdG = *The Science of Logic*, translated by George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

SLM = *Science of Logic*, translated by A.V. Miller (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press International, 1990).

WL = *Wissenschaft der Logik*, 2 vols. edited by Georg Lasson, Philosophische Bibliothek 56-57 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1975).

Some have argued that nothing is worth knowing which cannot be explained to an intelligent twelve-year-old in ten minutes. While such clarity, simplicity, and explanatory precision is a worthy goal, it is seldom achievable - and least of all with Hegel. Hegel wrote precisely, but not always clearly, and seldom simply. Thus secondary works on Hegel, like this one, incur the dilemma of having to try to present each point simply enough for our intelligent twelve-year-old to understand, but at the same time intricately enough to be true to Hegel. Both Hibben and I have strived to put this exegesis into readily intelligible terms while neither sacrificing accuracy nor cheating Hegel.

I am grateful for many enjoyable and useful conversations on Hegel's *Logic* that I have had with George diGiovanni, Richard Gaskins, the late Errol Harris, Stephen Houlgate, George Kline, William Maker, Mark Peterson, and Richard Winfield; and on Aristotle with Scott Davis, Emily Katz, the late Ed Pols, Søren Rosendal, Jonathan Sanford, and Eric Schumacher. I also thank the participants in "Logic Camp," especially John Burbidge, Marilyn Piety, Lawrence Stepelevich, Peter Stillman, and Thomas Wartenberg. This weeklong seminar on Hegel's greater *Logic* was held in August 1988 at Windy Pine on the shore of Kushog Lake in the Haliburton Highlands of Ontario, under the auspices of Trent University. I have learned much as well from the online discussion group, <hegel@yahoogroups.com>, and, among those discussants, I particularly thank John Bardis, Robert Fanelli, Kai Froeb, Beat Greuter, Paul Healey, Randall Preston Jackwak, Alan Ponikvar, Wil Sinda, Stephen Theron, and Robert Wallace - which is not to discount the contributions of any of the others. As usual, my wife Diane has been indispensable.

Eric v.d. Luft
Montréal, Québec
August 27, 2013



Preface to the First Edition

In his *Logic* Hegel has endeavored to incorporate the essential principles of philosophy which, in the development of the world's thought, have forced themselves upon our convictions, and have been attested by a general consensus of opinion. An insight into Hegel's system means, therefore, a comprehensive and appreciative grasp of the history of philosophy in the salient features of its progress. The *Logic* serves also as an excellent introduction to the more specific study of German philosophy which has been most profoundly affected by the writings of Hegel, both in the philosophical schools whose theories have been grounded confessedly upon Hegelian principles,

and also among those which represent a radical reaction against Hegel. Moreover, the system of philosophy as outlined in the *Logic* is not merely a speculative system of "abstract" thought, but at the same time an interpretation of life in all the fullness of its "concrete" significance. Upon these considerations, therefore, it is evident that a knowledge of Hegel's system must prove of inestimable value to the student of philosophy. Unfortunately the proverbial obscurity of Hegel has deterred many from undertaking a systematic study of his works. It is my conviction that the text of the *Logic* is self-illuminating. It has been my endeavor, therefore, to simplify Hegel's technical terms and explain their significance in the light of definitions given by Hegel himself, and as indicated in the context where such terms severally occur. There has been throughout an attempt to render intelligible the fundamental Hegelian theories by means of simple statement and illustration. The method of interpretation has grown out of the belief that the best commentary upon Hegel is Hegel himself. The basis of this exposition has been the *Logic* of the *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften* (1830).

During the preparation of this volume I have received valuable suggestions from my friend, Professor James Edwin Creighton of Cornell University, to whom I gladly express my indebtedness.

John Grier Hibben
Princeton University
October 6, 1902



"Der Mut der Wahrheit, der Glaube an die Macht des Geistes ist die erste Bedingung der Philosophie. Der Mensch, da er Geist ist, darf und soll sich selbst des Höchsten würdig achten; von der Grösse und Macht seines Geistes kann er nicht gross genug denken, und mit diesem Glauben wird nichts so spröde und hart sein, dass es sich ihm nicht eröffnete. Das zuerst verborgene und verschlossene Wesen des Universums hat keine Kraft, die dem Mute des Erkennens Widerstand leisten könnte: es muss sich vor ihm auftun, und seinen Reichtum und seine Tiefen ihm vor Augen legen und zum Genüsse geben."

"The courage of truth, faith in the power of spirit, is the first condition of philosophy. Humans, because they are spirit, may and should consider themselves worthy of the highest; by the greatness and power of the human spirit, they cannot think grandly enough, and with this faith there will be nothing so obstinate or difficult that it will not be revealed to them. The essence of the universe, which at first is hidden and secret, is not able to resist the courage of daring to know: It must disclose itself to them, lay its wealth and its depths before their eyes, and give them pleasure."

- Hegel, inaugural lecture on the history of philosophy, Heidelberg University, October 28, 1816



Part I

Introduction (§§ 1-83)

Modern Western systematic philosophy began when René Descartes (1596-1650) declared in the second of his six *Meditations on First Philosophy* (1641) that, beyond any possible doubt, he existed, at that moment and whenever he had any thought whatsoever. This remarkable event, the establishment of certain knowledge within each perceiving subject in this world, shifted the focus of Western philosophy from the objective or natural world to the conscious individual - and it has remained there ever since. Cartesianism emphasizes several strict dualisms, notably that between *res extensa* (extended or physical substance) and *res cogitans* (thinking or conscious substance), and that between the subject, i.e., the perceiver or knower, and the object of knowledge, i.e., that which is perceived or known. These dualisms have proved persistent and very difficult to explain away, although many philosophers, including Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), have tried. Descartes's insight into the nature and foundation of his own existence created not only certain knowledge, but also a foundation of certain knowledge, that at once engaged and perplexed philosophers. We will return to that important

idea, "foundation," but will say now only that it did not sit well with Hegel.

Hegel wrote in the preface to the second (1827) edition of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline*: "The scientific cognition of truth is what I have labored upon, and still do labor upon always, in all of my philosophical endeavors" (*EL*, p. 4; *LBD*, p. 8; *Enz.*, p. 3). In so depicting his life's work, he identified for himself a task to which he had been true since about 1804 and to which he would remain true until his death. Unlike the philosophy of his schoolmate, one-time friend, and long-time rival, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling (1775-1854), who seemed to change his mind with every new book he wrote, Hegel's philosophy is marked by an impressive consistency over the full span of his writing career. This consistency is of great service to Hegel's readers by making it possible to use any of Hegel's mature works confidently to illuminate any of the others.

Let us stress the phrase "in Outline" in the title of the *Encyclopedia*. As a textbook for his students, first at Heidelberg University until 1818 then at the Humboldt University of Berlin until his death, Hegel's *Encyclopedia* is comparatively short and direct. Today it must still be read, not as a treatise complete in itself, but as an elliptical and perhaps overly concise work that points, for its full understanding, toward Hegel's other works, especially the *Science of Logic* and the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Much of the Hegelian secondary literature concerns the relation among these three books. Although all three are difficult and often obscure, we generally concede that the *Science of Logic* is the most arduous and that the *Phenomenology* is the most convoluted. Accordingly, the *Phenomenology* is good preparation for the *Science of Logic* and the *Encyclopedia* is good preparation for them both. Moreover, if you can read them in German, do it. While they are not clear in any language, they are much clearer in German than in English. This is because Hegel exploits complex interconnections of puns, syntax, vocabularies, cognates, etymologies, neologisms, and circumlocutions which all come more or less naturally in German but which are nearly untranslatable into any other language.

In any given section (§) of the *Encyclopedia*, Hegel says what he has to say usually in its first paragraph, with subsequent paragraphs as notes or glosses. There are two kinds of paragraphs in the *Logic*: the difficult ones which describe the nature of a particular movement (*Bewegung*), and the relatively easy ones which tell us where we are at a particular phase or stage (*Moment*) of the dialectic.

Each philosopher seems to have one basic question. Descartes's is: "Is there any absolutely certain knowledge?" That of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is: "How is X possible?" Hegel's is: "How does X occur?"

The X itself is taken as a given, a "phenomenon" in the pure sense - according to its Greek etymology - of "something which appears." Hence, Hegel's philosophy is a *logos* of *phainomena*, a systematic or rational account of phenomena, i.e., a "phenomenology." The title of his best known work, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (*Phänomenologie des Geistes*), thus indicates a systematic or rational account of the phenomena by which spirit (*Geist*) manifests itself to us through all its phases in history, logic, psychology, art, religion, philosophy, and every other human endeavor. The Logic describes the processes by which we necessarily encounter phenomena and incorporate them for ourselves into rational spirit, to which both they and we already belong, i.e., into the whole, of which both they and we are already parts.

Phenomenology, for Hegel, is *Erfahrungslehre*, i.e., "the science of experience." This German term is to be sharply distinguished from a false cognate, *Erfahrungswissenschaft*, which commonly and almost idiomatically means "empirical science." Philosophy as *Erfahrungswissenschaft* is not really philosophy *per se*, but only a spiritless pseudo-philosophy hanging on the "dead skeleton" (*tote Gebein*) of logic, as Hegel argues in his "Introduction to the General Concept of Logic" (*WL*, vol. 1, pp. 34-35; *SLM*, p. 53; *SLdG*, p. 32). One particular sentence in that Introduction sums up Hegel's entire project with his Logic: "Wie würde ich meinen können, dass nicht die Methode, die ich in diesem Systeme der Logik befolge, - oder vielmehr die dies System an ihm selbst befolgt, - noch vieler Vervollkommnung, vieler Durchbildung im einzelnen fähig sei; aber ich weiss zugleich, dass sie die einzige wahrhafte ist." - "I could not possibly pretend that the method which I follow in this system of Logic - or rather, the method which this system itself follows - is not capable of greater perfection or greater amplification of details; but at the same time I know that it is the only true method" (*WL*, vol. 1, p. 36; *SLM*, p. 54; *SLdG*, p. 33). This sentence is important because it clearly anticipates and refutes those critics and interpreters of Hegel who claim that he intended his system to be complete in itself and closed-ended. The system in fact, on the contrary, with Hegel's emphasis on method rather than result, always remains open-ended. Philosophy is conducted *viva voce* as the diary or rational account of living, ever-changing spirit, and not - regardless of what Hegel says in the preface to the *Philosophy of Right* about the Owl of Minerva taking flight only as dusk begins to fall - as the postmortem examination of dead or perfected spirit. Hegel's system always and consistently leaves open the possibility of veering from or even reversing its current tendency or direction.



1

What is Philosophy? (§§ 1-18)

The first eighteen sections of the *Encyclopedia* are not part of the shorter *Logic* proper, but rather serve as an introduction to the whole book. As such, they should be studied before attempting to read this *Logic*, because, in setting the context of Hegel's philosophical project, they give us a clue of what to expect and thus could make our task of understanding the subsequent text a bit easier.

Hegel begins by arguing against presupposition in philosophy (§ 1). Philosophy cannot presuppose, i.e., accept without examination, its data, its starting point, its method, its goal(s), or its conclusion(s). It can have no axioms. In this it must be more rigorous than even geometry, which is allowed to have at least a few axioms. Philosophy must have none. It cannot even assume thought, feeling, or sensation. Thus, to begin to philosophize, or to find a way or a place in which to begin to philosophize, seems immediately and extraordinarily difficult. Moreover, philosophy and its entire content must be proved, validated through reason, and mediated through spirit. Even when Hegel claims here in § 1 that religion and philosophy have the same content, namely, God and all the finite, natural, and human spiritual phenomena pertaining to God, and that only God, i.e., only the absolute or the whole, is truth, he is not presupposing anything. Rather, he could have written this sentence only after having first gone through the entire logical, phenomenological, spiritual, and philosophical process of unfolding reason to determine that God is absolute truth and the shared content of religion and philosophy. In other words, the assertion that God is truth and that religion and philosophy have the same content but different forms is more like a conclusion than a programmatic declaration, even though it is written in the first paragraph of the exposition. The order of writing and the order of reading are not necessarily the same.

Some interpreters claim that Hegel begins with pure, indeterminate being (which is tantamount to nothing) and ends with the absolute idea at the absolute standpoint (which is tantamount to everything, fully interrelated). If so, then Hegel's Logic has a beginning and an end. Moreover, if it has this beginning and end, then we could look upon pure, indeterminate being/nothing as its presupposition. But Hegel explicitly states, both here and in many places elsewhere, that philosophy cannot have any presuppositions. This apparent dilemma has given rise to another school of Hegel interpretation, anti-foundationalism, which gained ascendancy in the 1970s mostly under the leadership of Richard Dien Winfield, Tom Rockmore, and William Maker. Anti-foundationalism takes Hegel at his word that philosophy, properly conceived and executed, cannot presuppose anything. Thus, the anti-foundationalists argue, Hegel's thought is not linear, but circular, and, like a circle, without beginning or end, so that we can "start" the logical process to expound the absolute idea anywhere on the circle, not just at the particular point on it that happens to be pure, indeterminate being/nothing. Any point will lead to any other. The absolute idea will imply pure, indeterminate being/nothing just as surely as pure, indeterminate being/nothing will imply the absolute idea.

Yet, consider that even the assertion that philosophy has no presuppositions may itself be a presupposition. We may not be able to avoid presuppositions entirely, even if we wish to do so.

If Hegel's Logic, epistemology, and systematic metaphysics are circular, then they constitute a non-vicious circle, as we shall see. If his system is foundational, i.e., if it indeed "begins" with pure, indeterminate being/nothing, then he stands within the tradition of continental rationalism that began with the dualist Descartes, whose monist successor, Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), specifically attempted to model philosophy after geometry, complete with axioms, propositions, theorems, and a deductive apparatus analogous to what we would expect to find in Euclid (ca. 300 B.C.E.). Hegel, even though he was profoundly influenced by Spinoza in many other ways, rejected Spinoza's geometric approach to constructing and presenting philosophy as a system. One may still argue that Hegel's system is somehow foundational, but, if Hegel's system is anti-foundational, then Hegel broke new ground with his Logic, distanced himself not only from continental rationalism, but also from Kantian subject/object dualistic epistemology, and is a true innovator in philosophy.

If philosophy has no presuppositions and does not even know where or how to begin, it can still think (§ 2). Thinking is naturally quite vague as it begins, but it always has promise, insofar as thinking is

what distinguishes humans from animals. (In this connection, § 2 could have been written by Aristotle [384-322 B.C.E.]. Hegel revisits these themes in § 24 *Zusatz* 1.) Moreover, insofar as thinking becomes, step by step, sufficiently disciplined to mediate immediate sensation and to moderate immoderate emotion, thinking becomes capable of acquiring certain knowledge, and thus also distinguishes scientists and philosophers from ordinary humans. With certainty as its goal and fulfillment, so too it seeks unity, in order to overcome internal dissension, partisan disagreement, and irrational belief. But if thinking is "one," i.e., if every path of genuine thinking always leads to the same conclusion, then this is not because of conformity, orthodoxy, "groupthink," or any other external corruption of the integrity of reason; rather, it is because of the nature of proof itself.

Eschewing, as we have said, the "geometric" method of proof favored by Spinoza, Hegel instead looks toward proof via the natural or internal relationships among things, thoughts, phenomena, and even among the relationships themselves, thus ensuring unity and mediation with the full survival of all particulars in the dialectic. What this means should become clearer as we proceed, but for now let us just say that for any given proposition or state of affairs (*Satz*), there arises spontaneously from its own internal nature its opposition or alternative state of affairs (*Gegensatz*), so that there must be either an impasse or a reconciliation (*Versöhnung*) between these two diametrical equals. Their truth is in their reconciliation. The truth of any phase is in the separate component phases of that phase, but especially in the logically subsequent or mediated phase which is the *Aufhebung*, i.e., the preservation, cancellation, and raising to a higher level of all the logically prior phases within it.

Proof is in relationships, but especially in the relationships among relationships. In other words, the internal relationships among things, thoughts, phenomena, and relationships provide their own proof of their own truth. We discover such truth and assimilate such proof through phenomenological analysis, which naturally runs according to the internal Logic of thought. Hegel would agree with Descartes that proof must be rigorous, but would claim that Cartesian reason fails to account for everything that needs to be accounted for. Specifically, Descartes fails to discover any real connection between nature and spirit, but just leaves them hanging, forever separate, dangling precariously from the pineal gland.

The post-Cartesian enterprise of trying to get clear and distinct ideas - with the emphasis on "distinct" - is like trying to keep a wave on the sand. For both Aristotle and Hegel, thoughts are always in the process of being thought, always indicative of thinking going on, or always

and necessarily purely active and dynamic. That is, thinking cannot be fixed or determined as static concepts. Thought is always a moving target - essentially unhittable. For Hegel, if an idea is clear, then it cannot be distinct. A distinct idea would be fixed, isolated, or "abstract," not really an idea at all; but a clear, genuine idea is dynamic, mediated, or "concrete."

Thought, reason, knowledge, certainty, and dialectical Logic all aim at the dynamic, ever-changing, and ever-expanding unity that must characterize and inform the whole, which must be one. But Descartes left two wholes each entire unto itself and disconnected from the other - and this cannot, for Hegel, characterize a complete philosophical system. Cartesian dualism is a dialectical impasse; in it there is no reconciliation between nature and spirit and no *Aufhebung* of body as *res extensa* and mind as *res cogitans*. With no unity of thought and its object, Cartesianism must fail.

Descartes was a foundationalist, perhaps the arch-foundationalist, and if Hegel is an anti-foundationalist, then he argues mainly, albeit mostly implicitly, against Descartes, who used the method of hypothetical doubt to achieve a temporary, heuristic performance of an anti-foundationalist position, but then proceeded instantly from that imaginary anti-foundationalism to discover one solid foundation, namely, "I am, I think, I exist," for every subsequent inference. Hence, for Hegel, "The philosophy of Descartes *proceeds* from ... unproven and unprovable presuppositions" (§ 77; *EL*, p. 123; *HL*, p. 110; *LBD*, p. 124; *Erz.*, p. 100).

If there is thinking, then there is consciousness; and if there is consciousness, then consciousness has content, since thinking requires an object of thought. But what - as Hegel wants to know in § 3 - is the content of consciousness? What are its determinacies (*Bestimmtheiten*). First of all, its content is phenomenological, i.e., it thinks about phenomena, including itself. (The step to *self*-consciousness, to which Descartes immediately proceeds, is, for Hegel, an unwarranted leap and requires instead quite a few intermediate but nearly simultaneous dialectical steps.) As consciousness proceeds in its natural - and indeed its only - activity of thinking, its content, objects, or phenomenological data become determinate as knowledge or cognition (*Erkenntnis*) (§ 4). Eventually its content becomes conceptual, i.e., it elevates knowledge to the high level of the concept (*Begriff*).

To proceed from the vagueness of mere thinking, the immediacy of mere awareness, the "abstractness" of mere receptivity, and the inadequacy of merely felt opinion, toward real knowledge, cognition, ideas, and concepts, we must reflect, meditate, or ruminate upon

whatever phenomena have become the content of our consciousness (§ 5). Hegel calls this important process *Nachdenken*, i.e., literally "thinking after." Through this process, we come to recognize the content of thinking as actuality (*Wirklichkeit*) or reality itself (§ 6). For Hegel, *Nachdenken*, as thinking after the fact, characterizes philosophy (§ 7). He returns to this theme again and again, most notably in the famous "Owl of Minerva" passage, where the owl symbolizes philosophy, taking flight only as daylight fades away from present objects, and able to find its prey only in the dimness of varying shades of gray.

As we reflect and meditate, a quintessential trio of thought-objects presents itself, namely, freedom, spirit, and God (§ 8). Hence we gravitate toward speculative thinking, which is the high-level movement of thought toward the concept, or of subjective, particular, and contingent thought toward objective, universal, and necessary thought (§ 9). Achieving the concept in this way is tantamount to the philosophical cognition of an idea or a universal phenomenon, i.e., we come into contact with the absolute (§ 10). As such, given that human spirit has a need for absolute spirit in order to actualize its full potential as rational spirit, we have a need for philosophy, and even more specifically, for dialectical philosophy (§ 11).

But again, where do we start? What is our best, our natural, our logical, or perhaps even our only possible starting point in philosophy? To answer this crucial question, we must examine the very basic logical structure of the dialectic. This is where Hegel's unique sense - or rather method - of negativity enters (§ 12). Every phenomenon is negated by some other phenomenon; every thought is negated by some other thought. Not that the former is the positive and the latter is the negative, but rather that they are each the negative of the other. Their relationship is symmetrical, not asymmetrical, and no value judgment is implied between the two, to make either one somehow "better" than or "preferable" to the other. Rather, they are equals, and are perhaps best conceived as the two poles of a single opposition (*Gegensatz*). The point is that without such negation or such opposition, the dialectic would have no driving force - and indeed, would not be able to move at all. Thinking and even life itself would be impossible, everything would be null and void, and spirit would not exist.

There are always tensions and oppositions between forms that share the same or similar content, for example, between the immediacy of the street and the mediatedness of the academy, between the emotion of religion and the reason of philosophy, or between the fixedness of being (*Sein*) and the transitoriness of seeming (*Schein*). As these

tensions and oppositions play out in their self-generated dialectic of mutual negation, reconciliation, and *Aufhebung*, spirit manifests itself in the realm of history (§ 13). History is purposive, and proceeds necessarily toward the absolute - albeit not with monolithic, unmitigated, predetermined necessity, as some of Hegel's critics have charged, but with a necessity that necessarily includes contingency, individuality, personality, and the full measure of freedom (§ 14).

Often throughout his corpus, Hegel speaks of the "abstract" universal (*das abstrakte Allgemeine*) and the "concrete" universal (*das konkrete Allgemeine*). The former is an unmediated, indeterminate, and generally subjective absolute, while the latter is a fully mediated, internally differentiated, and self-identical absolute, a unity of the subjective and the objective. Nevertheless, even though indeterminate in itself, the "abstract" universal is still a determinate concept, and thus may be distinguished from the merely vague, or yet to be determined, universal. As Hegel writes in the *Science of Logic*, the genuine, infinite universal, whether "abstract" or "concrete," is the concept (*Begriff*) itself, but the vague universal is only the indeterminate intention to become the concept (*WL*, vol. 2, p. 244; *SLM*, pp. 604-605; *SLdG*, p. 533). History and philosophy alike may be seen as dialectical movement from the vague to the "abstract" and ultimately to the "concrete" universal. Indeed, for Hegel, history and philosophy are intertwined in this way - and in many other ways.

Nevertheless, despite its central historical dimension, Hegelian dialectic is logical or conceptual, not temporal or chronological. All Logic occurs outside time. When time mediates the final standpoint of the Logic, then the transition into nature, history, and spirit occurs. Since the movement does not depend on time, a circle is possible; but if time were necessarily involved in the dialectical process, then no circle would be possible.

So, we return to the circle, and embark upon the Logic. A very important passage at the end of the *Science of Logic* says: "The method is the pure concept, which relates only to itself; the method is therefore *simple self-reference* or self-relation (*Beziehung auf sich*), which is being (*Sein*). But now it is also *fulfilled being* (*erfülltes Sein*), the *self-conceiving concept* (*der sich begreifende Begriff*), being as the 'concrete,' yet utterly *intensive* totality" (*WL*, vol. 2, p. 504; cf. *SLM*, p. 842; *SLdG*, p. 752). Thus we are back to where we started, with pure, universal being. We have come full circle, and the only difference is that universal being was unmediated, internally undifferentiated, empty, and meaningless when we began, but now is fully mediated, internally interrelated with all of itself, fulfilled, complete, absolute, and consummately significant. In other words: "Each of the parts of

philosophy is a philosophical whole, a circle that closes upon itself" (§ 15; *EL*, p. 39; *HL*, p. 20; *LBD*, p. 43; *Enz.*, p. 48).

"The whole presents itself ... as a circle of circles" (§ 15; *EL*, p. 39; *HL*, p. 20; *LBD*, p. 43; *Enz.*, p. 48); i.e., not only is the entire Logic circular, but also, within the dialectic of the Logic, particular processes become circular. As soon as they become circular, Hegel names them.

As the technical terms in Hegel's Logic are divided into (1) names of processes or circular movements, (2) names of one-way movements, and (3) names of the starting and ending points or poles of movements or processes, the following general pattern may be observed: 1 is a process. 3a and 3b are its starting and ending points. The one-way movement from 3a to 3b is 2a. The one-way movement from 3b to 3a is 2b. The never-ending oscillation between 2a and 2b is the process called 1. 2a and 2b are the two complementary aspects of 1.

For example: Finitude (*Endlichkeit*) is a circular process (1).

"Existence," "being-there," or "determinate being" (*Dasein*) and "determinacy" (*Bestimmtheit*) are its starting and ending points (3a and 3b). The one-way movement from *Dasein* to *Bestimmtheit* is "the barrier" or "the limit" (*die Schranke* or *die Grenze*) (2a). The one-way movement from *Bestimmtheit* to *Dasein* is "the ought" (*das Sollen*) (2b). The never-ending oscillation between *die Schranke* / *die Grenze* and *das Sollen* is the process called *Endlichkeit* (1). *Die Schranke* / *die Grenze* and *das Sollen* are the two complementary aspects of *Endlichkeit* (§§ 89-95).

But at the same time, "quality" (*Qualität*) may also be seen as a process, also with *Dasein* and *Bestimmtheit* as its two poles. The one-way movement from *Dasein* to *Bestimmtheit* is "negation" (*Negation*). The one-way movement from *Bestimmtheit* to *Dasein* is "isolation" (*Isolieren* or *Vereinzelung*). The never-ending oscillation between *Negation* and *Isolieren* is the process called *Qualität*. *Negation* and *Isolieren* / *Vereinzelung* are the two complementary aspects of *Qualität* (§§ 90-92).

Another way to regard *Endlichkeit* as a process is that something (*Etwas*) and its other (*Anderes*) are the starting and ending points of this process. The one-way movement from something to its other is negation (*Negation*). The one-way movement from this other to its own other, i.e., to something, is likewise negation. The never-ending oscillation between these alternating dialectical negations is the process called *Endlichkeit*. These reciprocal negations are the two complementary aspects of *Endlichkeit* (§§ 92-95). Paradoxically, because this process is infinite and because this oscillation is eternal, these reciprocal negations are also the two complementary aspects of

infinity (*Unendlichkeit*) - but here that is beside the point.

Whenever we consider any circle in the system, the whole system becomes larger. That is, any thought about any part of process becomes part of the whole process. In other words, whenever we move from one phase to the next, having come to believe that the former is fixed and absolute in its place, that former process reveals itself as still unfixed, relative, and active, playing a dynamic part in the latter. We cannot consider the absolute, i.e., the "non-relative," without considering it as relative - either to itself, to something else, or to whatever might be contained within it.

We still must ask, with what, if anything, must philosophy begin? Or may it begin with anything at all? Or does it even have to begin somewhere? Could we not instead just leap into it anywhere, *in medias res*? Paradoxically, we cannot begin until we have understood the whole and internalized the concept (§ 17). Yet starting at any point on the circle - or on any of the contained dialectical circles - as if it were the beginning or the "foundation" of the system has the advantage that understanding any bit of it could trigger an understanding of the whole. Thus we build philosophy as systematic knowledge or rigorous science (*Wissenschaft*), not mere airy speculation or a pretentious exchange of erudite opinions among scholars who really should find something more useful to do (§ 16).

Then, is Hegel's Logic really a logic or a philosophy of logic? This question might be analogous to asking whether John Cage's music is really music or a philosophy of music. What we want to know is whether Hegel's Logic is about the foundations, prerequisites, or presuppositions of logic *qua* critical thinking. If so, then Hegel's Logic might be a metalogic rather than, like Aristotle's, just a logic.

In § 18, Hegel presents the topics of the whole *Encyclopedia* as a threefold schema:

1. Logic: the systematic knowledge of the idea in and for itself.
2. Nature: the idea in its otherness.
3. Spirit: the idea having returned out of its otherness into itself.

As we see in "The Philosophy of Spirit," the third part of the *Encyclopedia*, spirit (*Geist*) is the infinite circular process or oscillation between Logic and nature, conceived as poles. Even at the "end" of the philosophy of spirit, even from the highest, most intricately mediated phase of the system, the absolute idea, absolute spirit, the "concrete" universal, we naturally return to the "beginning" of the Logic, of all philosophy, of all thought - or to the shared content of religion and philosophy: God. Accordingly, Hegel gives the last words in the

Encyclopedia, not to himself, but to one of the true founders of philosophy and science, Aristotle: "The best thinking is self-thinking that thinks of itself and for itself ... This is actuality (*energeia*) ... the best contemplation ... the life of the intellect ... eternal life ... the best life ... This is God" (*Metaphysics*, 1072b 18-30).



2

The Logic as a System of Philosophy (§§ 19-25)

Hegel's Logic is not a logic in the formal and restricted sense in which that term is usually understood, as the science or the art of reasoning. It has a far larger scope, embracing as it does a complete system of philosophy in itself. This is what Hegel means when he begins § 19 by defining "logic" as "the systematic knowledge of the pure idea (*die Wissenschaft der reinen Idee*)." Philosophy, according to Hegel, is a systematic knowledge (*Wissenschaft*) of things in a setting of thoughts; it is the science (*Wissenschaft*) of the universe as it is interpreted by thought, and as it has significance for the mind or spirit (*Geist*) which observes the wealth of its varied manifestations. The intelligence (*Geist*) which contemplates the universe finds therein a similar, if not identical, intelligence revealing itself, as face answers face in a mirror. That intelligence which characterizes the observing mind and the world which is the object of the observation are one and the same. In order to understand the essential features of Hegel's system, it is necessary to appreciate at the beginning the fundamental characteristics of the intelligence which constitutes its center and core.

Thought thinks. "Thought" is sometimes *Gedanke* (singular), sometimes *Gedanken* (plural), and sometimes *Denken* (gerund). That is, sometimes "thought" is "thoughts" and sometimes it is "thinking." "Thinking," the dynamic gerund, seems to have ascendancy over "thought" or "thoughts," the relatively static nouns. Pure thought is thinking spirit (*denkender Geist*) in the constant and infinite act of thinking - i.e., creating, defining, and sustaining - its own self as spirit. In other

words, pure thought is spirit thinking its own essence. That is, for Hegel, self-thinking spirit is similar in some ways to Aristotle's divine mind (*nous*) as self-thinking thought (*noêsis noêseôs*), the main difference being that Aristotle's universal mind is just the transcendent final cause of everything while Hegel's is more broadly conceived, is both immanent and transcendent, and indeed is everything, not just its cause. As if to underscore this point, Hegel concludes the *Encyclopedia* with that lengthy quotation from Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, Lambda, Chapter 7.

Accordingly, *Geist* is the most general subject matter of the Logic, just as it is also of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

With Hegel, thought, whether manifested in the activity of mind or revealed in the order and harmony of the universe, has four distinctive features:

First, it is essentially active and never passive. The mind is not to be seen as a plastic medium upon which impressions are produced by the varied stimulation of the several senses. The mind is not a photographic plate to hold whatever may be printed on it and then to give back on demand whatever it may have received. Thought is the rather to be conceived as a force, a dynamic center. Its function is constructive. The creative and sustaining source of the universe is a thought force; and the thought activity, which we are conscious of exercising, partakes of the same nature.

The second function of thought is to cancel, preserve, and raise to a higher dialectical level the crude material given by the senses into a systematic body of knowledge. Out of a chaos of sensations, perceptions, feelings, and the like, thought builds up an orderly cosmos. To extend the figure already employed, thought interprets the world in a series of portraits rather than photographs. Just as an interpretation of a person by means of a portrait always involves an ideal element, so in the interpretation of the world of thought there is always an ideal element. But the introduction of an ideal element does not render the interpretation unreal. On the contrary, when a superficial view of the world gives place to a deeper insight, or when thought, like an overarching creative spirit, broods over it, then we may be persuaded that the change which thought produces might bring us nearer to the heart and truth of things themselves.

It is of the nature of thought in the third place to seek the universal significance of every particular experience which confronts it. Animals live, move, and have their being amid particular experiences; but they do not possess the capacity of reflecting on these experiences, or they possess this capacity in a very restricted manner. Reflection, which is

the characteristic mode of thought, especially speculative thought, may be defined as the reference of a particular experience to its appropriate universal. Humans, as reflective animals, alone possess this power of seeing things in their universal aspect. We often say that humans differ from other animals in being endowed with a conceptual capacity, i.e., the capacity to form universal ideas. Thus when we say, "This is a man, a dog, a horse, etc.," we are simply referring the particular object of perception, which occupies the center of the field of vision for the moment, to the appropriate class, group, or kind to which it belongs. Such a group, kind, or class idea is a "concept" (*Begriff*), and always has universal significance. All of our assertions contain some such reference to a universal. Moreover, language itself, as the vehicle of thought, is a system of symbols which represent universal ideas, and which thought employs for the purpose of a complete characterization of particular experiences, which must remain without meaning until they are properly interpreted in the light of their universal relations - and interrelations among themselves. This interpretive process is what Hegel calls "mediation" (*Vermittlung*).

In the fourth place, every thought reference carries with it a self-consciousness, or a consciousness of the "I," the person who makes the reference. Yet this "I" is not Cartesian. Every conscious thought process, however simple, or however relatively unimportant, is in itself the declaration of a free personality (§ 23). Wherever there is thought, there is personality, according to Hegel's fundamental dictum. Therefore the intelligence which is so variously manifested in the world about us indicates an all-embracing "I," which is the great universal and to which all separate "I"s are to be referred as individuals to their corresponding genus. Such an "I," as a cosmic center, gives unity to the activities of all persons throughout the universe, comprehending all in one system, which, in every part, however minute, is characterized by intelligence.

Given this nature of thought in general as a dynamic, constructive, interpretive, and personal force, we will now examine its functions more in detail. Occupying as it does the central place in Hegel's system, it is necessary at the outset to understand fully Hegel's conception of thought activity. Obviously, thought manifests its activity in numerous ways. In the reference of each individual experience to its appropriate universal there is an incalculable number of universals, as various as the manifold possibilities of the world of experience itself. In this connection, a question naturally suggests itself, one which is also among the fundamental problems of philosophy: Are there not in thought a certain number of

comprehensive universals, to which all others may be referred, and which serve to mark off well-defined areas of knowledge or modes of thought, so that, when we speak of the world of knowledge, these divisions may be seen as constituting the great continents of thought?

Such large divisions of our knowledge are called categories or "thought determinations" (*Denkbestimmungen*). The original meaning of "category" is found in the Greek infinitive *katêgorein*, to predicate. That is, categories are possible ways in which we can predicate various attributes of any subject, so that together they may form natural classifications of the most comprehensive themes of our thinking. They suggest different ways in which the mind can view the world of experience. They are to be seen as typical modes of thought.

In many respects, in order to understand Hegel in general and Hegel's Logic in particular, we must go back to Aristotle. As an illustration, we may take the table of the categories, outlined by Aristotle, as follows:

1. Substance.
2. Quantity.
3. Quality.
4. Relation.
5. Action.
6. Passion (i.e., the object of action).
7. Where (i.e., space).
8. When (i.e., time).
9. Posture.
10. Habit.

When we have described anything as regards its substance, how large it is, what its nature is, its relations to other things, how it acts, how it is acted upon, its spatial and temporal conditions, its location in space and time, its posture, its force, and its habit, then we may well have nearly exhausted the possibilities of its description.

Hegel's system of philosophy as contained in his Logic may be appropriately styled a natural history of the categories, being essentially an exposition of their nature, their relations, and the mode of their development. The main theories of the Logic concerning the categories may be summarized as follows:

The categories are not to be seen as separate or isolated points of view. They sustain reciprocal relations in such a way that, together, they form a single, harmonious system. Moreover, this system resembles a series, in which, in general, various terms may be grouped in order of their progressive complexity, with the first term the simplest and succeeding terms more and more complex. Each term also contains at least two kinds of aspects - the explicit or "for itself"

(für sich) and the implicit or "in itself" (*an sich*). Explicitly, for itself, every term is the result of all the terms which precede it, but implicitly, in itself, it is the potential of all which are to follow. As such, the for itself is typically mediated (*vermittelt*), at least partially, while the in itself may be quite unmediated or immediate (*unmittelbar*). Whenever Hegel encounters a term, he likes to isolate it heuristically, identify and define its relations, determine it fully, then move on. Intricate analysis of the actual meaning of each term characterizes Hegel's approach to philosophy.

It is the nature of both thought itself and ideas, i.e., things as interpreted by thought, that when we start at the lowest or simplest category, where knowledge is reduced to a minimum, i.e., the least that can possibly be predicated of anything, the mind naturally tends toward passing onward and upward, as it were, to a higher, more complex category, a higher level of thought, in order to complete the trajectory, repair the defects, and remove the limitations of the lower, and so on, until the highest possible category is reached, the one which will comprehend and explain all the others. This movement (*Bewegung*) of thought is called dialectic. It is occasioned by the circumstance of the mind revolving about itself in the sphere of a single category and being typically confronted by two disquieting considerations or alternatives. It is never satisfied with a partial result, and will not tolerate a contradiction or inconsistency. Hence arises the natural, inner obligation to interpret phenomena, the content of consciousness, by transcending the limits of this single category, i.e., a partial or one-sided point of view, in order to overcome its defects and contradictions. This progressive movement of thought is the distinctive feature of Hegel's method of constructing his system of philosophy. Following Plato (427-347 B.C.E.), Hegel equates thought with being. Hence the movement of thought is the movement of being. In other words, both thought and being are dialectical. The movement of being (*Sein*) is becoming (*Werden*); that of essence (*Wesen*) is reflection; and that of the concept (*Begriff*) is "particularization" (*Besonderung*), "individuation," or "isolation" (*Vereinzelung*).

The term "dialectic" originated in ancient Greek philosophy, probably with Zeno the Eleatic (5th century B.C.E.), and it has been made familiar in the teachings of Socrates (470?-399 B.C.E.) and the dialogues of Plato. The latter recall to mind a picture of two disputants, one maintaining a proposition, the other opposing it, while out of the discussion there emerges a more exact and adequate statement of truth. This is, in effect, also the method of Hegel: the examination of a positive statement, or position (*Satz*), which is

confronted by a contrary or negative statement, alternative, or opposition (*Gegensatz*), and out of this confrontation there results a new statement or position (*aufgehobener Satz*), one which has now been *aufgehoben*, i.e., cancelled from its old configuration, preserved in its essential features, and raised to a higher dialectical level, which is a resolution of the existing contradiction on a higher plane of thought. On the same level or from the same point of view contradictory statements must ever remain obstinately irresoluble. Only in a higher sense, through dialectical scrutiny, can they be seen as half-truths combining to form an entire truth - at their proper level. Such a resolution (*Aufhebung*), therefore, always represents a progress in thought, an advance to a higher point of view, a more comprehensive survey, a deeper insight, a wider prospect. Sometimes, however, this progress or advance may appear as a penultimate retrograde motion.

But what, according to Hegel, its author, is going on in the Logic? Is he its inventor or its discoverer? Does he really "construct" it or is it a natural sequence which he is merely describing? Does the system work - and if so, how? Does it proceed according to finite human reason or infinite universal reason? Is the Logic pre-existent in any Platonic sense? Is it fixed and inexorable for all eternity and in all situations or does the process of the self-unfolding of *Geist* require any revisions from time to time? In order to understand the dialectical method, we must carefully consider the following observations:

In any dialectical triad, the first aspect, the position, Hegel designates as the manifestation of the "abstract" understanding; the second, the opposition, which represents of the incompleteness or inadequacy of the first by showing its obverse side and its internal contradictions, Hegel depicts as the manifestation of negating reason; the third, the resolution or *Aufhebung* of the two, he reveals as the speculative aspect, or the manifestation of reconciling reason.

The terms which are here employed - the "abstract" understanding, negating reason, and reconciling reason - are each used in senses peculiar to Hegel. There is a fundamental distinction drawn between "abstract" and "concrete," a distinction which runs through Hegel's entire philosophical system. "Abstract" is used always in the sense of a one-sided or partial view of something. "Concrete," on the other hand, indicates a comprehensive view of something, which includes all possible considerations as to the nature of the thing itself, its origin, the relations that it sustains, and its setting or context, all fully interrelated.

The first of these three aspects is referred to also as the product of the understanding (*Verstand*); the second and third, as those of negating

and reconciling reason (*Vernunft*) respectively. Hegel (like Plato, Aristotle, and Kant before him) evidently draws a distinction between understanding and reason. Hegel does not intend to leave the impression, however, that there is a certain definite faculty of the mind which we call the understanding, and still another, quite distinct, which we call reason. Such a view fails wholly to grasp his meaning. He maintains that the mind works, as it were, on two levels - a "lower," the understanding, which deals only with particulars, and a "higher," reason, which interrelates particulars under the aspect of the universal - yet are one and the same mind. In the lower, certain considerations are overlooked which are the characteristic and essential features of the higher. Also in the lower, the mind employs one of its functions to the exclusion of the rest, namely, that of discrimination, the seeing of things in their differences and thus as distinct, separate, or isolated - not in relation to other things or to the unitary system which embraces them all.

So, while the function of the understanding may be seen as a process of differentiation, i.e., dissecting and analyzing in order to understand specific things, that of reason is essentially a process of integration, i.e., creating an overarching grasp of not only the relationships among phenomena, but also the relationships among these relationships, all under the aegis of the universal. In § 24 *Zusatz* 1, Hegel reprises from § 2 the idea that animals and humans alike can feel, perceive, react, and understand, but only humans can think. Hence reason, the capacity for thought, expressed in discursive language, is the defining characteristic that distinguishes humans from animals. Reason is the synthesizing power of thought. It is the putting together of things in their natural relationships according to their natural logic. Yet reason also takes note of the differences which exist in the world of experience, and this makes it capable of apprehending any unity which may underlie these differences. It sees things not as apart or separate, but as cohering in natural systems, distinct systems which, by themselves, according to their own internal logic, form one all-comprehending system, the universe itself.

Evidently, therefore, the understanding and reason are not necessarily antithetical or antagonistic. The work of the understanding is preliminary and complementary to that of reason. Wherever they seem to be antagonistic, as they often do in the *Logic*, it is not Hegel's own view of the understanding, but a false, popular, or misleading view of the understanding, which is the object of Hegel's scorn, namely, a view which sees the functions of the understanding as complete in themselves, needing no further or higher operation of the mind to supplement or correct them, as if the understanding were the

only aspect of the mind that mattered.

It is the office of negating reason to make manifest the limitations of the understanding and the contradictions which every one-sided or partial view of things necessarily involves. The office of reconciling reason, on the other hand, is to make good the defects which negating reason reveals. In this connection, Hegel employs two technical terms which appear frequently as he develops his system: "negation" and "absolute negation." Negation is the process by which negating reason denies the primary position by revealing its internal contradiction. Absolute negation in turn overcomes this contradiction by asserting its denial and involving a higher point of view. This is almost but not quite equivalent to the standard grammatical double negative - *duplex negatio affirmat* - the negation of a negation, which always has the force of an affirmation. In Latin, German, French, and English grammar, and in traditional logic, $\neg(\neg X) = X$, but in Hegelian Logic, $\neg(\neg X)$ exists at a higher level than X . The process of negating X , then of negating the negation of X , has a qualitative effect on X , which transforms X , or cancels, preserves, and raises X to a higher dialectical level. So, usually for Hegel, $\neg(\neg X) > X$, although there are a few regressive dialectical movements in which $\neg(\neg X) < X$. The point is that this Hegelian double negation process never leads to a static result on the same dialectical level, but either, and usually, to a progressive, dialectically higher, and more fully mediated phase or, occasionally, to a penultimately lower phase as the dialectic temporarily or strategically regresses in order to achieve eventual mediation.

The three steps of the dialectic, therefore, are affirmation, negation, then the negation of this negation, which is itself an affirmation. We may observe, moreover, that Hegel uses the term "dialectic" in two senses, a general sense in which it designates the threefold process of thought as a whole, which we have just outlined, and a special sense when it is applied only to the second or negative stage of the process - the limiting of an original statement or position by revealing its contradiction.

The opposition which, both in thought and in general reality, opposes the primary position, is not a chance confronting of one state of affairs by another which just happens to oppose it. The contradiction is never external, artificial, or arbitrary, but grows out of the very nature of the original thought or situation itself. Every one-sided thought thus necessarily entails its own contradiction. From the very fact that it is finite and hence incomplete, it must at some point or other prove inadequate, and therefore collapse under its own weight. It can neither support nor justify itself. To use Hegel's own illustration (§ 81 *Zusatz* 1), we say that humans are mortal, and seem to think that the

ground of this mortality lies in the external circumstances that constantly surround and menace us; but the truth of the matter is that life, in its very nature, involves the germ of death; so, the life of any finite creature, being naturally and essentially at war with itself, works its own dissolution. The finite as such is self-contradictory. It goes to its limit and stops.

Hegel notes in the same *Zusatz* that this feature of the dialectic may be seen in the common proverb and legal principle, *summum jus, summa injuria* (the greatest law, the greatest injustice). That is, to push an "abstract" right to its extreme is to entail its contradiction and to pass insensibly over to it, thus in reality causing injustice rather than justice. He also here draws attention to the facts that, in the sphere of politics, extreme anarchy passes over into its opposite, extreme despotism, and that, in the sphere of ethics, these two proverbs attest the same general principle: "Pride goes before a fall" and "Too much wit outwits itself."

The dialectic finds further illustration in the history of philosophy itself, wherein each of the various systems of thought is confronted by its opposed system, so that, out of the ensuing controversies, there emerge more nearly complete systems, which combine the truth and discard the errors that each of the conflicting pairs of systems had contained. Such processes are repeated again and again in the gradual development of the fullness of truth, which only centuries of controversy and experience are able to reveal.

We have referred to the method by which Hegel proposes to construct the world of knowledge, and to show how each part is related to each other part throughout, and all parts to the whole in a progressive development wherein every advance marks a growing completeness of knowledge. But this is only half of Hegel's system. He also maintains, as one of the cardinal points of his philosophy, that the laws of thought are the same as the laws of things and phenomena, and that the categories of thought correspond precisely to the determining characteristics of things and phenomena. This means that rational, systematic thought is, for Hegel, equivalent to the true philosophy of all being. Thus epistemology, the theory of knowledge, and ontology, the theory of being, are one and the same; the secret of the mind is the secret of the universe. Humans as finite, temporal, rational beings are, by virtue of their existence as spirit, veritable microcosms of infinite, eternal being. The ancient Hindu dictum, "Know yourself and you know everything," is likewise expressed in Hegel's motto from the preface to his *Philosophy of Right*, "The actual (*wirklich*) is rational (*vernünftig*), and the rational is actual." This is also in accord with the theory of Spinoza, who affirms that "the order and concatenation of

ideas is the same as the order and concatenation of things" (*Ethics*, II, prop. 7).

Insofar as Hegel regards the cosmos and all cosmic and spiritual processes as manifestations of universal reason, therefore Logic, in Hegel's special sense, is equivalent to metaphysics, also in Hegel's special sense (§ 24). That is, what is real in thought is also real in the world, else the thought would be false, fictional, or irrational; and vice versa, what is real in the world is also thinkable in the realm of spirit, else the world would be chimerical, alien, and untrustworthy. Moreover, it is of the essence of reason to manifest itself in the objective world. Thus objective thoughts within the dialectic correspond to this objective world of phenomena, connection, and overarching rationality. (Readers interested in this aspect of Hegel's thought may wish to consult Ivan Soll, *An Introduction to Hegel's Metaphysics* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969].)

Reason has two sides - thought and force (*Kraft*), one a rational and the other a dynamic essence - and these two are one and the same. Reason is to be regarded, therefore, as underlying all thoughts, things, and phenomena. In the physical world, the laws of phenomena that find expression in mathematical formulas represent the thought side of reason, while the phenomena themselves are just the particular manifestations of these laws, the dynamic and perhaps "abstract" actualizations of the "concrete" reason implicit in them. Every individual thing and phenomenon in the universe must be seen as having some universal law or principle of reason as the very root and substance of its being, attributes, and activities. There is a movement from "determining" (*Bestimmen*), the active process, to "determinacy" (*Bestimmtheit*), the fixed product of this process, and back again. This reciprocal movement creates phenomena. The universal principle of reason is the creative and constructive force of the universe. It is seen in the architectonic principle which is the life of plants, the creative and sustaining power of animals, the spirit of humans, the formation of human character, the establishing of institutions, the building of monuments, the spectacle and trajectory of history, and the development of religion, the state, the arts and sciences, and culture (*Bildung*) in general.

Hegel calls this principle of reason the *Begriff*. To convey its full significance is not easily possible in English, especially with the original standard rendering of the term as "notion." Rather, we render it here with the newer standard, "concept." It is still necessary, however, to enlarge our usual connotation of "concept," so that, as a near equivalent for *Begriff*, it can signify this universal principle of reason which is active in all thought, all things, and all phenomena.

Let us examine a few passages from the *Logic* in order that at the beginning we may form a correct idea of Hegel's own interpretation of the term:

"... the concept is the principle of all life, and hence, at the same time, it is what is utterly 'concrete'." (§ 160 *Zusatz*; *EL*, p. 236; *HL*, p. 223; *LBD*, p. 233; *Enz.*, p. 151)

"The concept dwells within the things themselves, it is that through which they are what they are." (§ 166 *Zusatz*; *EL*, p. 245; *HL*, p. 232; *LBD*, p. 242; *Enz.*, pp. 155-156)

"... the logical ... forms of the concept ... are *the living spirit of actuality*, and whatever is true of whatever is actual is *true only by virtue of these forms, through them, and in them.*" (§ 162; *EL*, p. 239; *HL*, p. 226; *LBD*, p. 236; *Enz.*, p. 152; Hegel's emphasis; translations modified)

Sometimes Hegel's operational terms are best translated as gerunds, even if they do not have, or even if Hegel does not use, a gerundive form in German. For example, even though *Begriff* means "concept," sometimes it and its context can be illuminated by translating it as "conceiving."

What kinds of meanings, language, or categories can be applied not only to things and phenomena in the world, but also to concepts themselves, or to the concept itself? It is obvious that Hegel's system is an idealism, i.e., it holds that thought is the ultimate reality. More specifically, it is an absolute idealism, i.e., it holds that universal thought is the ultimate reality, as opposed to the subjective idealism of either George Berkeley (1685-1753) or Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), which each hold that individual thought or personal perception is the ultimate reality. But what does this mean? In Hegel's system, the inexorable, universal force is to be regarded, through all its various phases, as the sequential manifestations of all-embracing reason, and all history is to be seen as an evolution of this reason in the progressive unfolding of its inner activity. But does this process move toward otherworldly salvation, thisworldly utopia, both, neither, or some other outcome?

Shortly after Hegel's death in 1831, divergent interpretations of his philosophies of religion and history divided his followers into two camps that became known by the end of the 1830s as the "Old" or "Right" Hegelians and the "Young" or "Left" Hegelians. The former saw Hegel's thought as tending toward elucidating the traditional truths of Christianity and as pointing ultimately toward God as the "concrete" universal, the fully mediated absolute, or even perhaps a sort of Spinozistic substance or a philosophical version of the Christian

Trinity. The latter, on the other hand, discounted or dismissed the involvement of God in Hegel's system and instead adopted a more practical worldview, concentrating on history and social ethics, seeing Hegel's writings and lectures as either containing or foreshadowing a blueprint for the historical logic of social progress. The Left Hegelians believed that history was precisely the movement of absolute spirit, and that part of their duty as philosophers was to try to influence this movement for the greater good of society, or to try to ensure sociopolitical and socioeconomic progress. But, according to the Right Hegelians, insofar as Hegel's idealism is an absolute idealism, therefore the underlying and overarching universal reason, the creative and sustaining principle of all things, remains always perfectly one and the same, from which nothing can be taken and to which nothing can be added, even amid all its variety of manifestations. This reason is completely unconditioned and independent, without beginning and without end. It is, therefore, the universal, eternal absolute, i.e., God.

Hegel calls the highest manifestation of this principle of reason the idea (*die Idee*), wishing to indicate by a single word that the supreme power of the universe is neither mechanical nor material, but essentially rational and spiritual. The idea, the absolute, and God are often seen as generally synonymous terms, which Hegel seems to use interchangeably, with little shade of distinction in their meaning. But in fact, for Hegel, the idea is the concept combined with either reality or objectivity. What that means becomes clear only as we work through the whole system. Let it suffice now to say that the absolute and God may be identical for Hegel, but if so, then this absolute is a Spinozistic God; and the idea is quite different from them, though closely related to them.

In expounding his system, Hegel endeavors to show that the world of knowledge unfolds by the inner constraint of its own dialectic, from its simplest beginnings through more and more complex stages, until it reaches complete fulfillment in the all-embracing absolute. But, even though the absolute is the consummation of the process as a whole, nevertheless, as the creative and sustaining principle of reason itself, the absolute must also be the beginning of the process, must underlie every succeeding stage of the process, and must be implicit within each of these stages. Paradoxically, within the system, going forward is the same as going backward, but at the same time, going forward is not the same as going backward. If both of these assertions, which naturally contradict each other, are true within the system, then how can the system be consistent or coherent? How can it reflect time or history? The answer is that the system's - and all reality's - consistency and coherence stems from the absolute's intimate presence

in each and every phase, stage, form, or manifestation of spirit within the system. Every cross section of this evolutionary process reveals some phase of the absolute, albeit incomplete, and thus, if taken by itself, misleading. Yet even so, each phase, however isolated, remains an unmistakable manifestation of the divine reason which is its ground and justification. Thus Hegel can define the absolute as the essence of all being in general, as cause, as law in the physical universe, and as consciousness, purpose, beneficence, justice, etc., in the realm of mind or spirit. From this point of view, Hegel's system may be characterized as the progressive revelation of the absolute, or, if we prefer, God.

A natural, common, but inadequate mode of thinking, or rather, perhaps better said, perceiving, is to imagine pictures in our minds. The German word for this kind of thinking, *vorstellen*, means to think pictorially rather than conceptually, and the corresponding noun, *Vorstellung*, is variously translated in Hegelian texts as "representation," "picture thinking," or "mental imagery." Ideas formed in this way are immediate and vivid, but episodic and disconnected, and thus ultimately subjective, i.e., incapable of the universal. They are either visual or analogous to visual. They are in fact impressions rather than genuine ideas, which must be formulated in language, not as images. As such, for Hegel, mental images are dialectically unproductive and, if we allow them, they prevent us from aspiring to the conceptual by keeping us in a wallow of sensations, emotions, and imprecise, poorly supported beliefs.

The difference between *Vorstellung* and *Begriff* is like that between feeling and thinking, or between the mere impression, however intense, and the solid idea, however complicated. Whereas a *Vorstellung* is immediate, detached, insular, and "abstract," a *Begriff* is mediated, connected, related, and "concrete." The visual content of the mind cannot be meaningfully interrelated, but the discursive content can, just by virtue of being composed of precisely defined words, and thus alone can aspire to constitute accurate and comprehensive knowledge rather than mere belief. Hegel states (§ 20) that one of the main purposes of philosophy is to transform mental images first into thoughts, then into concepts, i.e., to transform "abstract" impressions first into precise, discursive terms, then into coherent ideas that can be expressed clearly and interrelated fully in language. For Hegel, nothing is ineffable. Moreover, if one picture is worth 10,000 words, then Hegel will prefer the 10,000 words, being interrelated and discursive, to the picture, being merely immediate and sensory.

The way in which either philosophy or common consciousness in general moves from mental images, impressions, feelings, beliefs, and

other immediate data to thoughts, concepts, ideas, and other mediated knowledge is a process that Hegel calls *Nachdenken*, i.e., meditation, reflection, or just "thinking it over" (§ 21; *EL*, p. 52; *HL*, p. 33; *LBD*, p. 54; *Enz.*, p. 56). The prefix, *nach*, which means "after," is significant. Thinking always occurs after perception. This again recalls the "Owl of Minerva" passage in the *Philosophy of Right*, where Hegel asserts that thinking always arrives on the scene after the fact - or ought to. Philosophy cannot - and should not - proceed without data. Thinking (*Denken*), especially reflective thinking or contemplation (*Nachdenken*), creates out of mere phenomena the content (*Inhalt*) of the philosophical consciousness, i.e., it changes the raw, disconnected data of perception into that which alone can generate the conceptual world of interconnected knowledge (§ 22). This process of *Nachdenken* is its own result; i.e., both the activity (*Wirkung*) and the actuality (*Wirklichkeit*) of thought constitute serenity. The whole movement of thought from *Vorstellung* to *Begriff* is from inadequacy to adequacy.

Hegel's method of exposition in general may be summarized, therefore, as an attempt to show the various stages of development in the manifestation of the principle of reason as a growing revelation of the absolute in such a way that every stage by itself is partial and thus involves its own contradiction. Yet these contradictions contain common elements by which, from more comprehensive points of view, they may be reconciled and combined. With new each rung of advantage gained in the progress of thought on the ladder to the absolute, there is disclosed a new contradiction, again to be resolved on a higher dialectical level by earnest consideration and penetrating insight, and so on, onward and upward through every stage of the process until spirit achieves absolute knowledge, where alone is found no unmediated contradiction and no unfulfilled incompleteness. The logical process and its underlying ontological ground are one. Any element in the process receives its full significance only in the light of the whole, once the whole is comprehended "concretely" in all its internal and interrelated manifestations. Then and only then is the coinciding truth (*Wahrheit*) of both Logic and spirit revealed in objective thoughts (§ 25). Truth for Hegel means always the knowledge which embraces its object from all possible sides and in all its possible relations as the complete expression of the eternal reason which underlies it. This is a thought akin to that of the old Hebrew poet and philosopher, the author of Psalm 36, who said, "In thy light shall we see light," and that of the later Hebrew, Spinoza, who so constantly insisted that everything is known only if it is viewed *sub specie aeternitatis*.



3

The Various Attitudes of Thought Toward the Objective World: Metaphysical Systems (§§ 26-36)

The fundamental insight and inspiration of Hegel's system of philosophy is that universal reason dominates all thoughts and all things (§ 24). It is necessary, therefore, at the very beginning to appreciate the inherent relationship between thoughts and things in general (§ 25), or more specifically, between the thinking mind and the objective world. In order to understand fully Hegel's attitude of thought to the objective world, the world which furnishes us the raw materials of knowledge, and of which we ourselves - though indeed free individuals - are but a phase and a component, it will be worthwhile to examine somewhat in detail the theories of other philosophical systems upon this subject in the light of Hegel's criticism of them. Their divergence from the Hegelian system will serve by contrast to mark the characteristic features of that system itself. There are four typical views of the relation of the thinking subject to the objective world - as follows:

1. Metaphysical systems (§§ 26-36).
2. Empirical schools (§§ 37-39).
3. Critical philosophy (§§ 40-60).
4. The theory of intuitive or immediate knowledge (§§ 61-78).

The first of these attitudes of thought regards the external world as perfectly pictured in a certain type of thought. This attitude is, for Hegel, "naive" (§ 26; *EL*, p. 65; *HL*, p. 47; *LBD*, p. 67; *Enz.*, p. 59). The question is not raised - except in connection with the epistemological considerations which sometimes accompany such metaphysics - about the difficulty of passing from the object which is perceived to the thinking subject which perceives it. The way is simply believed to be open and free. The objective reality of the outer, or physical, world is just assumed as a matter of fact. The testimony of the senses is taken as unquestionable. It is the standpoint of naive realism, "the mere

understanding" (§ 27; *EL*, p. 65; *HL*, p. 48; *LBD*, p. 68; *Enz.*, p. 60), which rests on the assumption that all things are in their essence what they seem to us to be in our most sophisticated perceptions of them.

As usual, Hegel names few names. Nevertheless, it is fairly clear that his target in this section is the consummate rationalism of the Leibniz-Wolff School and, to a lesser extent, the hierarchical systems of the Middle Ages, e.g., that of Thomas Aquinas (1225?-1274). In the German-speaking world, and throughout much of the rest of Europe, in the few generations just before Kant launched his "Copernican Revolution" in philosophy, Leibniz-Wolff metaphysics was required study in universities. Baron Christian von Wolff (1679-1754) had created a universal system within a formalized structure - which must have been very attractive to the encyclopedic mentality of the Enlightenment - by applying a rigorous determinism and deductivism to the thought of Gottfried Wilhelm Freiherr von Leibniz (1646-1716). As Wolff's determinism came to be interpreted more and more in the light of pious Christianity, and as Wolff himself grew more and more under the influence of Scholastic philosophy, his system was accepted as orthodox by crowned heads from Naples to St. Petersburg. Yet Wolff remains but a minor figure in the whole history of philosophy. Perhaps his philosophical epitaph was best written by Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) in *A History of Western Philosophy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), p. 595: "Leibniz is a dull writer, and his effect on German philosophy was to make it pedantic and arid. His disciple Wolf[f], who dominated the German universities until the publication of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* [in 1781], left out whatever was most interesting in Leibniz, and produced a dry professorial way of thinking." (Russell's book should not be taken as either a source of information about Western philosophy or even a serious attempt at a history, but rather, only intellectual entertainment, a clever, subjective - and often humorous - commentary.)

In Hegel's view, a natural result of such systems and their methods of interpreting the world of experience was that "abstract" and empty phrases, subtle and overly elaborate metaphysical distinctions, in short, the special terminology of these systems, came to be used instead of the living words which were actually more appropriate to describe living experience. No wonder that philosophy became as sterile and dry as dust when the truth of reality was officially expressed only in the desiccated formulas of contrived metaphysical speculation. That is to say, the real world of living experience was forced, in a purely artificial and arbitrary manner, into metaphysical molds. These molds were cast with no consideration for the patterns which the real world might have provided. They were fashioned according to both the caprice of speculation and the demands of

certain postulates of thought, which had no basis in reality.

In respect to all this, Hegel's own contention (implicit in § 28) is that a genuine knowledge of the external world must come through a process in which the particular objects of knowledge, including even God, the soul, and the world at large, are allowed to characterize themselves actually for the thinking subject, rather than be artificially characterized in thought by the thinking subject. In other words, we must interrogate the facts of experience and allow them each to tell us their own stories, rather than make up our own stories about them regardless of these facts. We must not take for granted certain characteristics or relationships as necessarily being the case just because our speculations seem to demand them. We dare not apply to "concrete" objects of thought, without considering the nature of these objects themselves, predicates which may have been derived from elsewhere. We should not anticipate experience, but faithfully interpret it. Take for example the supreme object of all thought, God *per se*. Just a poor and inadequate conception of God can result from merely ascribing to God a series of predicates which have been deduced from certain metaphysical necessities (§ 31). However many such predicates there may be, or however deep they may be, even all together they fail to describe God's infinite, eternal, absolute nature, the Godhead. This was the lesson of the Christian neo-Platonists from Origen (185?-254?) to Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464), especially Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (6th century), whose negative or apophatic theology Hegel knew well and accepted. The Hindus also appreciated this limitation on human thinking by declaring the God beyond God (Brahman) to be the Many-Named or the Many-Sided, without any variation or degree, so that, if these names should be cobbled together into a series, the result would necessarily be an infinite, yet essentially meaningless, series (§ 29).

Moreover, Hegel insists that at least some of the various metaphysical schools adopted a wrong criterion in being satisfied to derive their definitions from popular conceptions or "picture thinking" (*Vorstellung*) (§ 30). Any popular conception of God, the world, or the human spirit is necessarily inadequate, incomplete, one-sided, and therefore false, for it is necessarily colored by the nature of its era, or of the nation, culture, or people from which it emerges, and to that extent it is particular, local, and misleading. Any definition of God which embodies or includes popular conceptions, however nearly complete those conceptions may be, fails to sound the depths of the Godhead, i.e., God's being, essence, or nature. Hegel most vehemently contends that the only true method of building up the world of knowledge is to allow the objects of thought freely and spontaneously to expound their own characteristics. Thus God, like all objects of thought, is known

only as revealed - specifically, in God's case, as revealed in the continuous unfolding of the divine essence in cosmic processes, personal lives, nature, history, and humanity.

So also, we may define the human as the rational animal, but at best this is only a vague groping in the dark, for our knowledge of humanity cannot be compressed into a single judgment. That was the snare of the metaphysical schools, the belief that all objects of knowledge could be expressed completely within the scope of a formal definition or a stereotyped formula. What the "human" is, in all the possibilities of development as artisan, mechanic, scholar, soldier, citizen, statesman, martyr, or reformer, and so on, is something that only the complete history of humanity can reveal. The term "rational," as used in this traditional Aristotelian definition, conceals a vast territory of knowledge which lies behind it. We appreciate the vast extent of this territory when we meditate, even superficially, on the many - and many-sided - accomplishments of which this rationality is capable. It is only in the free activity of the constructive principle working within an object of knowledge that its essential characteristics are revealed.

Hegel saw the various metaphysical systems up to his time as dogmatic in the extreme (§ 32). Although the results of such speculations were partial and one-sided, they were nevertheless stoutly maintained as absolute and final. This insistence on the ultimate nature of partially conceived - and, unbeknownst to the schools, mostly concealed - truth indicates their characteristic spirit. Complacent with half-truths seen only in the dim light of the understanding, they could never attain full knowledge as revealed in the light of reason. Beyond the general point of view and method of these metaphysical systems, their treatment of the following four special problems is not only interesting in itself, but also has indirect bearing on some important points of Hegel's system:

1. As to the nature of being in general - ontology (§ 33).
2. As to the nature of the soul - rational psychology (§ 34).
3. As to the nature of the world - cosmology (§ 35).
4. As to the being and nature of God - natural or rational theology (§ 36).

Ontology, i.e., the theory of being, arose from ancient Greek attempts to answer the question of how being in general might be adequately characterized (§ 33). The distinctions raised by subsequent metaphysical schools were largely semantic or even just verbal. Whenever these metaphysicians found certain absolute terms which seemed to involve no contradictions to the generally received ideas of the day, they were completely satisfied that they had expressed the

truth in its fullness. They apparently did not pause to inquire about the "concrete" significance of the terms which they used or about the illustrations of these terms in actual experience. Such terms as, for example, existence, finitude, simplicity, complexity, etc., were the current coin of metaphysical expression, and seem to have been used with little thought as to their precise meaning or the definite scope of their application.

Hegel's criticism, at this point, is quite characteristic and illustrative of his general method. He insists that every term which we employ in philosophical thinking should represent a precise concept (*Begriff*), i.e., an idea of universal and necessary significance, and that such a concept cannot have any one-sided, "abstract," or rigid significance, but must contain a wealth of meaning in itself. Hegel anticipated and out-analyzed twentieth-century analytic philosophy with regard to isolating the meanings of individual concepts. Every concept, moreover, must be seen as a small world within itself, having manifold characteristics connected and interrelated in an indefinite variety of ways. The terms which represent such ideas can therefore never be employed in stereotyped ways, as was the metaphysicians' custom. The very fact that such ideas embody within themselves inner connections and relations means that contradictions necessarily arise which can be resolved only by viewing them in the light of all knowledge. To cut any such idea off as a finished product, incapable of further modification or development, is to deal with it in an extremely artificial and unphilosophical manner. Ideas are living processes, not dead products. "Let us avoid, therefore," Hegel might say, "the use of terms to which we have attached partial or poor meanings. Let the supreme task of thought be to overcome the superficial and the 'abstract'."

The second question discussed by metaphysicians was rational psychology (§ 34), which had special reference to the nature of the soul. Pre-Kantian dualistic metaphysics regarded the soul as a thing, an independent entity. This conception suggested the question - which proved to be utterly futile and misleading - of the seat of the soul, and the further question of whether the soul, insofar as it is a thing, should be seen as simple or composite. Some metaphysicians thought that the truth of the theory of immortality depends on the fact of the soul's simplicity, since whatever is not composed of parts can suffer no dissolution. Hegel insists at this point that the inner life of the mind (*Geist*) or soul (*Seele*) cannot be seen as a finished thing, a product once and for all complete, without possibility of further development. Such a conception also renders impossible any processes of action or reaction between the several elements which constitute the essence of the soul's life and varied activity, and leaves unexplained the mind's

external phenomena, which, in their variety of many-sided manifestations, are almost incalculably complex. The mind must be regarded, according to Hegel, as a "concrete" reality, evidenced by its manifestations. It is not a "thing," as metaphysicians use that term, but rather an inward constructive force determining the various phases of its external phenomena in unlimited, progressive development.

The third branch of traditional metaphysics is cosmology (§ 35). The topics it embraces include: the world, its contingency or necessity, its eternity or its necessary limitation in time and space, the formal laws of its changes, the freedom of humankind, and the nature and origin of evil. The general standpoint of metaphysicians before the time of Kant was that thought presents us with a succession of pairs of alternative judgments, one of which in each pair must be true and its opposite false. Therefore, in reference to particular cosmological questions, these metaphysicians held that we are necessarily constrained to choose dichotomously between theories, e.g., that the world is created or eternal, or that humans are predetermined or free. They argued, moreover, that the good and evil in the world are natural opposites, and can never be reconciled.

Hegel characteristically opposes this one-sided view of things by maintaining that the world contains on all sides an indefinite number of opposites, and that it is the peculiar function of reason to reconcile and harmonize them completely. His system is essentially a universal resolution of all the contradictions and inconsistencies of existence in an all-encompassing synthesis and reconciliation of reason. Thus, for example, the idea of freedom which involves no necessity, and the idea of necessity which involves no freedom, are each just partial obstructions of the understanding. In the actual world in which we live, move, and have our being (cf. Acts 17:28), freedom and necessity are not divorced. As a case in point, political freedom can be exercised only in communities wherein both law and culture guarantee liberty. Regarding the necessity which nature everywhere imposes on us, we must remember that the free activity of individuals is possible only to the extent that they can depend implicitly on the uniformity of nature's laws. If nature were without such law, and if its phenomena were the result of the caprice or whim of ruling deities, as in mythological conceptions, then the free purpose of humans would be constantly thwarted and annulled.

The fourth branch of metaphysics is natural or rational theology (§ 36), which is concerned with fundamental conceptions of God, enumerations of God's attributes, and proof(s) of God's being. The radical theological error of metaphysical logic is revealed in metaphysical attempts to discover some objective ground for the idea

of God. The resulting idea of God, thus formed, seems derived from something external to God *per se*. But God must be conceived as the sole ground of all things visible and invisible. Therefore God must be independent of anything like a foundation or support for the reality of God. If, on the other hand, God is seen as a particular being, derived from the world, then the very finitude of worldly processes would be integral to such an idea of God.

Hegel suggests that metaphysics is confronted with the following dilemma: Either God is the actual substance of the world, including the human mind, which endeavors to come to a knowledge of God; or God is an object distinct from the world, including the apprehending mind, the subject. The former horn of this dilemma is pantheism; the latter is a species of dualism. Hegel, in developing his system, tries to synthesize and reconcile the divine and human consciousnesses in such a way as to avoid these two extremes, dualism and pantheism. However, only when the entire system has unfolded before us do we have any basis to judge whether he has succeeded in this difficult undertaking. At our present stage of discussion, it is sufficient merely to mark his general purpose in this regard as a radical departure from traditional metaphysics.

There is a phrase which is often employed in speculations about the reality of God: "Consider nature, and nature will lead you to God." This is the natural theology of Thomas Aquinas, which argues "upward" from observed phenomena to asserting the reality of God. It is traditionally juxtaposed with revealed (or supernatural) theology, which argues "downward" from God's revelation to an understanding of human life on earth. Hegel protests against natural theology, insofar as it may seem to imply that God is just the consummation of the great cosmic process. Yet natural theologians know that this is not so. They use nature only epistemologically, as traces, vestiges, or evidence of nature's creator. While God may be regarded in a certain sense as the final consummation of all things, nevertheless God must be regarded primarily as the absolute ground of the initial and every subsequent phase of cosmic development. God is the beginning as well as the end of the world's evolution. Only in this very partial epistemological sense, therefore, and in no metaphysical sense, are we justified in saying that nature leads us to God, for in another and deeper ontological sense it is God *per se* who makes nature possible. Nature leads backward, not forward, to God.

As far as the denotative attributes of God are concerned, Hegel believes that they were conceived by metaphysicians in such an indefinite and obscure manner as to be devoid of much genuine significance. These schools of thought apparently dreaded assigning to

God any distinctively human attributes whatsoever, on the ground that to think of God's nature as at all resembling human nature would be to degrade or dishonor God. Fearing anthropomorphism, they lapsed into asserting vague non-definitions which lacked any significant content. Yet, with the noteworthy exception of Pseudo-Dionysius and other negative or mystical theologians, they seemed oblivious to this evident defect and satisfied themselves instead with summarizing the divine attributes in such vague, meaningless, and misleading expressions as: "God is the most real of all beings." Criticizing such statements as this, Hegel insists that if nothing is affirmed definitely of the most real, then this so-called "most real" would be, in fact, the very opposite of what cataphatic metaphysics purports it to be, and what the understanding supposes it to be. Rather than recognizing a God ample and above all measure, the metaphysical idea of God is so narrowly conceived that it is, on the contrary, poor and altogether empty.

With reason the heart craves meaningful answers to its questions about the nature of God. When the idea of God is reduced to indefinite and meaningless formulas, God then becomes so foreign to our thoughts and lives as to be reduced to an absolute zero. With no content possessing any constructive significance, our thoughts are shorn of all meaning. As Hegel puts it in a striking epigram, "Pure light is pure darkness" (§ 36 *Zusatz*; *EL*, p. 75; *HL*, p. 58; *LBD*, p. 77; *Enz.*, pp. 63-64). Notwithstanding Hegel's critical attitude toward the metaphysical schools and his radical difference from them in general point of view, he still frankly acknowledges that there is something of permanent value in one feature at least of their teachings - namely, their insistence on the basic truth that thought constitutes the essence of all that is. He incorporates this truth into his own philosophical system as its cardinal doctrine. Thought, however, does not consist for Hegel in "abstract" definitions and formulas, but is revealed in its fullness only in the "concrete" realities of life and spirit.



Empirical Schools (§§ 37-39)

In the course of the development of philosophical thought it was natural that there should follow a reaction against the "abstract," vague, and indefinite results which had been the outcome of metaphysical speculations. This reaction found expression in the teachings of the empirical schools of philosophy. Empiricists, beginning with Francis Bacon and John Locke, insisted that the starting point of all thought must be something definitely fixed and secure, some apparently "concrete" (in the ordinary sense) perceptual reality such as can be found only in the actual, physical experience of the immediate world (§ 37). Traditional (mostly Platonic but also to some extent Aristotelian) metaphysical procedure had started with apparently "abstract" (in the ordinary sense) universals which it had taken as "concrete." Its insurmountable difficulty lay in that it had no way to pass from generalities to the abundant variety of particular manifestations which correspond to such universals in the world of immediate, observable, or physical reality. The function of thought is to interpret experience, not to anticipate it. Therefore the empiricists urged that the logical, natural beginning of all inquiry after truth should be the particular instances which nature presents in profusion. They held, moreover, that the true and only source of all experience is to be found in our sensations and perceptions, not in our minds or imaginations. For Hegel, either *Dasein* (existence) or *das Ding* (the thing) is the starting point of empiricism.

According to empiricism, the foundations of knowledge rest solely upon the direct testimony of the senses; for here, and here alone, can consciousness be certain of itself and the results of its own operations. Whatever may be doubted, certitude is here at least, a firm footing, and the assurance of substantial progress. So we find the fundamental doctrine of empiricism formulated by Hegel in § 38: "... whatever is true must be in the actual world and present to sensation" (*EL*, p. 77; *HL*, p. 61; *LBD*, p. 79; *Enz.*, p. 65). This would seem to be a good commonsense basis for all serious investigation and for the construction of a sound practical philosophy; and there is, indeed, much to recommend it and to justify its claims. Hegel calls attention to the very valuable contribution to thought which has come directly from the empirical schools, and to which he himself fully subscribes - namely, that it is necessary for each of us to see for ourselves and to feel that we are present in those primary facts of knowledge which we feel constrained to accept. If we are really to know things, then we must see them as they are. This is in complete accord with the modern scientific spirit of inductive inquiry, which grounds all investigation in

a study of actual, physical sources, and that, too, at first hand.

The weakness of empiricism, however, as Hegel points out most conclusively (§ 38), consists in the fact that any sensation or combination of sensations, which, according to empiricists, is the ultimate ground of appeal, is always a particular and individual experience. It is impossible to pass from any such experience to any universal idea or law which it may illustrate without introducing some conceptions which transcend the purely empirical presupposition that we can know only particular phenomena and their immediate connections and relations.

David Hume (1711-1776) had long since drawn attention to the fact that, when we interpret the phenomena of experience as manifesting universal principles and as related by necessary causal connections, we are thereby reading into the phenomena what they themselves do not contain, but that with which they have been invested by our habits of thought. Even granted that necessity, causality, and universality are found everywhere in our consciousness, what reason have we, Hume would say, to assert that these characteristics are also the attributes of things themselves? If sensation is to maintain its claim to be the sole basis of all that we hold as true, then these ideas of necessity, causality, and universality must be seen as merely convenient fictions, clever and useful, yes, but by no means trustworthy. Hume very frankly accepted this conclusion; and so must every thoroughgoing empiricist. But Hegel, on the other hand, insists that reason joins to these fundamental processes of sensation and perception its peculiar function of interpreting in the light of their necessary, causal, or universal significance that which they present as particular experiences (§ 39). This relation between reason and the elementary data of the senses follows logically from the basic principle of Hegel's system that whatever is found to be an ultimate characteristic of reason must also apply in like manner to everything perceived and even to all reality itself.

Again, the method of empiricism is essentially analysis, i.e., subjecting our experiences to a kind of dissecting process which separates them into their constituent elements. The defect of such a method is that it makes no provision for any corresponding synthesis, except as a hypothetical patchwork of observed phenomena which is always subject to revision or even rejection. After the analytic work is complete, some unifying and constructive function of the mind must emerge as its natural and necessary complement. Accordingly, in "Reflections on the Doctrine of a Single Universal Spirit" (1702), Leibniz amended the standard empiricist slogan: *Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu, nisi intellectus ipse* ("There is nothing in the intellect

that was not first in the senses, except the intellect itself"). It is such a function which enables us to pass from phenomena to the laws which underlie them. Dissection as an exclusive process suggests only death and sterility, and can never reproduce or even account adequately for nimble phenomena. Moreover, if thought is active in systematizing the crude material which is given by the senses, then it must bring to the process something more than whatever the mere sensation itself is able to provide.

As to three questions which are of special import for philosophical thinkers - namely, the respective ontologies of God, the soul, and the world - empirical schools took the position that the human mind is so constituted that it can deal only with the finite, the natural, and the physical, and thus could not discover, know, or say anything about God, soul, or world. Finding truth only in what could be mediated by the senses, they insisted that even if the existence of a spiritual, supersensible, or extrasensory world were granted, then any knowledge of that world would still be impossible. Sometimes such a radically empiricist view would lead to a reductionist materialism, from which it would follow that there is no place in any philosophical or scientific system for either a theory of morals or a philosophy of religion. Not even Hume would go that far. Indeed, Hume wrote extensively, innovatively, and cogently about both ethics and the philosophy of religion. But for reductionist materialists, on the other hand, both ethics and religion lose all objective character and at the same time their universal validity. Such materialism is diametrically opposed to Hegelianism in both its general methods and its results.

Nevertheless, reductionist materialism, extreme physicalism, naive realism, or whatever we may choose to call it, is not the only kind of materialism. There have even been some philosophers who have been self-pronounced materialists and yet have styled themselves disciples of Hegel. Among them are some of the so-called Left Hegelians, notably Friedrich Engels (1820-1895), Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872), and David Friedrich Strauss (1808-1874). Some interpreters regard this particular development of Hegelianism as a perversion of Hegel's teaching rather than as a logical outcome of his system. Yet such perversion is not necessarily the case. Hegel's criticism of reductionist or physicalist materialism, e.g., in the "Phrenology" section of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, is so clear and emphatic as to give no uncertain sound. He draws attention to the fact that these materialists in general regard matter in the light of "abstractions." Matter would be, after all, the unknown behind the phenomena, which are merely its manifestations.

When reductionist materialism tries to explain what matter itself is, its

fundamental nature, or its essential characteristics, it must use such concepts as force, causation, action/reaction, etc., which are essentially metaphysical, and for which materialism can give no account. The world of sense perception, as physicalism conceives it, can give only a series of isolated, discrete phenomena. To think of them as forming components of an interrelated system, or as sustaining necessary relations to each other or to the whole, would be equivalent to rationalizing the material universe in a way which would introduce some non-materialistic factors. This procedure, of course, contradicts the postulate of materialism that all knowledge is confined to the data furnished by the senses. Hence this brand of empiricism is met with a practical dilemma: To defend and complete itself, it must use the weapons and tactics of metaphysics; but, as soon as it waxes metaphysical, it ceases immediately to be either materialist or even consistently empiricist. Materialism, therefore, falls into either inadequacy, inconsistency, or outright self-contradiction. To overcome such limitations, Hegel seeks a solution in absolute idealism.



5

Critical Philosophy (§§ 40-60)

Critical philosophy takes its name from the Kantian view that thought or reason itself must investigate to what extent it is capable of knowledge, i.e., must become critical of itself. We are aware that our whole theory of knowledge depends on the ideas of necessity or universality for its primary features of order and uniformity (§ 40). Insofar as the senses, *qua* pure sensation, can never, in and of themselves, provide these ideas, therefore, the source of these ideas, according to Kant, must lie in the very nature of thought itself. Moreover, he insists that we are not to seek this source in the thought of any single individual, which is merely that individual's particular capacity, but in the thought which is the common possession of all rational beings alike - i.e., in the very nature of thought itself, pure

thought, regardless of any peculiar modes or habits of thought incident to any particular rational being. These fundamental ideas, which seem to be the common property of all rational creatures, and which, together with their relations and connections, form the determining factors in reducing the crude data of sensation to a system of knowledge characterized by order, regularity, predictability, and natural law, are Kant's twelve categories of the understanding - e.g., necessity, cause and effect, unity, negation, etc. - subsumed under four classes of three categories each: quantity, quality, relation, and modality.

Critical philosophy sets itself the task of testing the value and implications of these categories in reference to their application to the sciences, epistemology, metaphysics, and our ordinary conceptual processes (§ 41). It also tries to determine the primary nature and function of these categories, so as to distinguish within our knowledge between what is subjective and what is objective. The terms "subjective" and "objective" play such important roles in philosophy in general, especially in the systems of both Kant and Hegel, that it will repay us at this stage of our investigation to explore in some detail the meaning and usage of these terms. Hegel (§ 41 *Zusatz* 2) draws attention to three distinct senses in which the term "objective" (*objektiv*) is used:

First, the word "objective" is used in a loose and rather popular manner to designate whatever exists externally. By contrast, whatever is "subjective" is seen as that which exists only in our fancies, hopes, or dreams.

Second, Kant's use of the word "objective" consists in applying the term to the universal and necessary elements of thought - i.e., what all rational beings must think; in contrast to the "subjective" character attached to individual experiences which give thoughts a certain particular and episodic coloring.

Third, Hegel's use of the word "objective" acknowledges the universal and necessary elements of thought in general after the manner of Kant, but adds that these universal and necessary elements are at the same time the real essence of all phenomena and of everything existent.

This latter distinction marks a point of Hegel's departure from Kant. Hegel maintains that if the necessary and essential factors in building up our world of knowledge were to belong only to the processes of thought, then all thought would necessarily be forever separated from any object of our thought and from anything which exists apart from our perception of it. Although it is true that Kant's twelve categories

lie strictly within the province of thought, it does not necessarily follow for Hegel that they must be ours merely in a subjective sense and not at the same time also the essential characteristics of things themselves (§ 43). Hegel, moreover, will not allow that the convenient Kantian fiction of the thing in itself (*Ding an sich*) can possibly express the real nature of any object when we have eliminated all that is present in consciousness relative to its phenomenon - all the deliverances of feeling and all specific judgments concerning it as to its evident attributes and qualities (§ 44). What is left, Hegel asks, but an utter "abstraction," a total emptiness?

It is not quite fair to say that when Kant strikes the balance between subjective and objective, all knowledge is found to be on the side of the subjective, with nothing remaining to the credit of the objective. That would be better said of Fichte. For Kant, on the other hand, subjective knowledge is mediated through the two forms of intuition, the twelve categories of the understanding, and their corresponding twelve forms of judgment, and is ultimately governed by the transcendental presence of the thing in itself. All of this creates a bond between subject and object which prevents Kant from lapsing into solipsism, a charge which is sometimes brought against Fichte. When Kant speaks of the unity of individual apperceptive consciousness as transcendental (§ 42), he seems to mean by this that our body of knowledge, seen as constituting a thoroughly ordered and unified system, has validity only for our own thoughts, and not for objects apart from our knowledge of their phenomena. What they are in themselves must remain, therefore, unknown - the insoluble X in the equation of knowledge.

It is characteristic, moreover, of Hegel's method that the significance which he attaches to the term "objective" is really a synthesis of the other two views mentioned above. The first holds that objectivity refers to external things; the second that objectivity refers to necessary and universal thought; while Hegel insists that the truly objective is the combination of the two, i.e., as true thought concerning real things. The subjective would signify, therefore, that which for the time being has a place in our thoughts but has no reference to outside reality, and which other people under similar circumstances might not necessarily notice, experience, or accept.

Kant's philosophy is a transcendental idealism, i.e., it depends on the fixed nature of the mind itself and other extra-experiential realities to impose a regularity or rationality on the otherwise chaotic phenomena of perception (§ 45). Were it not for the admixture of the *Ding an sich*, which, in Hegel's view, arrives on the scene like a *deus ex machina*, Kant's system would be a purely subjective idealism, like that of

Fichte, in which we know only appearances and possess no certitude as to what they are in fact or in themselves (§ 46). Hegel's system, on the other hand, is an absolute idealism, i.e., it concedes that the objects of our knowledge are phenomena, but that nevertheless we must regard them as true representations of what there is. The warrant for such belief lies in that whatever thought may discover in or through phenomena, as well as in or through thought and reason itself, is a manifestation of divine and universal reason. To show how this must be so, and to indicate reason's significance as the cornerstone of Hegel's entire system, is the very purpose of the Logic, and can be appreciated in its fullness only after we master the detailed exposition which comprises the Logic.

As to the special problems of the soul, the world, and God, Kant's position may be outlined as follows:

In their respective teachings about the nature of the soul, Kant and Hegel are at one in criticizing the old metaphysical definition of the soul as substantial, simple, self-identical, and maintaining its independence in its relations with the material or spatio-temporal world (§ 47). They both hold such a definition to be quite unsatisfactory, but for very different reasons. Kant affirms that the metaphysical definition fails because reason has no more warrant in making the transition from the soul as we think it is to the soul as it really is in itself than it has in proceeding from the appearances of things as we experience, perceive, and think them to these things as they are in themselves. Hegel, however, repudiates the metaphysical definition on the ground that the attributes given as elementary characteristics of the soul are altogether inadequate to express the "concrete" wealth of content which our conception of the soul should encompass.

As to the problem of the world, Kant draws attention to the fact that thought, in endeavoring to comprehend the unconditioned nature of the world, stumbles upon certain contradictions or "antinomies," for it is sometimes necessary to maintain simultaneously two contradictory propositions about one and the same object in such a way that each of the two mutually destructive propositions seems of itself to have the stamp of necessity and universal validity (§ 48). The Kantian antinomies are four, as follows:

1. The world is limited in space and time. The world is not limited in space and time.
2. Matter is indefinitely divisible. Matter is not indefinitely divisible.
3. The will must be free. The will must be determined.
4. The world is caused or created. The world is uncaused or eternal.

Kant's explanation of these seemingly contradictory statements is that the difficulty is not inherent in the objects themselves which are under contemplation, but attaches only to reason, which fails to comprehend them in their true significance. Hegel takes exception to Kant's explanation, and insists instead that there are not just four antinomies, but an indefinite number of such contradictions arising from the essential nature of being itself. The difficulty lies not in any defect of reason. On the contrary, it is the peculiar office of reason to show that these contradictions attach to the things or phenomena themselves and are necessary in order to foster the progressive development whose very essence consists in overcoming contradictions and establishing ever-higher unities among all differences. Only reason, according to Hegel, is capable of constructing such unities; only absolute reason is capable of constructing the ultimate unity; and, to the extent that human reason partakes of absolute reason, humans are capable of comprehending whatever is rational, including reason itself. Here again we obtain a characteristic glimpse of Hegel's basic philosophical innovation, and a suggestion of how his dialectical method works.

Concerning the third problem, the theistic question, Hegel is clear that God is knowable, available to finite reason, and describable as more than just an "abstraction," but, as we have mentioned above, not exhaustively describable in any determinate, cataphatic, or non-negative way (§ 49). Hegel, although himself a Lutheran, would reject the so-called "Protestant Principle," i.e., *finitum non capax infiniti* (the finite is not capable of the infinite). For him, the finite, *qua* reason, is indeed capable of unmediated access to the infinite, though not, of course, to the same extent that the infinite, *qua* absolute reason, is capable of access to itself. Finite reason only partakes of infinite reason, but is not identical with it. In other words, the human is capable of participating in the divine, but not of becoming divine; i.e., the human can know the infinite, eternal, and absolute, but cannot become infinite, eternal, or absolute. Hegel would agree with the mystic Meister Eckhart (1260?-1327?) that the human contains a spark (*Fünklein*) of the divine.

But Hegel is a naturalist, not a mystic, in this regard, and does not accept the possibility of miracles or any other violations of logic or nature. That is, even though he would generally reject the Protestant Principle, he would not be comfortable with its contrary, *finitum capax infiniti* (the finite is capable of the infinite), i.e., the Roman Catholic position that under certain circumstances the finite is indeed, by the grace of God, capable of achieving the infinite, e.g., in the transubstantiation of eucharistic bread and wine into the actual body and blood of Jesus Christ. Most Protestants, on the other hand, and

certainly Kant and F.D.E. Schleiermacher (1768-1834), would abide strictly with the Protestant Principle and affirm that the divine, the infinite, and the eternal are "wholly other" (*ganz andere*) than the human, the finite, and the temporal - and that human reason does not partake of divine reason, unless divine reason should grant special, occasional, or miraculous dispensation to give human reason a small taste of the divine in the form of particular mystical awareness.

In this connection, we would do well to examine briefly Kant's criticism of the traditional proofs of the reality of God. These proofs may be divided into two kinds - cosmological and ontological - according to whether one or the other of two methods is followed: For the former, we begin by observing nature or phenomena, then analysing our data, and through that process reach the idea of God. For the latter, we begin by analysing just the very idea of God, and thus infer the ground of the divine essence and conclude that God must be real.

The former method provides either strictly cosmological (e.g., the first, second, and third ways of Thomas Aquinas) or physico-theological proofs (e.g., the fourth and fifth ways of Aquinas) of the reality of God. The cosmological proofs reason from the variously related and interconnected phenomena of the universe to a first cause as necessary to account for their origin and sustained existence. Such proofs turn on the concept of causation. Physico-theological proofs reason from evidence of intelligent design as manifest in phenomena to the reality of the great architect of them all. These proofs turn on the concept of final causality. Kant's criticism of these proofs is that any argument which infers a logical chain of reasoning from the world, which is finite and contingent, to God, who is infinite and necessary, includes in the conclusion far more than is contained in the premises, and therefore that the inference is unwarranted. *Finitum non capax infiniti*. If we may not logically pass, by whatever process of reasoning, from raw sensation to ideas of universality and necessity, then neither may we pass from these same beginnings to the idea of God.

Hegel challenges Kant's rejection of cosmological and physico-theological arguments on two points: the first concerned with a question of form, the second with a question of content.

As to the first point, that of the formal process involved in our reasoning, if we regard the logical chain of reasoning from the finite to the infinite as represented by a syllogistic process, then the starting point must involve some theory of the world which makes it an aggregate either of contingent facts or of relations which imply design. But the world, thus conceived, is no longer a world of mere sensations

or perceptions. Rather, it is a world of sensations and perceptions as they have been cancelled, preserved, and raised to a higher dialectical level (*aufgehoben*) by thought, and as they contain elements of necessity and universality. We have seen above that it is the fundamental nature of thought to exercise this function of cancelling, preserving, and raising to a higher dialectical level (*Aufhebung*) our sensations, perceptions, and other phenomenal data into higher forms for the mind (*Geist*). In this process of *Aufhebung*, crude sensations and other data are destroyed in their nature as sensations or data, but preserved in their essence as thoughts or concepts, and thus raised to the next level. This is, for Hegel, the negative phase in the logical chain of reasoning from the world to God. The world seen as an aggregate of data disappears. But from its ashes arises a newly unified world as interpreted by categories and aspects of thought. Such a rational world, which naturally and logically implies universality and necessity, is an adequate starting point to prove the reality of God as the source of such unity and rationality.

Hegel's second point relates to the content of any truths to which any logical chain of reasoning from the world to God may lead, such as those concerning the nature of the world, its substance, its essence, its relation to God, or its cause *qua* that which may regulate it according to design or direct it according to plan. These ideas express only a partial, inadequate, and misleading knowledge of God, even though they are penultimately necessary to a complete conception of God. Hegel insists that while they should not be discounted, they must be not only supplemented by higher truths, but also *aufgehoben*. For example, while inanimate nature may give us some intimations of God, there are higher revelations of God available to us when we start our chain of reasoning with observations of living organisms. Thus we may reach the idea of God as the source of life. Similarly, there are always still higher levels which we may take as starting points. The highest such level is that of mind or spirit (*Geist*) itself, because it is through *Geist* alone that we reach the highest possible conception of God. Hence God's nature can be adequately known or determined only when we regard God as absolute *Geist*.

The latter method of proof, the ontological, is in a sense the inverse of the former, i.e., it begins with absolute superlatives and argues from them to the actual reality of the ultimate superlative: perfection. Kant's criticism is that we may not reason from any thought to the actual existence or reality of the object of that thought. He illustrates this point by saying that conceiving money in the mind does not put money into anyone's purse. In other words, Kant rejects ontological arguments because he believes that existence cannot be a predicate. But this is his failure. He treats God as if God were a particular "being"

or entity which could "exist." But God cannot "exist," since to "exist" (from the Greek *ek* + *histêmi* and the Latin *ex* + *sistere*) is to "stand out" or "stand apart," i.e., to be finite, or to be a being among other beings. Because God is necessarily infinite, God cannot be a particular being, even if this particular being were eternal, perfect, absolute, omnipotent, and supreme. Rather, God is the ground or cause both of being (*Sein*) and of all beings (*Seiende*), beyond being and beings, the negation of being and the principle of the unification (*Vereinigung*) of beings. Hegel knew this - as did his predecessors Pseudo-Dionysius, Anselm (1033-1109), and Spinoza, and his successor Paul Tillich (1886-1965).

Hegel's criticism of Kant puts the matter in a very different light. Hegel says that no such analogy as Kant's could discredit any ontological argument, because any adequate idea of God would be unique in the sense that it would necessarily *not* involve any finite attributes (§ 51). That is, any adequate idea of God is beyond finite reasoning and cannot be achieved in the way that we achieve thoughts about whatever is finite. Kant claims that the very nature of any finite thing is expressed by saying that its being in time and space must differ from our concept of it - but he erroneously extends this claim to apply also to what is real outside time and space, i.e., to the ultimate, infinite, eternal absolute. God is indeed beyond and greater than any idea that any finite mind may ever have of God, but the reality of God - God *in re* - and the idea of God in a finite mind - God *in intellectu* - differ only in degree of adequacy, not in kind. Therefore, for those who, like Hegel, accept ontological arguments, the idea of God - and of God alone - cannot exclude the conviction that God is not only real, but ultimately and necessarily real. God, the infinite one, occupies in our thoughts a position which can be accorded to nothing that is finite. In God and in God alone is the idea of God and God's being one and the same. This is the supreme illustration that the rational is real and the real is rational.

Kant's attacks on the traditional proofs for the reality of God amount to a self-destruction of the unification (*Vereinigung*) which should always obtain between God and the world and which should always be available to human reason (§ 50). Like Hume, Kant fails to recognize the essential unity of the world, its God, and all its situations, and thus remains caught in "abstract" ways of thought (§ 52). For Hegel, "concreteness" in general, as well as "concrete" thought, always entails unity and interrelatedness.

In the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788) and the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785), Kant discusses ethical reasoning, duty, and action. He denies to pure reason the free control of its own

activity, but vindicates this freedom for practical reason, which manifests itself in various aspects of human conduct and moral (or immoral) action (§ 53). By practical reason he means the free will that self-determines according to universal laws, which, he claims, possess objective validity, i.e., are recognized by sound intellects everywhere and at all times as imposing upon every rational being a common obligation or absolute duty, which is known intuitively through conscience as categorical and hypothetical imperatives. Among Kant's contributions to ethical thought are his protests against consequentialist, hedonistic, Epicurean, and naturalist ethics, and even Aristotelian eudaimonism. He opposed any philosophy which would find humankind's chief end in some form of happiness, especially happiness as acquired through surrender to inclination or desire, or through gratifying selfish appetites conditioned by the pleasures and pains of life (§ 54 *Zusatz*). Hegel's criticism of Kant is that his ethical theory gives only the "abstract" form of morality in universal laws of conduct, that this formal admonition to do what is right by no means determines the content of such laws or intuited duties, and that he thus cannot definitely determine what is right to do in "concrete" cases.

It is thoroughly characteristic of Hegel's method to criticize any one-sided view of things, then to seek correction by showing the complementary side. Furthermore, it is typical of Hegel never to choose "either/or" when he can take "both/and." So here too, Hegel agrees with Kant as far as Kant goes, but adds that Kant's system does not go far enough, is "abstract," inadequate, and needs to be rounded out in some way that will provide not only the formal basis of a formal ethics, i.e., the "abstract" or "vertical" relationship between the conscientious, free individual and God *qua* author of the categorical imperative, but also the grounded content of a practical, worldly ethics which would fully involve the "concrete," interpersonal, social, political, and "horizontal" relationships which Kant ignores, so that the two may become the mutually interrelated elements which create the whole (§ 59). Both the "vertical" and the "horizontal" relationships together are required for a completely mediated and workable ethics.

Mainly in § 77 of the *Critique of Judgment* (1790), Kant declares the reflective power of judgment (*die reflektierende Urteilskraft*) to be almost equivalent to the function of the intuitive understanding (*der anschauende Verstand*) (§ 55). Thus Kant, at least to some extent, approaches Hegel's conception of reason as the basis of all things, in affirming that everything that exists manifests its nature according to its inner idea (§ 56). Therefore, in the intuitive judgment of beauty in nature or in art, of an ideal, a goal, or a purpose to be realized in all living organisms throughout the vast range of nature - in all this we

rise to the height of comprehending (*begreifen*) in some measure that the mere phenomena of the universe reveal in themselves such ideals, goals, or purposes. The universe may therefore be seen as the incarnation of reason. Hegel's system departs from Kant's in holding that these ideals, goals, and purposes, and this incarnate reason are revealed not only to the artistic instincts of geniuses or poets, but also to humbler minds through the simple operations of thought alone.

Kant's and Hegel's positions are fairly close when Kant asserts that the purposiveness in nature is not an external principle of finality, but immanent within each organism, wherein the final cause is active as a molding principle, forming a constructive dynamic center (§ 57). Kant falls short, however, of attaining the Hegelian theory in its completeness, because he says that, in the last analysis, immanent finality can be affirmed only of our thoughts about things and not of the things themselves. Hegel, on the other hand, says not only that there is an objective as well as a subjective finality, but also that they are here one and the same, so that this finality is characteristic of both our thoughts and their objects (§ 58).

In summarizing his review of Kant's critical philosophy, Hegel gives it two points of merit: positively, that it emphasizes the independence of reason (§ 60 *Zusatz* 2), and, negatively, that it insists that the categories of the understanding are finite (§ 60 *Zusatz* 1). Kant's weakness, for Hegel, lies in affirming that what is false or inadequate in knowledge is due solely to the limitations of our mental faculties. Hegel says, on the contrary, that these defects of knowledge must be ascribed to the finite nature of the objects of thought themselves and not to the categories by which they are constructed into a system of knowledge.



The chief representative of the theory of immediate or intuitive knowledge is Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819), who claims that all knowledge obtained through the categories of the understanding is derivative and therefore finite and conditioned, and because finite and conditioned, therefore unsatisfactory. Moreover, he claims that it is impossible through any process of reasoning to rise to the high level of apprehending the absolutely true, infinite, and unconditioned, i.e., God *per se* (§ 61). But, by an immediate revelation of reason or feeling, we may know - or feel - God intuitively. For Jacobi, the reality of God cannot be proved, but can be immediately recognized. He uses terms such as "knowledge," "faith," "intuition," and "feeling" rather unsystematically to indicate this immediate deliverance to consciousness.

Hegel's criticism of this position is, in part, that although the knowledge of God may be seen as an immediate intuition, it is nevertheless an intuition which must be considered as an intellectual product, i.e., it must rise above phenomena or the data of sense, in order to deal with facts of inherently universal significance which have special reference to our thinking minds. But for Jacobi, pure and simple intuition (*Anschauung*) seems like nothing more or less than pure and simple thought, and any distinction between thought and intuition seems merely verbal. The basic difficulty with this position is that, while Jacobi claims intuition to be immediate, he overlooks the possibility that what may seem self-contained, complete in itself, and *sui generis* is nevertheless, in some sense, a constructed product and, as a product, the result of some process. In other words, for Hegel, Jacobi fails because he does not account for mediation, i.e., does not allow that thoughts, feelings, intuitions, or other types of immediate or direct awareness may eventually be mediated and thereby raised to higher, more "concrete" levels of knowledge, such as concepts (§ 62).

Hegel's position is that in all immediate knowledge the immediate elements each have behind them somewhere a process, and by that process they are mediated. It remains only to discover and come to know these elements and processes. For instance, a seed is an immediate existence as regards the flower and fruit which may spring from it as the seed develops beyond its immediate existence, perishes in itself, but survives in its development (cf. *PhS*, p. 2; *PhG*, p. 10). As we hold the seed in our hand, we have no hesitancy in calling it a finished and complete thing in itself - at that stage. But the flower and eventually the fruit are mediated by processes which are started by forces latent in the seed. From a similar point of view, the seed itself may be seen as a product resulting from processes by which it has been developed and mediated, and comes to be what it is in its seemingly complete and independent state.

But immediate knowledge is that which is not subjected to any analysis whatsoever, and such is not only the nature of our knowledge of mere being, but also the nature of mere being itself. Without analysis, no further determination is possible.

Another illustration of Hegel's idea of mediation is our knowledge of a book whose title, author, and general point of view we know only by common report, but which we ourselves have never read. Hegel would call such knowledge immediate, general, and "abstract," i.e., the kind of immediate knowledge which would have no special significance or value. However, once we have read the book, noted the gradual unfolding of the author's train of thought, and related each newly read part to the ever-larger whole as it reached its final expression, we find that our knowledge of it has grown in both definition and value through this process - which is tantamount to Hegelian mediation. That is, we have encountered the entire book directly and set it deeply within the context of all our prior and interrelated experience. It has thus become an actual part of us. It has left on our minds a certain impression of its total significance, which we might call immediate knowledge, but which now is really mediated, specific, and "concrete," since in the course of time the various steps of the mediation process become merged in the result of the process as well as in the wider context of our lives, so that we come to retain in consciousness the finished product as a whole, whose development and internal relations we now understand. Such knowledge, immediate in the sense that it is direct, but mediated in the sense that it is the result of a rational or dialectical process, is different from the vague, indefinite, "abstract" knowledge which went before and was independent of and prior to all mediation. This distinction gives deep insight into Hegel's method and general point of view (§ 69).

So also religion and morals contain, of course, as their most marked characteristics, the elements of faith, or immediate knowledge (§ 63), and yet from another point of view they must be seen as conditioned on every side by the mediating processes of development, education, history, and the rational formation of character. Hegel defines faith (*Glaube*) as immediate knowing (*unmittelbares Wissen*), i.e., the knowing that merely "knows," but has no reason for knowing, no justification for believing, and does not know why or how it "knows." This phase is a caricature of genuine knowing, which is always mediated and exists in the realm of real reason (*Vernunft*). Faith is unmediated and exists in the realm of the understanding (*Verstand*).

The importance of *Verstand* lies in that it oscillates between both negative or dialectical *Vernunft* and positive or simple *Vernunft*. All under the aegis of *Verstand*, in each phase of the dialectic, positive *Vernunft* negates negative *Vernunft* and thus completes that phase. *Verstand* represents an effort toward maximum precision and is achieved in the concept (*Begriff*) (§ 70). In fact, though considered broadly and admitting of many exceptions, *Verstand* is *Begriff*, dialectic is becoming (*Werden*), and speculation is reflection (*Reflexion*).

For any Hegelian immediacy, it is immediate from just one standpoint, the immediate standpoint, but mediated from at least one other standpoint. Mediated immediacy is reflected immediacy, which is just empty determinacy, or the immediacy of *Nichtdasein*, "not-being-there" or "being-somewhere-else."

Hegel was very critical of imprecision in philosophical terminology, and would probably still be so today. Like the romantic theologians of the unmediated understanding in his time, some philosophers and logicians of our time also throw terms around as if they knew their meanings, but they do not understand these terms as concepts. That is Hegel's point. To understand any word correctly is to know not only its definition, denotations, and everyday usage, but also its etymology and connotations as it interrelates with all other meanings which may be involved in its widest possible context. Put differently, to know how to use a word in a sentence is to understand it only formally and superficially; but to understand any word completely or philosophically, i.e., to be able to use it as a technical philosophical or systematic term, we must look deeply into its actual content and internalize all its possible meanings and relationships among and beyond these meanings, in order to grasp the fully mediated content of these meanings. We must learn where its meanings fit into the whole schema of revealed rational spirit. For Hegel, nothing is ineffable, there are no synonyms, and all knowledge is discursive, at least potentially.

The opposite of discursive reasoning, which Hegel generally esteems, is "picture thinking" (*Vorstellung*), which he mostly holds in contempt, although he recognizes it - perhaps grudgingly - as a necessary phase. *Vorstellung* is a very broad term. It not only means "picture thinking" or "mental imagery," but it can also refer to any "isolated," "unmediated," or "pictorially abstract" idea. Hegel's quarrel is not with people who use *Vorstellung*, but with people who believe that it is adequate in itself and thus refuse - out of either ignorance, spite, or childishness - to proceed beyond it toward the concept (*Begriff*). Hegel claims that, from the point of view of *Vorstellung*, everything, even God, the infinite, the eternal, seems immediate and to that extent either false or inadequate; but, as we begin to transcend *Vorstellung*, we can begin to regard things, perceptions, and ideas as mediated (§ 64), i.e., as concepts (*Begriffe*).

The relation between mediation and immediacy is one of the keys to a thorough understanding of Hegel's system. We need only refer to it here in passing by way of anticipation, insofar as this relation is developed at length in the second part of the *Logic*, "The Theory of Essence." His theory of essential being (*Wesenheit*), as there expressed, is made to rest upon the unity which underlies the seeming opposition (*Gegensatz*) of mediation and immediacy (§ 65).

Hegel further criticizes the theory of immediate knowledge on the ground that it finds its criterion of truth not in the character or content of that which purports to be true, but in the bare fact that this phenomenon has found a place in some particular consciousness (§§ 66, 70-71). This would make subjective awareness the sole basis of truth - with no touchstone except the specific liveliness of someone's faith. Whatever any individual consciousness may discover within itself and believe as a truth, this consciousness thereby declares to be a universal truth for the evidence and benefit of all consciousness, and that it is to be regarded even as the very essence of thought itself. This alleged truth is felt - but not known - to have been revealed by God. Such revelation, however, does not necessarily conform to any kind of reason or logic; and if granted, it would prove too much, since as a result of such an argument there may be found as valid a warrant for primitive superstitions as for the doctrines of Christianity (§ 67). As Hegel remarks, "It is not because of so-called mediated knowing, argumentation, and syllogizing that the Indian looks on the cow or the ape, the Brahmin or the Lama, as God, but he *believes* in it" (§ 72; *EL*, p. 120; *HL*, p. 107; *LBD*, p. 121; *Enz.*, p. 97; cf. § 63; *EL*, p. 112; *HL*, p. 98; *LBD*, p. 113; *Enz.*, p. 89).

Hegel charges the one-sidedness or "abstractness" of Jacobi's epistemology of feeling and intuition with three faults: (1) it

determines truth by the bare fact of awareness or conviction, rather than by verifiable or coherent content (§ 71); (2) it has no criterion by which to distinguish genuine philosophical truth from superstition, since feelings, intuitions, and other unmediated forms are its only basis of religious experience or theological knowledge, which means that, for Jacobi, any awareness of God can only be immediate (§ 72); and (3) it cannot state anything "concrete" or conceptual about the essence or nature of God, because it cannot mediate any knowledge of God (§§ 73-75). Hegel acknowledges that Jacobi's immediate knowledge of God tells us *that* God is - but this is *all* that it can tell us about God (§ 73). Hence the idea of God as an object of religion is narrowed down to an indefinite, vague, supersensible being devoid of all positive, identifiable, or meaningful attributes. From this point of view, God must ever remain unknown and unknowable - the "wholly other." Such an idea of God is on the same level as Herbert Spencer's (1820-1903) subsequent characterization of God as "The Unknowable" in *First Principles of a New System of Philosophy* (1862). It also foreshadows other post-Enlightenment irrationalist theology, such as that of Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), Rudolf Otto (1869-1937), or Martin Buber (1878-1965).

Moreover, in Hegel's interpretation of Jacobi, the "abstract" thought of the metaphysician and the "abstract" intuition of the devout believer are one and the same thing. From either point of view, God is immediately imagined - mainly through simple intuition, direct beholding (*Anschauung*), unconditioned awareness, or *Vorstellung* - as a being vaguely indefinite, indeterminate, and indeterminable (§ 74). For any romantic theologian or unsophisticated devotee to call God spirit or to say that we know God as spirit immediately, Hegel insists, is only an empty phrase; since the consciousness - or better the self-consciousness - which any valid idea of spirit would imply, would necessarily render that idea more specific and definite by analyzing it in such a way as to show the various elements which constitute its essence and by separating it from all else that might be confused with it. But such an act of thought is itself a process of mediation (§ 68). Thus any strictly immediate knowledge is vague and indefinite, and really not knowledge at all, but only awareness. The very act of making it definite or distinct necessitates subjecting its immediacy to some process of mediation. Without such a process all knowledge would be both unscientific and unphilosophical (§ 75).

Still on this topic of immediate knowledge, and from the standpoint of the inadequacy of such knowledge, Hegel continues his attack on Descartes (§§ 64, 76-77). In the *Science of Logic* he writes: "Es ist die Unmittelbarkeit des *Nichtseins*, welche den Schein ausmacht; dies

Nichtsein aber ist nichts anderes als die Negativität des Wesens an ihm selbst. Das Sein ist Nichtsein in dem Wesen. Seine *Nichtigkeit* an sich ist *die negative Natur des Wesens selbst*. Die Unmittelbarkeit oder Gleichgültigkeit aber, welche dies Nichtsein enthält, ist das eigene absolute Ansichsein des Wesens." - "The immediacy of *non-being* is what constitutes show; but this non-being is nothing other than the negativity of essence with respect to essence itself. Being is non-being within essence. Being's nothingness in itself is *the negative nature of essence itself*. The immediacy or indifference, however, which contains this non-being, is the proper, absolute inherentness of essence" (WL, vol. 2, p. 11; cf. SLM, p. 397; SLdG, p. 344). Using one of his typically untranslatable puns, Hegel repeats many times: *Das Sein ist das Schein*, i.e., being is show, being is for show, being is shining, or, less accurately, being is illusion. Because the Cartesian foundation, i.e., the declaration of *cogito ergo sum*, is immediate knowledge, therefore it is *Schein*, and therefore non-knowledge, nothing. It falls short of the concept. It is, and must forever remain, a mere feeling, an accurate feeling, yes, but even in its truth, never a thought, never a concept.

The equivalence of *Sein* and *Schein* is chimerical. *Being* qua *being* must include the wispiqueness of *Schein*, lest we fall into Parmenidean *stasis*. Also, *Schein*, being anything at all, must be an aspect of *Sein*. Yet it cannot be proved or developed; it can only be noticed. It remains "abstract." That is why the *cogito* of Descartes fails as a philosophical principle, because, as an immediate aspect of *Schein* which does not admit of conceptual progress or mediation beyond itself, it can never become "concrete."

The results that we have reached through Hegel's criticism of various attitudes of thought toward the objective world may be summarized as follows: (1) Metaphysics has "abstract" forms of thought, but they prove to be empty. (2) Empiricism has a vast wealth of data but unthought forms in which to express it. (3) Critical philosophy has the thought forms, but what seem to be data ready for its analysis prove, upon investigation, to be shadowy and unsubstantial. (4) Immediate intuition, direct beholding (*Anschaung*), or intuitive understanding also possess critical thought forms, but they lack any distinctive or useful pattern, and therefore, whatever their data may be, the result of analysis is always the same, possessing no specific characteristics and without significance or value. Hegel seeks to overcome the evident defects of these four types of philosophy by uniting into one system the partial truths which they severally contain. By which method this will be attempted and with what level of success it will be attended, we shall hope to see in a detailed exposition of the *Logic* - the scientific or rigorously philosophical task which now lies just before

us. This will be achieved affirmatively and constructively, not in a Cartesian or skeptical way (§ 78).



7

A General Survey of the Logic (§§ 79-83)

The *Logic* is divided into three parts (§ 83):

I. The Theory of Being (*die Lehre vom Sein*) (§§ 84-111), the result of answers to questions about what a thing or phenomenon is.

II. The Theory of Essence (*die Lehre vom Wesen*) (§§ 112-159), the result of answers to questions about what comprises or constitutes a thing or phenomenon.

III. The Theory of the Concept (*die Lehre vom Begriff*) (§§ 160-244), the result of answers to questions about what end or purpose a thing or phenomenon may have and whether it is capable of progressing to that end or purpose.

These divisions represent the successive stages in the progressive unfolding of our knowledge, through which the various processes of thought come to their complete and final expression. They are to be seen as successive only in the sense that, by our analysis, we separate them in our thoughts and think of them as following one another, i.e., in a logical, but not necessarily temporal, sequence. But in reality we should conceive of these elements of knowledge as lying within one another, and the first two within the third. Their progress, indicated in their logical or internal development, is not so much an advance as a deepening insight into more and more important attributes and more and more intricately mediated relations. The complete knowledge of a thing or phenomenon, therefore, embraces the categories of its being, the ground of its being, and the purpose of its being.

We readily see that the first category involves the second, in order to complete its meaning, and that the second involves the third in the

same way, and that the third underlies the other two. The being of any thing or the meaning of any phenomenon becomes definitely known to us only when we are able to refer it "concretely" to its appropriate ground, and when we possess some insight into its origin and the processes by which its being is maintained and perfected. Also, the ground of its being has its full significance only in consideration of whatever end it aims to realize, if and only if its being supports that end. Thus, the question of what something is implies the question of where it came from, and that question in turn leads irresistibly to the question of where it is going. Hence, we may call the category of being the logic of description; that of essence, the logic of explanation; and that of the concept, the logic of the final cause.

The first category, being (*Sein*), represents knowledge reduced to its simplest or most basic terms. The mere or apparent existence of beings or phenomena, even those of the very least significance, nevertheless involves some sort of attribute, qualification, specification, or other identifying mark for each of them, for otherwise they could not be perceived or known at all. Therefore our perception and knowledge of being pure and simple, i.e., *Sein* without any further attributes, qualifications, or specifications, is zero. Hence being is in fact nothing (*Nichts*), and vice versa.

There are many different terms by which Hegel characterizes or names being, and a systematic understanding of these terms will provide insight into the meaning of the whole theory of being while at the same time preparing us to appreciate the fundamental distinction between being and essence. Some of these terms are "abstract" (*abstrakt*), "identity" (*Identität*), "absolute identity" (*absolute Identität*), "abstract identity" (*abstrakte Identität*), "immediate" (*unmittelbar*), "undetermined" or "indeterminate" (*unbestimmt*), "in itself" (*an sich*), and "for itself" (*für sich*). Accordingly, at this point the reader should consult the descriptions of these several terms in the German glossary in [Appendix A](#).

Being is to be regarded merely as a transitional state of knowledge, the very beginning of knowledge, insofar as that which may later become definite and determined as essentiality (*Wesenheit*) is still indefinite and undetermined as mere being. However, being does contain the potential of all that appears explicitly in actuality and in essence. The same could be said of nothing. To emphasize the identity for Hegel of being and nothing, consider: Nothing is to be regarded merely as a transitional state of knowledge, the very beginning of knowledge, insofar as that which may later become definite and determined as essentiality is still indefinite and undetermined as mere

nothing. However, nothing does contain the potential of all that appears explicitly in actuality and in essence. Again, nothing is not nothing because it is nothing; nothing is nothing because it is being without attributes, qualifications, or specifications, and thus is imperceptible and unknowable.

We come now to consider the chief characteristics of essence in contrast to those of being. Essence is the result of deeper insight than is given or represented by mere being. The essence of a thing is what it is, regarded no longer as an isolated fact, but as part of a whole system of interrelated elements - or perhaps better said, as one among many constituents all interrelated into a systematic whole. The idea of system is closely associated with the idea of reflection, to which Hegel refers constantly in connection with the category of essence.

Reflection is the speculative, synthetic movement of the system (§ 82).

The essence of a thing or phenomenon is revealed only when we see it in its complete setting and thus possess a thorough knowledge of its sustained relationships within every part of the system. This thing or phenomenon, therefore, does not shine in its own light so much as in the light reflected from all the coordinate elements to which it is related. We know it only when it is the focal point of this illumination via its complete setting. In this sense Hegel says that the essence of a thing or phenomenon is known by means of reflection. Yet essence generates reflection, not the other way around.

Moreover, in order to understand fully the essence of anything, we must analyze the total profundity of its appearances, both superficial and genuinely profound, in order to discover the underlying elements and processes which have given rise to its existence. As merely existent or phenomenal, it appears as an unanalyzed unit, a simple product with no reference to any of the processes which have produced it. In thus analyzing it into its constituent elements, formative processes, and interrelations, we employ, in our thought, mediation (*Vermittlung*), i.e., the internal process by which something comes to be what it is in its inherent nature and its essential characteristics. Mediation emphasizes especially the means by which the purpose of anything is identified and achieved.

Again, while being is always indefinite and indeterminate, essence, on the contrary, is being which has become defined and determined. The definiteness which is characteristic of essence is achieved - like everything else in Hegel's system - through the process of negation. To make anything definite or determinate means to negate whatever it is not, i.e., to mark off the distinct limits beyond which the entity in question ceases to be what it is. The process of negation is therefore the establishing of a boundary around something, forming an

enclosing line, a line of negation, beyond which nothing can be seen as properly belonging to the essence of the thus limited or circumscribed something. Mere being, as we have seen, is homogeneous throughout, lacking all characteristics, color, and determinacy; but this "defect" of being is remedied by negation disclosing its various aspects, their respective complementary aspects, and their reciprocal relations. In so doing, all the various aspects of being, i.e., every A and every -A, are necessarily co-determined and differentiated from one another. To accomplish this is among the functions of negation.

Negation, therefore, is the process of revealing the specific differences among entities or phenomena, or among the several elements and functions of a single entity or phenomenon. It is, in a sense, a twofold process: (1) the discrimination of something from all that is external to it and (2) the analysis of it into its component elements and functions. Negation, as Hegel uses the term, is roughly equivalent to the biological idea of "differentiation." The differentiation, for instance, of an embryo in the process of development is the breaking up of the comparative homogeneity of the initial zygote into the interrelated parts which will be revealed in the living organism newly hatched or born. It is in this differentiation that the essential nature of the animal is fully disclosed.

Hegel's idea of negation is embodied in Spinoza's dictum from Letter 50 to Jarig Jellis, June 2, 1674: *determinatio negatio est*, "determination is negation," which Hegel misquotes in § 91 *Zusatz* and elsewhere as *omnis determinatio est negatio*, "all determination is negation." (Hegel, of course, is in basic agreement with Spinoza about determination and negation, but for a classic misreading of Hegel in favor of Spinoza on this point, see Pierre Macherey, *Hegel or Spinoza*, translated by Susan M. Ruddick [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011], pp. 113-213, especially p. 162.) That is, we determine the characteristic(s) and essential feature(s) of anything by a sharp distinction between what it is and what it is not - as well as by learning how what it is and what it is not relate to each other. When negation draws no such line of distinction, knowledge is blurry, without definition, like an out-of-focus photograph.

As essence may be seen as the development and completion of being, in like manner the concept is the development and completion of essence. Each stage marks deeper penetration and further progress toward the fullness of knowledge. If we ask about the nature of the process which necessarily underlies anything seen as merely a product, we thus will have raised the question of its essence. If we then probe deeper and ask about the thought which has devised this

process and is at the same time both the dynamic source of the process itself and its complete realization, we thus will have raised the question of its concept, i.e., its creating and sustaining reason. The concept, therefore, embraces the truth of both being and essence.

We have remarked above that the category of being expresses immediate knowledge, i.e., accepting an object of knowledge as a fact even though it is yet unanalyzed and unexplained. We have also noted that the category of essence expresses mediated knowledge, i.e., knowledge analyzed and explained. We may therefore regard the category of the concept as, in a sense, the combination of these two kinds of knowledge. It embraces immediate knowledge as comprehending, from the beginning, the end to be realized as a finished product; but it is mediated knowledge as well, insofar as it is the knowledge of the process which is necessary in order to realize this envisioned end. At the same time it alone has the capacity to originate and direct the process.

Insofar as knowledge within the realm of being is indefinite and undetermined, and knowledge within the realm of essence is definite and determined; therefore, the concept in this connection may be described as the principle of reason which determines itself as knowledge, i.e., transforms the indefinite and undetermined into the definite and determined by its own inherent self-activity as thinking. Insofar as being is homogeneous, without any internal differentiation into parts, components, or even aspects; and insofar as essence is the breaking up of this dull sameness into distinct parts, components, and aspects; therefore, the concept may also be seen as the capacity for self-differentiation or self-specification. As being is the potential, and essence the actual; therefore, the concept may be seen as both the capacity and the consummation of effecting the transition from the potential to the actual, i.e., both the capacity and the consummation of self-realization.

These ideas of self-realization, self-determination, and self-specification characterize the concept under the several varieties of development, freedom, and individuality. Such a principle as this, which is able freely to realize its own ends, is, for Hegel, to be considered not so much as a substance, underlying and constituting the essentiality (*Wesenheit*) of all things, but rather as a subject, because every manifestation of which it is the ground is a self-manifestation. Moreover, it is self-motivating. The concept is not "abstractly" subjective in the sense of peculiar or radical individuality such as would later be popularized by Kierkegaard, but it is "concretely" subjective in the sense of representing and characterizing mediated, internally consistent, or interrelated individuality (cf. §§

163-164). Hence, the first and second parts of the *Logic*, the theories of being and of essence, Hegel characterizes as objective, but the third, the theory of the concept, as "subjective" in his special sense. Being and essence represent manifestations in the real world; the concept represents both the basis of these manifestations and their ends as well, not only as particulars, but also as components of a larger, more fully integrated totality.

Hegel's system, as this totality, is a progressive evolution. He characterizes it as a process of the dialectical evolution (*Entwicklung*) of rational spirit in almost the same terms that Spencer employs in his definition of biological evolution: "Evolution," says Spencer, "is a change from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity, through continuous differentiations and integrations" (*First Principles* [London: Williams and Norgate, 1862], p. 216).

The change which is indicated by Spencer's definition occurs between two states of an organism; the first corresponds to that of mere being, the second to that of essence. Hegel also uses terms like "indefinite" and "incoherent" to characterize the state of mere being. Spencer's term, "homogeneity," has a significance similar to Hegel's "abstract" identity, i.e., it refers to that which is without distinction, differentiation, or characterization in its parts - if it even has parts. So also, and conversely, Spencer's terms, "definite" and "coherent," would be precisely applicable to the state of mediation in Hegel's idea of essence. "Heterogeneity" indicates the state in which the initial sameness has been resolved into separate components with distinctive characteristics, and may also be applied to Hegelian essence. Spencer regards each transition from one state to the next as a process which is "mediated," in the Hegelian sense, through successive differentiations and integrations. "Differentiation" corresponds roughly to Hegel's process of mediation by negation; likewise, "integration" corresponds to the *Aufhebung* which is the result of such a process. Just as every integration, for Spencer, implies a previous differentiation, so also for Hegel, every putatively "immediate" aspect of knowledge must still be seen as a product on some level, insofar as it has incorporated some previous mediation(s) as the process which has produced it. In other words, while Spencer's idea of differentiation corresponds to Hegel's process of negation, his integration may be seen as corresponding to negation as affirmation, which Hegel describes in § 87, i.e., the more than usually complex dialectical movement from the nadir of indeterminacy, the pure "abstraction" of being, "the absolute negative" (*das Absolut-Negative*), through several successive negations to a new *Aufhebung* or affirmation at a much higher level of determinacy and

mediation.

Besides the division of the entire Logic into the theories of being, essence, and the concept, there is also a general threefold division of the dialectic into moments or phases of (1) the "abstract" understanding, (2) its rational negation, and (3) the "concrete," positive, rational, and speculative unity and reconciliation of these two (§ 79). This second division does not necessarily correspond to the first, and usually does not. Each such dialectical triad is a step in the whole dialectical movement (*Bewegung*), and together they form the blueprint of the dialectic.

Thinking as understanding (*Verstand*) understands determinate things as they are, in isolation, as particulars, as given, but goes no further (§ 80). That is why it is "abstract." It takes no action; it only "stands under," as it were, and allows information to pour down upon it, soaking it, permeating it, while it just passively waits. It cannot think for itself, or initiate any kind of analysis, creativity, synthesis, or even negation. If it did, then it would be reason (*Vernunft*), not the understanding. In short, the understanding is finite, but reason is infinite.

Thinking as negation is the initial and initiating act of reason that begins to push the dialectic away from the "abstract" understanding toward "concrete" speculation (§ 81). It is the heart of the dialectic.

Thinking as speculative reconciliation is the end product of every triad - but not a fixed product. (§ 82) It also constitutes, as soon as it is understood, the beginning of the next triad. As the Latin etymology of the word "speculation" suggests, this result "mirrors" what has gone before, while at the same time shining new light on it. "Speculation," for Hegel, certainly does not mean "guessing" or "gambling," as it might in ordinary English or as its true cognate, (*die*) *Spekulation*, might in ordinary German. Rather, it refers to the creative thinking that is born of self-initiating contemplation or rumination and always entails some sort of reconciliation or resolution. The hallmark of Hegelian speculation is its ability to reconcile apparently irreconcilable pairs of opposites. (For a fuller description of what "speculation" means for Hegel, cf. Michael Inwood's gloss on this term in *A Hegel Dictionary* [Oxford: Blackwell, 1992], pp. 271-274.)

(As a side note on the terminology that describes the types of Western philosophy in general, one typically hears talk of analytic vs. continental philosophy or, somewhat less often, of Anglo-American vs. speculative philosophy. These juxtapositions are not parallel and thus not especially helpful. To be more accurate, we should pair up conceptual terms and geographical terms respectively, as follows:

analytic vs. speculative philosophy; Anglo-American vs. continental philosophy. The former pair is preferable because analytic philosophy occurs in continental Europe as well as in Britain and America, and speculative philosophy occurs in Britain and America as well as in continental Europe.)

But to return to our comparison of Hegel and Spencer, there is at least one very clear contrast between Hegel's idea of dialectical evolution and Spencer's idea of biological evolution, which was published only three years after Charles Darwin's *On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection* appeared in 1859. Spencer's theory contains nothing which corresponds to Hegel's *Begriff*. Whatever may underlie either thinker's series of never-ceasing changes from their beginnings to their final consummations, there is in Spencer's philosophy only The Great Unknowable, which, Spencer would insist, is reason's barrier. Beyond it would lie only conjecture, sentiment, and the hope of knowledge, but not knowledge itself. For Hegel, on the other hand, nothing, in principle, is either unknowable or ineffable. Hegel would protest Spencer's agnosticism and would urge that, given being, essence, things, phenomena, and their historical and logical evolution within the cosmic ordering of progressive development, thought would necessarily posit a constructive and determining principle of reason as the intelligent alpha and omega. Hegel would further maintain that this principle of reason, i.e., the concept and eventually the absolute idea, which is sufficient to account for the logic and reality of cosmic evolution from beginning to end, is a self-contained, free, omnipotent activity, creating and sustaining all things in wisdom and goodness, and thus can be none other than the eternal absolute, or God. Hegel's claim that the underlying ground of all things must be a subject rather than a substance makes the transition to identifying this subject as the absolute or God quite natural. Further exposition of the Logic will show that the momentum of the entire dialectical movement makes this conclusion necessary (§ 81).



"... das Sein ... ist nicht zu empfinden, nicht anzuschauen und nicht

vorzustellen, sondern es ist der reine Gedanke und als solcher macht es den Anfang."

"Being cannot be felt, directly beheld, nor mentally imagined; on the contrary, it is pure thought and, as such, constitutes the starting point."

- Hegel, *EL*, § 86 *Zusatz* 1, p. 137 (translation modified); *HL*, p. 125; *LBD*, p. 137; *Enz.*, pp. 106-107.



Part II

The Theory of Being (§§ 84-111)

Hegel discusses the theory of being (*die Lehre vom Sein*) under its aspects of quality, quantity, and measure. Before beginning an exposition of Hegel's conceptions of these three logical components of being, we would do well to examine in some detail the general theory of being. Such an undertaking will serve at the same time as an introduction to his more specific teachings about the nature of being.

If we agree to regard knowledge as an evolution, then the beginnings of that evolution must represent the minimum of knowledge. Such a beginning is found in the category of being (§ 86). In ascribing to an object mere being without any further characterization, we render our assertion as indefinite as we can. Knowledge at such a low level is equivalent to no knowledge at all, or, as Hegel tersely puts it: "Being is the same as nothing" (§ 88; *EL*, p. 141; *HL*, p. 129; *LBD*, p. 141; *Enz.*, pp. 108-109). The apparent identification of being (*Sein*) and nothing (*Nichts*) or non-being (*Nichtsein*), when thrust upon us as a bare statement without comment, not only startles us but also arouses a very natural feeling of protest and perhaps even indignation. But first of all, for Hegel, pure being (*reines Sein*) is the same as *Nichts*, and *Nichts* is almost but not quite the same as *Nichtsein*. The difference is that *Sein* and *Nichts* oscillate between each other, and are in fact the same, but *Nichtsein*, on the other hand, is irrevocable non-existence or

unreality, with no possibility of ever changing over into being. *Nichtsein*, with no potential for development, is purely, completely, irrevocably, and statically "abstract," in Hegel's technical sense, while *Nichts*, with the constant - and constantly realized - potential to change over into *Sein*, is only penultimately "abstract" or even progressive. In other words, nothing is something, but non-being is truly nothing.

We say to ourselves, "Is Hegel merely juggling words? Is it possible that behind this abrupt formula he is secretly laughing at us, and that his whole system is just a keen satire on our limited powers of reason?" So it might seem, at least after a rapid or superficial glance at such a proposition. But when we come to analyze the statement that being and nothing are the same, we find that it is only an epigrammatic expression of what we have always believed most soundly; for we are accustomed to think that any indefinite or noncommittal statement is of no value or significance as knowledge. If it should be put to us in the form of a promise, it would carry with it no weight of assurance that the promise would ever be fulfilled. For us it would amount to nothing. This is expressed in Emily Dickinson's proverb: "Some time is no time."

We therefore see that Hegel's identification of being and nothing is equivalent to saying that whatever is presented to us as wholly indefinite ranks, in reference to its worth as knowledge, as though it did not even exist. If so, then the Hegelian epigram wins our assent immediately. Hegel's critics have tried to entrap him by asking: "Do you mean to tell us that a house is the same as no house? That a person is the same as no person? That a God is the same as no God?" Such questions indicate a radical misunderstanding of Hegel's conception of the relation of being to nothing. In these three examples - house, person, God - we have something more in each case than mere indeterminate being; we have being which has already been determined, i.e., rendered definite and explicit, and possesses the whole "concrete" content which these three words severally mean. These cases fall entirely outside the sphere of mere being, and hence are irrelevant to the point which these critics raise. Hegel affirms that being, i.e., pure being without any characterization whatsoever, absolutely indefinite and indeterminate in its essential qualities - is nothing (§ 87).

But while being, from one point of view as purely "abstract" being, is the same as nothing, from another point of view it is quite different from nothing. Being in Hegel's system is seen as the first stage in a dialectical or developmental series. It thus marks a beginning. While it is so far nothing explicitly or for itself (*für sich*), it must still be seen as

something implicitly or in itself (*an sich*) - i.e., it must contain - and indeed be - the potential of something which is to appear later in actual development. In it must be, as John Tyndall (1820-1893) put it in *The Beginnings of Things, or, Science Versus Theology* ([Boston: Mendum, 1874], p. 62), "the promise and potency" of all that is to follow throughout the subsequent stages of its growth. It would be correct to assert of a stone placed on a parapet at the top of a building: "This stone is at rest. It has no movement." Yet if it should be pushed away from its support, it would fall to the ground below because of the gravitational attraction which it possessed - as potency - by virtue of its position alone. Hence it would be correct to say in the first instance that it both is at rest and, nevertheless, potentially possesses movement. This movement is not yet actual; but even as only potential, it is real in a very strong sense. If being is thus to be seen as the first stage in a series, then we must think of it as having full potential as regards its latent qualities.

Suppose, therefore, that being, which we have conceived as the starting point in this growth process, begins to develop its potential qualities into actual ones. We find that whatever has heretofore been indefinite or undetermined now tends to become more and more definite or determined as the process advances. The very idea of development implies that each succeeding stage of the series is a manifestation of something which in the preceding stage had as yet no actuality. It is in this sense that Hegel affirms that becoming (*Werden*) is the unity of *Nichts* and *Sein* - i.e., a transition from that which is not to that which is (§ 88). Dialectic is *Werden*. The concept of *Werden* is contained in the relationship (*Verhältnis*) between *Sein* and *Nichts* - in fact, it is precisely this relationship. The back-and-forth, constantly reversible and reversing transition (*Übergang*) or oscillation between *Sein* and *Nichts* is *Werden*. We usually do not even notice it happening. But if thinking (*Denken*) were not movement (*Bewegung*), then we could not explain the origin of *Werden* out of the *Sein/Nichts* relationship.

Imagine that there is something barely discernible in the twilight. Our knowledge of it is completely exhausted by the bare statement that something is there. What its nature may be more specifically, its characteristics, as to form, color, and the like - what it is in fact, is unknown; it is nothing. Yet, while our knowledge of its true nature is so indefinite that we correctly designate it as nothing, it still contains at the same time the potential of something else which, under proper circumstances, may be revealed. Hence we may imagine the light gradually getting brighter, penetrating the surrounding darkness, so that this mysterious something becomes clearer to us, and so that

what only a moment earlier was indefinite and unknown becomes more definite and better known. Such a process is *Werden*, which consists of transition from the unknown to the known, a revelation of hidden qualities. This process may be appropriately characterized as the unity or unifying of that which is not with that which is, or as Hegel puts it, the unity of non-being (*Nichtsein*) or nothing (*Nichts*) and being (*Sein*). But remember that *Nichts* is not quite the same as *Nichtsein*.

The dialectical transitions in the Logic are not clear-cut, but this is not really a problem. The situation is analogous to burning wood. We start with wood, proceed through the charcoal phase, and end with ash. At some points in the burning process the wood becomes charcoal and then ash, but we are at a loss to say exactly when these changes happen. Moreover, at some indeterminate point the burning material is *both* wood and charcoal and at another it is *both* charcoal and ash.

Recall that the technical terms in Hegel's Logic can be divided into three types:

1. Names of processes, i.e., fixed, circular movements.
2. Names of movements, i.e., dynamic, one-way movements, from point A to point B.
3. Names of starting and ending points, i.e., the poles of movements or processes.

Becoming (*Werden*) is a process. Being (*Sein*) and nothing (*Nichts*) are its starting and ending points. The one-way movement from *Sein* to *Nichts* is "vanishing" or "passing out of being" (*Vergehen*). The one-way movement from *Nichts* to *Sein* is "originating" or "coming into being" (*Entstehen*). The never-ending oscillation between *Vergehen* and *Entstehen* is the process called *Werden*. *Vergehen* and *Entstehen* are the two complementary aspects of *Werden*. These two aspects of becoming, *Vergehen* and *Entstehen*, reciprocally paralyze each other. Yet at the same time they enable and invigorate each other. Being is becoming nothing. Nothing is becoming being. Becoming itself is not becoming anything and does not become anything. The circle of *Vergehen* and *Entstehen* is calm, stable, in equilibrium (*Gleichgewicht*), and eternal.

In this connection, the last two sections of the chapter on *Werden* in the *Science of Logic* (*WL*, vol. 1, pp. 92-95; *SLM*, pp. 105-108; *SLdG*, pp. 80-82) are key to understanding not only Hegel's Logic, but also his whole philosophical project. The following sentence, especially, is very important: "Das Werden ist ein haltungslose Unruhe, die in ein ruhiges Resultat zusammensinkt." - "Becoming is an unstable unrest which collapses into a calm result" (*WL*, vol. 1, p. 93; *SLM*, p. 106;

SLdG, p. 81). The "calm result" is its determinacy (*Bestimmtheit*), determinate being (*bestimmtes Sein*), or "being-there" (*Dasein*). That is, becoming, either as process or as the termination of the reciprocal process of *Vergehen* and *Entstehen*, is preserved, cancelled, and raised to the next higher level (*aufgehoben*) as a particular being: *Dasein* (§ 89).

The famous usage of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) aside, we might profit by asking to what the *da* in *Dasein* refers, both in ordinary German and specifically for Hegel. Literally *Da-sein* means "there-being" or "being-there" and is just the usual German word for "existence." For Hegel, the idea of *Dasein* is much simpler and more matter-of-fact than it is for Heidegger; i.e., Hegel uses the word pretty much as in ordinary German, to mean just "existence." So, as *Werden* settles into its "calm result" as "determinate being," it becomes identifiable, having emerged, at least to some extent, from the aforementioned twilight. It is not only "something," but now it is also something "there" (*da*). With a definite location in time, space, and thought, it is a phenomenon which "exists."

Hence, in this same passage (*WL*, vol. 1, p. 93; *SLM*, p. 106; *SLdG*, p. 81), Hegel means "determination of the whole" (*Bestimmung des Ganzen*) not as the whole whole, once and for all, total and absolute, but only the whole concept as presented and mediated so far. Hegel's dialectic, as he himself claims, is only following the lines of development which philosophical thought as a whole has already described in its path of progress from the ancient Greeks to his own time.

Hegel maintains that his system of evolving thought brings together into one overarching schema all the different phases of philosophical speculation which, at various times or eras in the total process of development, have respectively and often exclusively harped on one phase or another and have overlooked the interrelation of these phases, so that each partial viewpoint has missed the whole. To illustrate this idea, we need not evoke here the well-known subcontinental Indian fable of the blind men and the elephant, in which each perceiver is in a sense wrong but at the same time in a sense right. Rather, for instance, we might consider several competent botanists describing a plant, one referring to its seed, another its blossom, another its fruit, and yet another its possible use for medicinal purposes. In this case, all four scientists would be right, none wrong, even though they differ, since they each acknowledge the incompleteness of their respective emphases. Because each description is partial, all of them should be brought together in order to form one complete description of the plant. Similarly, for Hegelian philosophy,

each (logically, not necessarily chronologically) prior philosophical or scientific position represents a phase in the whole (logical, not necessarily chronological) process of philosophical or scientific growth.

For example, the system of Parmenides of Elea (5th century B.C.E.) regarded the idea of being separately from its relations to non-being and to becoming. The consequence was that his system represented the world as consisting of rigidly unalterable elements, merely ready-made or unchanging products, from which the idea of any process whatsoever had to be completely excluded. But Heraclitus of Ephesus (6th century B.C.E.), on the contrary, held that the truth of being consisted in perpetual becoming. Everything flows (*Panta rei*), he said. Thus Heraclitus was equally as one-sided as Parmenides, but in the opposite way, insofar as his systematic category of becoming trumped and to some extent excluded all others. For Hegel, Heraclitus marks an advance over Parmenides, insofar as Heraclitus's idea of becoming also implied the idea of being, so that, while (anachronistically) he destroyed the being of Parmenides with one hand, he restored it with the other, regarding it as an essential factor in the whole process of becoming. Also for Hegel, the difference between Parmenides and Heraclitus has followed the lines of dialectical movement, insofar as these seemingly contradictory positions from either of their respective viewpoints are brought together in a higher unity, and from a more comprehensive viewpoint, as the Parmenidean idea of being is absorbed or *aufgehoben* in the Heraclitean idea becoming.

The result of the process of becoming, in any "concrete" instance, must be some definite product. In a very Heraclitean way, Hegel likens this process to a fire which constantly consumes its fuel, yet does not leave any kind of empty nothing as a result. What is destroyed in one form is preserved in another. The immediate result attained by this process is *Dasein*, i.e., being which has been rendered definite through the manifestation of its characteristic qualities. The word *Dasein* thus denotes "definite or determinate being," or the penultimate culmination of becoming.



Determinacy and Indeterminacy (§§ 84-85)

Hegel's crucial consideration with regard to the question of where to start the logical system is "indeterminacy" (*Unbestimmtheit*). We must begin with whatever is indeterminate, simply because, from the standpoint of the eventually mediated dialectic, we do not know anything yet. Hence, determinacy is the beginning of knowledge, i.e., the beginning of the movement from nothing to the realization of the concept (*Begriff*). But what does it mean to be "determinate" (*bestimmt*)?

Being, even determinate being or being elevated to its concept, exists merely in itself (*an sich*) (§ 84). It just sits there, as it were. For full actuality and constructive activity, it needs further determination, from the mere form of determinacy to a "concrete," interrelated plurality of individual entities and concepts. It needs to proceed according to a movement from determinacy (*Bestimmtheit*) in general to the "concrete" act of determining (*Bestimmen*) and to particular determinations (*Bestimmungen*). In other words, determinacy must determine such things as difference, self-relation, finitude, and even the concept itself and the absolute itself, or God (§ 85). Everything is definable, determinable, and effable, but this work must be conceived and done, not merely imagined. Being in itself must move toward being for itself (*für sich*), as we shall see in § 96 and following.



Quality (§§ 86-98)

That which determines a being or renders it definite is its quality (*Qualität*). Quality is what constitutes it as what it is. Modify its

quality, and the being itself is likewise modified. Hegel's plan is to discuss the bare idea of quality in general, not to enter a discussion of the nature of any specific quality in particular. His question is, "What do we understand by the idea of the quality of anything?"

Hegel draws a distinction at the outset between the categories of quality and quantity (*Quantität*) (§ 85 *Zusatz*). Quality in general is immediate determinacy (§ 90), the internal determining factor of being, with quantity as its external determining factor. Any variation in whatever makes any being what it is will, of course, affect the nature of being itself; but a variation in how much or how little of that being may be taken does not necessarily affect the nature of being itself. For example, a drop of ocean water does not differ in quality from the entire ocean, of which it is just an infinitesimal portion. Being and its quality are identical in the sphere of nature, but not quite so obviously identical in the sphere of mind (*Geist*). The various mental functions cannot be accurately described as consisting of certain definite and invariable qualities. The very complexity of the phenomena of *Geist* make simplifying them into definite qualities a difficult if not an impossible task. There is, for example, no determinate quality of either memory or will attaching to consciousness as such.

Quality has both a positive and a negative aspect. Positively, the quality of any determinate being (*Dasein*) constitutes its reality, i.e., makes it what it is. Negatively, the quality of such a being is determined by a certain natural "limit" or "boundary" (*Grenze*) beyond which, if we proceed in thought, there is immediately a marked change in quality and thus in the very nature of the being. There are two kinds of *Grenze*: qualitative and quantitative. *Grenze* is not the same as *Schranke* ("barrier") (§ 92). *Grenze* is that which perfunctorily separates *Etwas* and *Anderes* ("something" and its "other"). *Schranke* functions not only as a barrier, but also shows what is beyond the barrier, namely, "the ought" (*Sollen*). The dialectical relation between *Schranke* and *Sollen* with regard to finitude (*Endlichkeit*) is analogous to the dialectical relation between arising (*Entstehen*) and perishing (*Vergehen*) with regard to becoming (*Werden*).

"Something" or "anything" (*Etwas*) may be seen as a process, with "quality" and "reality" (*Realität*) as its two poles. The one-way movement from *Qualität* to *Realität* is "determinacy" (*Bestimmtheit*). The one-way movement from *Realität* to *Qualität* is "differentiation" (*Unterscheiden*). The never-ending oscillation between *Bestimmtheit* and *Unterscheiden* is the process called *Etwas*. *Bestimmtheit* and *Unterscheiden* are the two complementary aspects of *Etwas* (§ 91; cf. § 96 *Zusatz*). Reality sort of sneaks in through the back door in § 91.

Here we speak of the qualitative limit, which is essentially a limit as to kind, and its boundary marks a definite change of kind. The quantitative, on the other hand, is naturally a boundary of magnitude, and marks a purely quantifiable or even numerical change. The qualitative limit is a form of negative determination, i.e., if its boundary is overstepped, then the being in question changes its nature, perhaps radically. Such limits are, therefore, the determining points of being. From the time of the ancient Greeks, some philosophers have believed that to think a limit is to go beyond it. Hence, on this view, with which Hegel would mostly agree, there would be no real limits, or at least no limits on thinking. But paradoxically, the act of thinking (*Denken*) often stands in contrast to the being that exists (*Daseiendes*) (§ 90), especially to the extent that this being is still "abstract."

A finite being can know its full qualitative possibility but cannot achieve it. Such predetermination to inadequacy or insufficiency - some might call it failure - is what defines finitude. *Finitum non capax infiniti*. This is the limit of *Sollen*. That is, the finite reaches endlessly toward the infinite, but only in an extended, linear way, so that the finite's exertions toward the infinite constitute for it only what Hegel calls the "bad, spurious, or negative infinite" (*schlechte oder negative Unendlichkeit*) (§ 94). i.e., an infinite series with little mediation and no resolution. Hegel's analysis of *Sollen* is implicit criticism of Kant's moral philosophy, especially Kant's belief that we can never be good. Kant's entire philosophy can be seen as a theory of the metaphysical restraints on finite being(s). *Sollen*, for Kant, means that a finite being knows its moral possibility but cannot actualize it. Kant writes in § 76 of the *Critique of Judgment*: "... only because of the subjective character of our practical ability do we have to present moral laws as commands (and the actions conforming to them as duties) and does reason express this necessity not by is (i.e., happens) but by ought to be. This would not be the case if we considered reason, regarding its causality, as being without sensibility (the subjective condition for applying reason to objects of nature), and hence as being a cause in an intelligible world that harmonized throughout with the moral law" (translated by Werner S. Pluhar [Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987], pp. 286-287). For Hegel, such a view would be one-sided, incomplete, selective, and ultimately sterile or even subversive for the aspirations of the human spirit. Hegel instead would say that just because we know that we cannot achieve the infinite is no reason for us not to try.

To understand the nature of being in any particular instance, we must know, not only in a general way what kind of a being is under discussion, but also definitely at just what point a variation in its

quality would cause it to transform into some other kind of being. Hegel emphasizes especially that the very idea of limit signifies that it marks a boundary line between two kinds of being. It is impossible to conceive of a limit which would be the boundary of only one thing, since even while it circumscribes only one, it separates it at the same time from something else. Therefore, the very existence of any determinate being necessarily implies that something else lies beyond its limit, and this "something else" is what Hegel calls its "other" (*Anderes*). The conception of this "other," the obverse, as it were, of every determinate being, plays a conspicuous and significant role in Hegel's system.

The other which stands over against every determinate being is not just anything which happens to lie outside the sphere of the determinate being in question; rather, it must be that particular other which is, as it were, its next of kin or, as we have said, its obverse. It could in some cases be an Empedoclean complement, i.e., that which, in the philosophy of Empedocles (5th century B.C.E.), would form half of a natural pair which, if sundered, would cause horrible strife that could be remedied only by love and reunification (cf. Aristophanes's tale in Plato's *Symposium*, 189c-193d). Something and its other must lie within the boundaries of some common system to which both may be referred. To regard, say, a triangle and a horse, or a fish and bicycle, as examples of a certain determinate being and its other would be incorrect. Triangles and horses do not help to determine each other, nor do fish and bicycles. Good examples would include man and woman, life and death, being and essence, quality and quantity, identity and difference, and, since something and its other in the Hegelian sense are not necessarily pairs of opposites, somewhat less obvious examples would be ellipse and circle, fruit and tree, or religion and philosophy. Something in its otherness (*Anderssein*) from something else is naturally more fully determined than something whose limit and other are not recognized (§ 91).

As Hegel puts it, every determinate being in the process of development has a certain meaning in itself (*an sich*), i.e., considered merely within its own sphere; but this meaning is always partial or "abstract" because it remains undeveloped and requires for its completion a consideration of the nature of its limit, and this in turn can be known only as we pass over into the adjacent sphere of its other. The full meaning, therefore, of any determinate being can be grasped only when we think of it as not only *an sich*, but also for itself (*für sich*) and for another (*für Anderes*) as well, i.e., its corresponding other.

This conception is the basis of the idea of dialectical evolution, which

is continuous change, such that every next or advancing phase is the necessary other of the phase which immediately preceded it. As the great cosmic system is evolutionary, every determinate being in it must show inherently this tendency toward constant alteration (*Veränderlichkeit*) or passing over into its other. But when any determinate being passes over into its other, this other, itself possessing determinate being, must also have its own other to complete its own meaning, and so on without end (§ 93). We are thus launched upon an infinite series that can never be satisfactory, because it can never be complete. It is an endless parade of phenomena that can bring only unutterable weariness to any mind which attempts to follow it. This infinite but non-resolving series, the bad infinite, is just the tedious extension of finite terms in a never-ending process, but involves no genuine progress or mediation. Metaphorically, the bad infinite is an endless ray or vector, but the "good, true, or genuine infinite" (*wahrhafte Unendlichkeit*) is a circle, because a circle is complete in itself. The adjective "infinite" (*unendlich*) and the noun "infinite" or "infinity" (*Unendlichkeit*) have many meanings, the careful study of which will reward the student of Hegelian philosophy in general.

The finite, for Hegel, may be described as that which contains within itself its own contradiction. Its very incompleteness is the cause of its breaking down under its own weight. As Hegel characteristically describes it, it negates itself. It needs always to be referred to some other being as its cause and explanation, its necessary other. But such a process is, as we have seen, infinite, limitless. Hegel's idea of the true or genuine infinite is that, despite this indefinitely continuing process of referring always to some further beyond, there is at each stage of the process a suggestion that the underlying ground of not only each particular stage, but also the entire evolution itself, of which this stage and even this ground are themselves just very small phases, rests on some absolute basis (§ 95) and will eventually be resolved. Therefore, every cross-section, as it were, of the continuing process of development is to be seen as a manifestation of eternal reason, the absolute idea. This is Hegel's fundamental principle of absolute idealism. In any change from any imperfectly determinate phase to another there is always something which remains unalterable and, when it passes over into its other, is still itself. This Hegel calls *Fürsichsein*, or "being for itself," i.e., being conceived as possessing a certain constant core of self-identity amid all variation, and which preserves its own integrity as determinate being despite any modifying force to which it may be subjected. This essentially permanent element in being partakes of the nature of the absolute, and encloses within its finite appearance an Eckhartian spark (*Fünklein*). Its process

is the true infinite.

Therefore, insofar as the quality of any determinate being is determined by a process of negation which assigns to it a definite limit, to conceive being in its more developed form as being for itself is to regard this limit as in a certain sense obliterated, because being as thus conceived and its other then fall together within a single sphere of common reference. This obliteration of limit or boundary is a process of negation; but fixing the limit in the former process was also a negation. The obliteration of the limit is thus the negation of a negation, i.e., an absolute negation, and has, therefore, the force of an affirmation. As the seed develops the first shoots which appear above the ground, these change into stalk and twigs, which put forth leaves and blossoms, and finally bear fruit. Each stage of growth changes into its other, but are all embraced in one. The various limits which mark the stages of transition disappear in our thought of the plant as a whole, which endures in its integrity throughout the whole process, even in the seed itself. An even better illustration of Hegelian being for itself is found in the higher sphere of consciousness, the nature of personality, the "I." The overall personhood of the self remains unchanged amid innumerable alterations of its manifold activities, and in this way partakes of the absolute permanence which is an essential attribute of the infinite. The idea of the "I" - consciousness apart from its "concrete" manifestation in any particular individual (Kant's *Bewusstsein überhaupt*, "consciousness in general") - may be seen as the most comprehensive feature of the absolute. Every individual "I" must therefore partake of the nature of the absolute whose image it bears, "for Reason, as tis now, does not bind in its *own* name, but in the name of its *Supreme Lord*, and *Sovereign*, by whom Reason *lives*, and *moves*, and *has its being*," as Nathanael Culverwel wrote in *An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature* (1669).

Moreover, we find in the category of being for itself an intimation of ideality (*Idealität*). For Hegel, ideality in all being is the elemental, dynamic, and constructive principle which works out its ends from within. It is the immanent reason in everything, the self-directing and self-manifesting architectonic principle. As we have seen, determinate being is referred to the category of reality; but we must regard being for itself under the category of ideality. The two are not contradictory, however, since ideality just represents deeper insight and implies reality as its necessary correlate. Hegel draws attention to the fact that the term "reality" is used in two senses: (1) As has already been pointed out, reality is conceived as identical with the positive side of determinate being, i.e., the manifestation of some definite quality which renders being what it is. Thus we speak of the reality of a plan

or purpose, when it remains no longer merely an inner or subjective notion, but has been realized in some definite form of actual being.

(2) Reality signifies anything that exists in a state completely conformable to its essential nature, or that conforms completely to its concept or essential idea. For instance, when we say, "He is a real man," we mean that he is someone who has realized the ideal of manhood. In this sense Hegel insists that reality and ideality are inseparable correlates. The real is the ideal, and the ideal is the real.

Insofar as our thought brings being for itself and being for its other together through the underlying unity which embraces them both in a single system - even, for instance, in a single organism - we consequently may regard these two phases of being as constituting (penultimately) a closed sphere. While the unit thus formed is complex, it is nevertheless one by itself, separate from all others. To be for itself means to be a single entity (§ 96). This *Aufhebung* is the final stage in the development of quality, but at the same time suggests a natural transition to quantity. The very idea of anything which we can designate as individual implies that there should be others of the same kind. The idea of "one" necessitates the complementary idea of "many." Either idea would be meaningless if not for the contrast between the one and the many.

As now we can conceive of many ones grouped together, each one may be seen as excluding every other one from itself, and such a relation is reciprocal repulsion (*gegenseitige Repulsion*) or reciprocal exclusion (*gegenseitiges Ausschliessen*) (§ 97). But at the same time we must not overlook that, even though reciprocally repelling or excluding, these many ones are still all of the same kind and consequently fall together in a single system. There must be some bond of attraction which holds them together in an underlying unity.

If, in this complex unity, we emphasize the idea of the particularity or separate individuality of each of its elements, we bring to the fore the idea of repulsion. But if, on the other hand, we emphasize that each one is grouped with many others of the same kind, then we give prominence to the idea of attraction (*Attraktion*), which constitutes their common being (§ 98).

The reciprocal repulsion of the many was discussed in ancient atomist philosophy; but there the common bond was chance. Some number of atoms falling into the same group was considered to be wholly fortuitous. In Hegel's system, on the contrary, the common bond which unifies each separate system of being, and also unites all such systems ultimately into one, is instantiated reason, the absolute idea as universal creator and organizer.

If the one in any particular system of being is seen as merely one of many, all of the same kind, then the idea of quality becomes irrelevant, and may be suspended altogether. Thus the transition is made to the idea of pure quantity, in which the idea of the quality of any number of objects is eliminated because quality is reduced in every case to a Leibnizian identity of indiscernibles.

Hegel's development of being may be summarized as consisting of three stages and three corresponding processes. The three stages are:

1. Indeterminate being (*Sein*) (§§ 86-88).
2. Determinate being (*Dasein*) (§§ 89-95).
3. Being for itself (*Fürsichsein*) (§§ 96-98).

The three corresponding processes are:

1. Becoming (*Werden*) (§ 88).
2. "Being other" (*Anderssein*) or alteration or "othering" (*Veränderung*) (§§ 91-95).
3. Attraction (*Attraktion*) and repulsion (*Repulsion*) (§§ 97-98).



10

Quantity (§§ 99-106)

The idea of quantity concerns that aspect of pure being from which any tinge of quality has been eliminated. Hegel describes the category of quantity from three points of view:

1. Quantity in general or pure quantity (*reine Quantität*) (§§ 99-100).
2. Determinate quantity (*Quantum*) (§§ 101-102).
3. Degree (*Grad*) (§§ 103-106).

We will see in the following exposition that these three sides of quantity correspond to the three general divisions of quality:

1. Being in general (*allgemeines Sein*) or pure being (*reines Sein*) (§ 99).
2. Determinate being (*bestimmtes Sein*) or being-there (*Dasein*) (§ 102).

3. Self-determined being (*selbstbestimmtes Sein*) or being for itself (*Fürsichsein*) (§§ 104-106).

Hegel applies the term "magnitude" (*Grösse*) to determinate quantity, not the general idea of quantity (§ 99). Yet quantity in general may be considered apart from any reference to definite magnitude, just as quality in general was considered apart from any reference to specific qualities. While quantity may be seen by itself as an essential moment in the evolution of universal reason, we must not see it as exclusive or exhaustive. Hegel has no sympathy with any kind of quantitative reductionism, i.e., any tendency to quantify all phenomena, even mental or spiritual phenomena, in the name of empiricism or any other kind of science. He insists that any simply mechanical view of the universe, which such quantitative reduction implies, is by no means complete or comprehensive. A mechanical view may seem to suffice with regard to the inorganic world, but falls short of adequate explanation when we come to the organic, mental, spiritual, emotional, social, political, artistic, metaphysical, logical, or psychological worlds, especially when we seek to explain the phenomena of the free activity of the mind.

Insofar as quantity is a necessary evolution from being, and also marks a definite characteristic of being, it may, according to Hegel's general method, be seen as an attribute of the absolute in one of its manifold phases. To define the absolute merely as quantity would represent, of course, a very one-sided and limited conception; but if, on the other hand, quantity were omitted altogether, the idea of the absolute would lack an essential element of its characterization.

When we come to a more specific inquiry about the nature of our idea of quantity, we find that it may be conceived from either of two points of view: Quantity may be either (1) continuous (*kontinuierlich*), i.e., in one unit, or (2) discrete (*diskret*), i.e., in many units (§ 100). If we regard quantity as a sum of many parts or units - or as the one which is composed of or divisible into the many - and if we emphasize the unity into which these many blend, then we are representing quantity as continuous. If, on the other hand, we discount in our thought the connecting bond(s), and instead emphasize the relative isolation and reciprocal exclusiveness of the several parts - seeing them as the many which comprise or constitute the one - then quantity will appear to us as discrete. A line is an example of continuous quantity. A bushel of apples is a discrete quantity. However, the terms, "continuous" and "discrete," are not mutually exclusive. For example, time on an analog watch seems continuous, but artificially and conveniently broken into countable units; while time on a digital watch seems like an aggregate of discrete units cobbled together into a continuum. Yet time is time,

however we may choose to conceive or measure it.

Quite in keeping with Hegel's point of view, either one of these terms, apart from and excluding the other, represents a mere "abstraction," i.e., a partial and therefore misleading conception. Truth is found always in-between, in the unity or reconciliation of the two. They could be seen as mirror images of each other, or as two sides of the same coin. They are an example of what Hegel elsewhere calls "identity in difference" (*Identität im Unterschiede*) and discusses as "the unity of identity and difference" briefly in § 121 of the shorter *Logic* and more fully in Chapter 2 of "The Theory of Essence" in the larger *Logic*. Hegel derived his idea of their unity from the "coincidence of opposites" (*coincidentia oppositorum*) of Nicolas Cusanus (1401-1464).

Every continuous quantity is in a sense discrete, and likewise, every discrete quantity is in the opposite sense continuous. Again, this juxtaposition of the continuous and the discrete is the same as the post-Hegelian distinction between the analog and the digital. Anything can be a quantity in either an analog or a digital schema. Consider again the measurement of time. Either a traditional analog watch with moving hands or a modern digital watch with ever-changing numbers can tell time accurately. The display is different, but time itself is the same in both cases. The difference between the continuous and the discrete is a distinction of quality within the idea of quantity. We can never avoid considerations of quality.

We may see a line as discrete in the sense that it is composed of an infinite number of separate points, or divided into an infinite number of distinct segments, each a certain length measurable in centimeters, inches, or some other arbitrary units. Conversely, we may see a bushel of apples as continuous if, for instance, we compare the price of apples per bushel now with the price at the same time last year. Here the emphasized unit is the bushel, not the single apple. The bushel, when regarded as a whole rather than as a collection of unit apples, is a continuous quantity. Kant's first and second antinomies, regarding (1) limited vs. limitless space and time and (2) divisible vs. indivisible matter, can be resolved by applying these considerations. Seen as continuous magnitudes, they are infinitely divisible; but seen as discrete magnitudes, they are not. Their seeming contradictions emerge only from different points of view.

When we come to the idea of definite quantity, or quantum, as Hegel calls it, we find that it arises necessarily whenever we ask, "How much?" It bears the same relation to quantity in general that determinate being bears to being in general. Every quantum, or definite magnitude, may be conceived also as composed of parts which are themselves quanta of lesser magnitudes. Every definite

magnitude, as distinct from all others, forms a unity, a closed system, as it were, separate and for itself, yet still subject to further analysis within its own limits. It is a manifold constituted in its parts. Thus we see that quantum must involve number (§ 101). We may interpret number as comprehending the two moments or aspects of the idea of quantum, namely, (1) sum or total as a discrete quantity and (2) unity as a continuous quantity. From the various combinations, interrelations, and reciprocities of these two moments come all the modes of reckoning which comprise arithmetic. We may regard any arithmetical operation as based on the principle of putting numbers in the relation of unity *qua* sum, difference, quotient, product, or other total amount; and establishing the equality of these two functions (§ 102).

Thus the simplest arithmetical operation is counting, which may be defined as a process which aims to construct an aggregate or sum by putting together separate units, one after another. In this operation each unit ranks the same in value as every other. There is no quantitative distinction of any kind among them. But it is also possible to conceive each unit in question as possessing a value different from every other - i.e., each unit may be conceived as itself an aggregate or sum, possessing varying values, as 3, 7, 9, 4, etc. When we enumerate these sums in order to find the total value in simple units, we are performing the operation of addition.

In multiplication each unit is also an aggregate, but they are all alike, not varying in value, whereas in addition they are ordinarily unlike. However, multiplication may be represented as a kind of addition. We may have the following aggregates to count: 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8; and we may do this by addition, regarding it merely as a special case in which the aggregates are all alike. Or we can obtain the same result directly by taking eight seven times, which is the process of multiplication. In multiplication we are indifferent about which of the two factors we see as the aggregate and which as the unit.

The process of raising a number to a power is a special case of multiplication. To raise any number to the second power, for instance, the aggregate is taken as many times as it itself contains simple units. Thus 8 squared is 8 taken 8 times. In such a process is represented the equivalence of total and unity. To raise any number to a higher power requires only to repeat this process.

Addition, multiplication, and raising to a power exhaust the modes of arithmetical calculation. The three other arithmetical processes, i.e., subtraction, division, and taking the root of a number, are not distinct types of arithmetical operations, but are merely the inverse operations of the first three.

Here we might ask what *Bestimmung* (determination) and *Beschaffenheit* (character, condition, or constitution) mean with respect to each other. The present context determines quantity as countable or unifiable quanta - and this is its qualitative character. Recall that we can never avoid involving quality, however assiduously we may try to reduce something to its mere quantity. Quantity itself has a quality, and this quality is its *Beschaffenheit*. It is so determined (*bestimmt*).

As with quantity in general we found the distinction between continuous and discrete magnitudes, so with quantum or determinate quantity, there is a similar distinction between extensive and intensive magnitude. Extensive magnitude corresponds to continuous quantity, and intensive to discrete. This correspondence can be seen through the following considerations: Magnitude is definite only if it possesses a definite quantitative limit. If this magnitude is seen as a continuous quantity, then the limit is marked simply by the contour or periphery of the magnitude itself, i.e., its boundary of definition. From this perspective, the separate identity of each part is lost in the whole, which is one and not many, as all parts are included within the same circumscribed limit. But if the magnitude is seen as discrete, then any of its distinct parts, just by its position, may mark a definite limit (§ 103). For example, when we take anyone's temperature, only one limiting degree is significant. The quantity of heat, thus measured, is given in terms of intensity or degree (*Grad*).

Regarding the intensity of quantitative determination, the various discrete units may be seen as arranged in order, so as to form a series; therefore they do not all count alike. There would always be one which, by its position in the series, marks the limit, and thus has a particular significance attached to it. As such a series rises, falls, or goes forward or backward, as the case may be, the different units marking the varying limit in every case indicate corresponding levels of intensity.

Just as a continuous quantity may be seen as discrete, and a discrete quantity as continuous, so also an extensive magnitude may be seen as intensive, and an intensive magnitude as extensive. For instance, the intensity of heat may have an extensive significance as interpreted by the height of the column of mercury. This intensity determines the extent to which the mercury - a unit - has extensively risen in the tube. Hegel also illustrates this feature of change from intensive to extensive in the sphere of *Geist*. He claims that someone with a certain intensity of mental power is, at the same time, someone who touches others' lives on many sides, so that this capacity has evidently an extensive manifestation as well (§ 103 *Zusatz*). This last illustration

seems rather fanciful, and should be taken figuratively, not literally.

Hegel again protests quantitative reductionism, i.e., here against those who would subordinate intensive magnitude to a mere form of extensive magnitude. He insists that while they are most intimately correlated in thought, nevertheless there is a real distinction between the two that should not be overlooked. The idea of intensity contains a rich, qualitative element which is lacking in the bare idea of extension. This, however, must not be interpreted as signifying that intensive magnitude is or could be independent of extensive magnitude. Neither must be so merged into the other as to lose its distinctive characteristics.

The very idea of quantity is such that the limit which renders quantity a definite amount - or a definite extensive degree of intensity - must be conceived as varying indefinitely without affecting the nature or quality of the magnitude in question. The limit which determines any amount or degree is purely external (§ 104), and the idea of quantity includes the possibility of pushing beyond quantity indefinitely. There is no natural or necessary restriction on any quantitative limit; hence the continuous breaking down in our thought of any limit necessitates our conceiving - or rather, imagining - an infinite quantitative progression. In this connection Hegel quotes Aristotle quoting Zeno, who has put this idea enigmatically: "It is the same to say something *once* and to say it *constantly*" (§ 104; *EL*, p. 165; *HL*, p. 153; *LBD*, p. 164; *Enz.*, p. 120).

But such an infinite series gives a false idea of the true significance of infinity. It is false for the same reason that the qualitatively infinite progression is false, as we have already seen. It is an infinite that Spinoza calls imaginary (Letter XII to Meyer, April 20, 1663). To expand on this version of the bad infinite, Hegel (§ 104 *Zusatz 2*; *EL*, p. 166; *HL*, p. 154; *LBD*, p. 165; *Enz.*, p. 120) quotes eight lines from "Über die Ewigkeit" ("Beyond Eternity"), an unfinished poem by Albrecht von Haller (1708-1777):

Ich häufe ungeheure Zahlen
Gebürge Millionen auf,
Ich wälze Zeit auf Zeit und Welt auf Welten hin,
Und wann ich auf der March des endlichen nun bin
Und von der fürchterlichen Höhe
Mit Schwindeln wieder nach dir sehe,
Ist alle Macht der Zahl, vermehrt mit Tausend Malen,
Noch nicht ein Teil von dir.

I pile up immense numbers,
Mountains of millions.

I roll time over time, and world over world,
And now when I am at the boundary of the finite
And from that awful height
With reeling brain I look toward thee,
All the power of number increased a thousandfold
Is not yet one part of thee.

Hegel remarks that Haller does well to add to that description of the false infinite this closing line: "Ich tilge sie, und du liegst ganz vor mir" ("I blot them out, and thou liest fully before me"). This means that the true infinite is not merely another world which transcends or extends the finite; and if we are ever to appreciate its significance, we must learn to see it as something other than just indefinite linear, numerical, or extensible "progress."

The ancient Pythagoreans, as is well-known, magnified the theory of number into a complete system of philosophy. Even though his school unduly exaggerated the concept of number as expressing the essence of being, we still must not overlook that Pythagoras touched upon an important truth by insisting that there are certain states of things, or certain phenomena of nature, whose characteristics seem to vary according to a scale of number relations. This may be illustrated in the relation between music and reality. According to common tradition, it was variations in tone, pitch, and harmony which first suggested to Pythagoras the idea that the essence of all things was number. Hegel, according to his general method, adopts the teachings of this school, not as a complete system of philosophy, but as just one phase among many in the development of universal reason. Pythagorean theory corresponds roughly to Hegel's idea of quantitative relation (*quantitatives Verhältnis*), which marks a natural transition to the third division of the theory of being: measure (*Mass*).

Quantitative relation is that which obtains between numbers which themselves may vary indefinitely, provided only the relation itself remains constant (§ 105). In other words, it is just a plain ratio. The relation 2:4 is the same as 3:6. Amid varying quantities, there is thus a constant which retains its own specific character through a potentially limitless process. This idea of a constant feature within quantitative variation suggests that this constant value has qualitative force, since it is quality which remains unchanged through quantitative change. Thus, in developing the idea of quantity in all its possible implications, we find, between the synchronized alterations in magnitude that form a ratio, a constant of such a nature that the idea of quantity will not explain it satisfactorily. We therefore fall back again on the idea of quality in order to account for it. But we have already found the fully developed idea of quality to be incomplete in

itself, so that when it was developed to its utmost limit, it carried our thought over into the sphere of quantity (§ 106). Then, in turn, the fully developed idea of quantity brought us back again to quality. So, is this movement (*Bewegung*) of thought only a circle that merely brings us back to the starting point? By Hegel's method, the incompleteness of thought at this stage is overcome by the dialectical process which unites these two ideas, quality and quantity, into a third idea at an advanced or higher point of view. Hegel calls this new development "qualitative quantum" (§ 107; *EL*, p. 170; *HL*, p. 157; *LBD*, p. 168; *Enz.*, p. 120), or measure. This *Aufhebung* of quality and quantity represents the truth of quality and quantity combined.



11

Measure (§§ 107-111)

We have seen how the category of being, when allowed to develop fully its own inherent nature, discloses the phases of quantity and quality. There now remains to be considered the relation between quantity and quality, which in itself constitutes a distinct category. Only an extremely "abstract" view of quantity would regard it as having no qualitative significance. In any "concrete" view which embraces the totality of elements whose interrelations constitute the significance of a concept, there are usually some quantitative differences which must be seen as having conspicuous qualitative implications - and vice versa. For instance, the generally expected size of any given animal is intimately associated with the complex of properties which form its qualitative determinants. This is true to such an extent that the element of magnitude itself ranks as a qualitative characteristic of animals, e.g., the size of an elephant or a mouse is seen as one of its determining marks or essential properties. The notion of an elephant having the dimensions of a mouse, or a mouse bulking large as an elephant, would do violence to the essential features which constitute the concepts of these animals. There is, of

course, an allowable margin of variation, so that a difference in size within certain limits may be seen as an accidental property of an animal, having no special significance. But beyond certain well-defined limits, this allowance is not the case.

The quantity/quality relation, which indicates for every quantitative change a corresponding qualitative value, and vice versa, Hegel calls measure (*Mass*). He uses this term almost to mean "standard" or "type." To translate *Mass* literally as "measure" does not convey its full significance as Hegel employs it. We might do better to translate it with a circumlocution. Illustrations of its Hegelian meaning are found not only throughout the biological world, but also in the inorganic world, where, for example, each element possesses its own specific gravity, so that this quantitative coefficient becomes in each case a distinctive, qualitative mark of a definite group of constant, correlated properties. Thus the specific gravity of gold, though just a number, is inseparably associated with all the essential properties of gold by which it is what it is. Similar illustrations involve the relative differences between two corresponding series, e.g., between the variations in thickness of the four strings on a violin and the accompanying four different pitches, or between the variations in wavelengths of light and the proportionate differences in color. The former in each case represent purely quantitative differences; and the latter, qualitative. Between them there exists an exact, one-to-one correspondence. Each of these illustrations shows a necessary relation between a variation in quantity and the corresponding variation in quality.

In accord with Hegel's general procedure, we see every phase in the progressive development of being as a manifestation of an attribute of the absolute. In the present situation, therefore, the absolute, or God, may be defined as *Mass* - i.e., God is the absolute standard, the measure, the ideal, or the archetype, of all creation. This signifies that the absolute must naturally contain the norm or standard of all things. This agrees with the Hebrew conception of God, whereby God has appointed to everything its proper bound and typical form. In his description of wisdom, Job exclaims in 28:23-28 (RSV):

23. God understands the way to it, and he knows its place.

24. For he looks to the ends of the earth, and sees everything under the heavens.

25. When he gave to the wind its weight, and meted out the waters by measure;

26. when he made a decree for the rain, and a way for the lightning of the thunder;

27. then he saw it and declared it; he established it, and searched it

out.

28. And he said to man, "Behold, the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom; and to depart from evil is understanding."

In ancient Greek religion this idea is also frequently expressed, especially in the doctrine of Nemesis (§ 107 *Zusatz*). According to this conception, there is a natural limit to all things, to riches, honor, power, pleasure, and even pain, so that when anyone exceeds the definite allotment for any of them, there must inevitably follow its corresponding opposite, personified by the avenging goddess of justice, Nemesis. In this way natural balance is restored. Hegel characteristically, like many thinkers of his time, draws upon ancient forms of religion both to illustrate and to justify his own point of view. He recognizes that religious and philosophical teachers of all ages have noticed important truths which he gathers together into a unified, all-encompassing philosophical system. This is not eclecticism; it is philosophical syncretism.

Since there is some form or size which may be seen as the standard or type for any given class, then deviations from this standard or type may occur, within certain limits, without affecting the integrity of the class. Such exceptions within such limits are merely natural departures from what Hegel calls the "rule" (*Regel*), i.e., the standard form or size in any given class (§ 108). For Hegel "rule" has the same significance as the term "mode," which signifies the prevailing type in a bell curve showing the relative distribution of variations, the curve itself indicating the manner in which these variations are distributed around the standard itself. In such a curve, the maximum ordinate represents the mode, and the varying lengths of the other ordinates the relative number of cases corresponding to the different variations.

It is significant, however, that the range of possible deviations from any prevailing type is necessarily limited, so that, if it is exceeded, then the type itself is so far changed as to constitute an essentially new type, a distinct class. It thus appears that, up to a certain limit, there may be continuous increasing or decreasing of quantity in the given magnitude with no appreciable effect on the corresponding quality. While the quantity may vary, the quality nevertheless remains constant. But, in this process of variation, some point must always be reached at which a quantitative change begins to produce qualitative change as well. Hegel illustrates this by noting that the temperature of water seems quite independent of its qualitative state of liquidity, but as we change the temperature through a wide range we finally reach a level of either heat, 212° F, or cold, 32° F, which marks a clear qualitative change as the liquid becomes either vapor or ice. Between these limits, the various temperature changes have little or no

qualitative significance. As Hegel remarks, the approach toward either limit occurs without any accompanying circumstances to anticipate it as far as our normal observation goes, so that the point which begins the corresponding qualitative change is reached, as it were, by stealth.

Hegel's illustration of variations in water temperature may be further supplemented as follows, shedding some additional light on the exposition. It is well-known in physics that, before reaching the freezing point, the decreasing temperature causes a proportional decrease in the volume of the water. This decrease in volume is continuous to about 39° F, but then a decisive change is noticeable, as the water now begins to expand instead of contracting as before, and so continues until the fluid becomes ice. This change at 39° F almost seems to warn that even more radical change is immanent.

The point in a series of continuous changes which begins or marks a simultaneous qualitative and quantitative difference, Hegel calls the "node" or "nodal point" (*Knoten*) - a term which he borrowed from astronomy. The line which indicates the continuous changes which may occur between these points without effecting any qualitative difference, he calls the "nodal line" (*Knotenlinie*). A node in astronomy is the point at which any celestial orbit cuts the plane of the ecliptic, the great circle in the plane of the earth's orbit. Hence a node is a point having double significance by virtue of its being the intersection of two circles; and it may be conceived as belonging first to one, then to the other, and indeed to both.

Hegel seizes this idea of a point or node having a twofold significance in order to indicate that some particular point in quantitative variation may at the same time have qualitative significance as well. Such a point partakes of the combined characteristics which constitute both its qualitative and its quantitative features, just as a point which is common to two circles partakes of the characteristic features of each. Between these nodes, or beyond them in either direction, the various quantitative differences seem to have no significance in producing any definite qualitative change. Whenever quantitative changes possess no qualitative significance, they cannot contribute toward any standard, type, or measure. Hegel calls such magnitudes measureless (*Masslos*), i.e., lacking the essential characteristics of a standard or type (§ 109). Quantity in itself does not determine qualitative differences - or vice versa - given that some magnitudes have no corresponding qualitative characteristics at all. Quantity proves unsatisfactory as an ultimate explanation of qualitative differences. Insofar as quantity fails because of itself, it seems to necessitate by its very inefficiency some further category which can satisfactorily explain the relation between quantitative and qualitative

variations. That category, again, is measure.

Even when an unqualified quantity, an unquantified quality, or an imperfect quantity/quality union is determined to be measureless, it is still a measure, because it is a positive determination (§ 110). The immediacy of quantity and quality is mediated in measure, even via measurelessness or some other failure. A key to this paragraph is the meaning of *an ihm*. Typically, to designate "in itself," Hegel would use either *an sich* or, less often, *an ihm selbst*. Here *an ihm* means "in measure." Quantity as such and quality as such are each immediate or "abstract" when "in measure," but they are also *aufgehoben* "in measure," so that, by this newly mediated dialectical relation, they become their own unity, their own mutual negation, and acquire a distinctive "relational identity" (*relative Identität*).

Everything, even measurelessness, is measure (§ 109). This is not quantitative or any other kind of reductionism, since measure is a "concrete" mediation of several "abstract" phases, including quantity. To rely on measure is not to reduce the irreducible. It is a good way of science. Yet the dialectic still points beyond measure.

A similar situation develops at every stage of progress in the evolution of thought from the simplest beginning in mere being and "abstract" immediacy to the most "concrete" configurations of mediated concepts. Throughout, each category that is reached in this progress proves insufficient to explain itself and all that have gone before. This lays upon thought the necessity to proceed to further stages of development in order to supply defects and achieve meaning. This is the Hegelian dialectic in a nutshell.

We have seen that the idea of mere being carried with it the necessary implication of a complex system of attributes designated as the quality of determinate being. This in turn was found to necessitate the idea of oneness or singularity, i.e., being for itself, a particular entity separate in a sense from all others. This idea of the one - or the individual - was then found to imply necessarily the idea of the many - a purely quantitative concept. The highest expression of quantity was reached when it was seen as correlated with quality. This quantity/quality relation, which Hegel calls "measure" - or better, "standard measure" - seems to have consummated this entire process through reciprocal negation (§ 111).

This relation, however, is unstable, i.e., it exists for certain quantitative values and not for others. Thought is thus constrained by the very nature of its own processes and its own demands to press onward to further stages of development, and to ask what it is which underlies these various relations of quantity and quality, rendering

them significant at certain coincidental points, the Hegelian "nodes," but at others having no significance? The category of standard measure is, by its very shortcomings, a challenge to thought; i.e., it requires thought to produce something more nearly ultimate as its underlying ground. It demands some satisfactory explanation of the various distinct natural types, each determined according to its own particular standard.

The most complete expression of being, the final term in the development of the idea of being, the idea of standard measure, has been found insufficient as a self-contained or self-explaining category. It therefore can no longer be seen as a final term. Rather, additional categories must be discovered in the dialectical or developmental process to be its natural complement and explanation.

The next complementary term in the logical unfolding of universal reason is essence (*Wesen*), the topic of the second main division of the *Logic*. Essence is seen first as the ground which underlies the various changes in the progressive development of being. *Wesen* is mediated *Sein*. At first *Sein* was non-essential (*unwesentlich*). What being is in its essence determines its qualitative characteristics and correlates them with certain quantitative changes by the fundamental law of its own nature. Magnitude does not determine quality, nor does quality determine magnitude, but the roots of both the quantitative and qualitative elements of being lie deeply concealed in their essence. Hegel expresses this as an epigram: "*Essence is the truth of being*" - "*Die Wahrheit des Seins ist das Wesen*" (*WL*, vol. 2, p. 3; *SLM*, p. 389; *SLdG*, p. 337).



"Dies ist also überhaupt der Unterschied der Formen des Seins und des Wesens; im Sein ist Alles 'unmittelbar,' im Wesen dagegen ist Alles relativ. ... Der Standpunkt des Wesens ist überhaupt der Standpunkt der Reflexion."

"Thus in general this is the difference between the form of being and the form of essence; in being, all is 'immediate,' but in essence, on the

other hand, all is relational. ... The standpoint of essence is in general the standpoint of reflection."

- Hegel, *EL*, § 111 *Zusatz*, p. 174, § 112 *Zusatz*, p. 176 (translation modified); *HL*, pp. 161, 163; *LBD*, pp. 172, 174; *Enz.*, pp. 121-123.



Part III

The Theory of Essence (§§ 112-159)

The theory of essence (*die Lehre vom Wesen*) forms the second part of the *Logic*. The transition from the thought of being (*Sein*) to that of essence (*Wesen*) marks a decided advance in thought and involves the introduction of several new ideas. Although these ideas have not been explicitly manifest in the category of simple being, they have been, nevertheless, implicitly present, so that their appearance at the beginning of the exposition of the nature of essence is to be seen as the developed expression of a potential factor already present in the preceding stage of being. In one sense, *Wesen* is the result of a becoming (*Werden*) of *Sein*. In another sense, it is coeval, as it were, with *Sein*. *Wesen* preserves, cancels, and raises to the next dialectical level (*aufhebt*) both the immediacy and the determinacy of *Sein*.

The ideas which form the constituent elements in the category of essence are as follows:

1. Mediation (*Vermittlung*) (§§ 112, 114, 122, 132, 137, 147, 149, 159).
2. Negation (§§ 112, 116, 119-120, 123, 130, 135).
3. Reflection (*Reflexion*) (§§ 112, 114-115, 118, 121, 123-127, 129-132, 136-138, 140, 142, 144-145, 147, 153-154, 156, 159).
4. Permanence (*Bleibendes*) (§§ 112 *Zusatz*, 158).
5. Systematic integration, or totality (*Totalität*) (§§ 121-122, 125, 128-133, 136, 138, 143, 147-148, 151, 159).

We will discuss these in their order.

First, as to the idea of mediation, we have found that Hegel sees mere being as immediate (*unmittelbar*), i.e., unaccounted for, unexplained, but still to be accepted as fact, with no reason assigned to it, and not referred to any other thing by which it might be conceived as the result of some process. If, however, a *raison d'être* is given for any determinate being, this at once connects this being with its underlying ground, and such connection is in itself a process of mediation, i.e., that by which something eventually comes to be what it is in all its interrelations (*vermittelt*). Being cannot explain itself, and although we readily come to accept the various attributes of being, e.g., quantity, quality, degree, measure, etc., still they are not sufficient to explain or justify themselves. Being, pure and simple, bears the stamp of derivation. Though it may sound like a paradox to say so, the truth is that being comes from something even more fundamental than itself. Its origin, life history, and destiny all lie concealed. To disclose these sources and their dependent processes is the job of mediation. When mediation has completely done this job, then the true essence of being will stand revealed.

Hegel's descriptions make the difference between mediated and immediate knowledge explicit: While immediate knowledge is unrelated, simply given, elementary, and marks the beginning of knowledge; mediated knowledge is interrelated, explained, developed, and marks the ongoing result of the process of learning and discovery.

Second, the idea of essence implies the negation of being. Hegel defines essence as "being mediating itself with itself through its own negativity" - "das durch die Negativität seiner selbst sich mit sich vermittelnde Sein" (§ 112; *EL*, p. 175; *HL*, p. 162; *LBD*, p. 173; *Enz.*, p. 123). This definition may be elucidated as follows: Being may at first seem to be quite independent and immediate, yet in examining the necessary relations and connections which it involves, it is found to be dependent on something else, from which it has arisen, and by which the integrity of its constitution is preserved. This is also in itself a process of mediation, and is what Hegel means by "being mediating itself with itself." Being, therefore, as self-constituted and self-sufficient, falls to the ground under its own weight, having undermined itself. This is what Hegel means by "through its own negativity." Nevertheless, while dying as an independent, immediate, self-contained form, being regains its life in the underlying ground to which it is necessarily referred and by which it becomes specifically determined.

In its essence, being, i.e., mere being, is *aufgehoben*. This very significant word in Hegel's terminology cannot be adequately translated by any one English word, since it conveys three distinct

ideas in German which must be taken together in order to express its full significance. The verb *aufheben* has a threefold meaning for Hegel - to cancel or destroy, to preserve in essence, and at the same time to lift up, elevate, or recreate in a higher form. To speak of anything as *aufgehoben* means that it disappears in its given form, but reappears in a new form, and that the new form always represents a higher point of view and significant progress in thought. One English word which comes tolerably close to expressing this meaning is "transmute." Another might be "sublate." But as *aufheben* in Hegel's special sense really means "to preserve, cancel, and raise a phase to a higher dialectical level," it really cannot be translated. It is best just to leave it in German and to learn, at least in this instance, the intricacies of the German language. Note especially that, in English, when we use a word with multiple meanings, we typically mean only one, and the context makes clear which one; but in German, when we use a word with multiple meanings, we typically mean all of them at once.

Recall how the technical terms in Hegel's Logic are divided into (1) names of processes or circular movements, (2) names of one-way movements, and (3) names of the starting and ending points or poles of movements or processes. "Being-there" or "determinate being" (*Dasein*) may be seen as a process, with becoming (*Werden*) and the unity of being and nothing (*Einheit des Seins und Nichts*) as its two poles. The one-way movement from *Werden* to the *Einheit des Seins und Nichts* is "preserving, cancelling, and raising this phase to a higher dialectical level" (*Aufheben*). The one-way movement from the *Einheit des Seins und Nichts* to *Werden* is "withering away" (*Verschwinden*). The never-ending oscillation between *Aufheben* and *Verschwinden* is the process called *Dasein*. *Aufheben* and *Verschwinden* are the two complementary aspects of *Dasein*.

When Hegel affirms that, in essence, being is *aufgehoben*, he means that it has lost its independence only to find it again in a dependence which has the peculiar characteristic that it is not subordinated to anything foreign to its own concept or idea. Rather, in the last analysis, it is one with its original self. The basis of being must be an aspect of being itself, or even being itself, otherwise the relation would be external, meaningless, and worthless. While the independence of being is thus in a sense denied, it is in another and higher sense reaffirmed. The first denial is negation; the reaffirmation is the negation of that negation. This second negation is the absolute negation which is always an affirmation. The independence of being, denied, gives way to a dependence which, in turn denied, is found to be in reality the dependence of being on its own ground, which is equivalent to self-dependence. Self-dependence is the same as independence. Thus this second negation reasserts the original

independence of being; but, in the process of thought through which this independence has passed, it has acquired a richer, fuller significance. It has now become a justified or mediated independence.

For Hegel, the process of negation is never extinction or annihilation. It is only a sublimation into a higher form. The absorption of being into essence is one of the best illustrations of the process of negation, which plays such an important, conspicuous role in the Hegelian dialectic. In this way, negation is the means to more and more precise characterization and determination in the progressive development of thought. The nature of negation as a process may be summed up most completely in the term *aufheben* - the overthrowing, the preserving, and the restoring on a higher plane.

Third, the category of reflection presents a point of view from which the theory of essence may be best understood and appreciated. This is so important an idea in Hegel's general scheme that several references may not be out of place to clarify it. Hegel sees being as a category which is not self-illuminating. It receives its light from something else, its ground. There is an analogy for Hegel between this kind of reflection and the well-known physical process of reflection. Just as a substance in front of a mirror is seen through reflection as an image of itself, in the same way being may be seen as the reflection of its ground. The image in the glass has an immediate reality in a certain sense, but, as to its self-determination, it is illusory. Its reality is dependent, due to its reflecting the object to which it stands related, and to which it must be related in order to explain and justify any reality that it may have.

Thus the ground of being, and being as it is manifest, are related to each other as substance and show (*Schein*), i.e., the underlying essence and the reflected appearance. We should precisely determine the meaning of two phrases which Hegel frequently uses in this connection: reflection into itself (*Reflexion in sich*) and reflection into something else (*Reflexion in Anderes*). Their significance is brought out clearly if we translate the former as "that by which something shines in its own light" and the latter as "that by which something shines in the light of another." We may say, therefore, that the various attributes of being do not shine in their own light, but in the light of some other, their necessary complement, their essence, or their indispensable ground.

Fourth, essence is to be distinguished from mere being insofar as essence is the permanent basis (*das Bleibende*) which underlies what is only its transient manifestation, the *Schein* of *Sein*. (Note that Hegel often uses German puns to make philosophical points.) The many changes which the dialectical movement has produced among the

attributes of being allow no resting place for thought. We have passed from quality to quantity; from quantity back to quality, which then possessed at that stage of development the additional characteristic of quantitative determinacy; and from there to a quantitative determination which had no qualitative significance; and through all this the idea of being was not able to show any permanent basis which it could call its own. Nevertheless, the nature of thought is such that we must demand some permanent underlying ground to which these various changes may attach. In the necessary complement of being, essence, we find the solid foundation to underlie and support all the changing manifestations of being. While everything, according to Heraclitus, ceaselessly changes, something nevertheless remains. That which remains, a constant, is in itself the explanation of all change. Through it all variation is reduced to law and uniformity. The significance of variables lies in that they may be referred to some underlying constant. Where there is no constant, variables can have no meaning.

Permanence, as it characterizes essence, has for Hegel an etymological warrant. Essence (*Wesen*) is the same as "past being" (*vergangenenes Sein*), as seen in the original meaning of the past participle, *gewesen*. This means that whatever has being exists by virtue of what was before. What was before could thus be related as the *Wesen* or ground of what is now, given that the other interrelations between what was before and what is now are solid and necessary. In other words, Hegel does not commit the *post hoc ergo propter hoc* fallacy. The priority expressed in *Wesen* is not necessarily a priority in time, but it is necessarily a logical priority. The past, which has been before and is to be seen as the ground or essence of that which exists or has being in the present, is not "past" in the sense of having died, vanished, or been set aside. Rather, it is to be seen as preserved, but living again in a new form as the present being. That is, the past as the logical prerequisite of being is *aufgehoben* - past and yet enduring.

Hegel's special use of the word *Wesen* and his way of establishing its significance furnish a characteristic example of his general habit of thought, particularly his conviction that the most valuable human ideas are often found crystallized in language. Of the suggestiveness of language, he writes: "In everything that human beings have interiorized, in everything that in some way or other has become for them a representation, in whatever they have made their own, there has language penetrated, and everything that they transform into language and express in it contains a category, whether concealed, mixed, or well-defined. So much is logic natural to human beings; it is indeed their very nature" (*WL*, vol. 1, p. 10; *SLM*, p. 31; *SLdG*, p. 12).

Essence is to be regarded as a constituted system of relations, a complex manifold of various elements which throughout are interrelated and coordinated. This meaning of "essence" also appears in ordinary German, e.g., in such words as *Zeitungswesen*, the newspaper system; *Postwesen*, the postal system; and *Steuerwesen*, the revenue system. In these connections the word *Wesen* expresses that everything which is, or has being, must be referred to its appropriate place in the particular system to which it belongs and in which it has its true ground and proper explanation; and moreover, that there is nothing in the universe which is unrelated to others, can remain apart, or can exist by itself.

Fifth, this idea of the ground of being conceived as a system of coordinated and necessarily related elements is in accord with late nineteenth-century theories of logic, especially the "law of totality" and the reliance on integrated systems. These theories lay special emphasis on the order and uniformity which characterize the world of knowledge and the consistent, coherent relationships which every element must sustain with every other and with the whole. (Cf. Hibben, *Inductive Logic*, pp. 7-8; Bernard Bosanquet, *The Essentials of Logic* [London: Macmillan, 1895], p. 140: "... the condition of inference is always a system.")

These five, then, are the chief factors, or, as Hegel would call them, moments, which constitute the idea of essence.



12

General Features of the Theory of Essence (§§ 112-114)

In keeping with his general point of view, Hegel defines the absolute as essence (§ 112). Although we speak of finite essences such as the human essence, nevertheless the term itself in Hegel's system implies that we have passed beyond finitude, and that there is in the last analysis just one supreme essence, the true infinite, which embraces

and validates all other so-called essences within itself. Thus, according to this conception, all else outside the absolute, God, would possess no essentiality. God is not to be regarded merely as a being among many others, or even as an essence, even the highest essence - despite the fact that *das höchste Wesen* is among the usual German names of God. Rather, God is, as Tillich would later say, "the ground of being," or pre-eminently the universal essence underlying all. Hegel's philosophical theism draws special attention to the idea that the divine nature is by no means exhausted in ascribing essence to God. If we define God as essence only, we thereby assure God's universal and irresistible power, but overlook God's other attributes. God is still only God, but God's more personal relations with the world in general, and with humans in particular, are not recognized in such a definition. This may be said to be the common defect of Islam and some versions of Judaism and Christianity alike, in which the creator is forever divided by an impassable gulf from the creature (§ 112 *Zusatz*).

Also in § 112 - an especially rich section that rewards careful study - Hegel begins to anticipate the third and culminating division of the Logic: the theory of the concept (*Begriff*). In learning to understand being (*Sein*) as the expression of essence (*Wesen*), and *Wesen* as the ground of *Sein*, we thus begin to grasp *Wesen* and *Sein* conceptually rather than just phenomenologically or even just logically. That is, they begin to become for us actual ideas or concepts rather than just objects of perception or understanding. Hence, at this early stage in the development of essence, the *Begriff* is posited or established (*gesetzt*) as a necessity, but not yet fully mediated as a fundamental dialectical feature. That will happen in the third division. In this subsequent dialectical movement we will see that the category of essence necessitates by its very limitations the complementary and final category of the concept, or universal reason. Thus any idea of God as only essence must likewise be augmented or completed by adding to the divine nature those attributes which are necessary to the concept.

Insofar as *Sein* is the *Schein* of *Wesen* and *Wesen* is the *Schein* of *Sein*, a mutual reflection exists, which, for each of the two sides, is really a reflection into itself (*Reflexion in sich*) or indeed, a self-relation (*Beziehung auf sich*). Hence there is an identity between *Sein* and *Wesen* (§ 113). Yet this identity, although fundamental, is still immediate, external, "inessential" (*unwesentlich*), merely formal, not deep (§ 114). As reflection, it has the nature of only an appearance and is characterized by shimmering oscillation between apparently contradictory poles such as immediacy/mediation, self/other, being/nothing, positive/negative, illusion/reality, becoming/*Dasein*, existence/ground, potentiality/actuality, etc. But as we emerge from

Schein toward the *Begriff*, these contradictions will be resolved and incorporated into *Wesen*. The identity will be mediated. Hegel is trying to demonstrate in this section on *Schein* that whatever we may use to characterize *Schein* is what we must use to characterize *Wesen*, at least at first.

In discussing the category of essence, Hegel divides the subject into three parts, which we will treat in the three following chapters:

1. Essence as ground of existence (*das Wesen als Grund der Existenz*) (§§ 115-130).
2. Appearance (*Erscheinung*) (§§ 131-141).
3. Actuality (*Wirklichkeit*) (§§ 142-159).



13

Essence as the Ground of Existence (§§ 115-130)

Hegel first considers the category of essence under the aspect of the ground of existence. The conception of the ground of existence implies the idea of something fundamental and permanent. We live in a world of changing phenomena. The elements which constitute these phenomena vary indefinitely, and our natural impulse is to seek some constant factor that will give determinacy to the great world problem. For Hegel, every phenomenon in the universe is the manifestation of its own underlying ground, and on this account it preserves always its identity with itself. Moreover, any phenomenal appearance must be seen as a mere reflection of its underlying essence, and their fundamental identity connects essence and appearance as one and the same (§ 115). Identity is one of the three categories of reflection, or reflective determinations (*Reflexionsbestimmungen*), along with difference (*Unterschied*) and ground (*Grund*). To illustrate his idea of identity, Hegel cites the central integrity of being which characterizes the "I," the logical concept, and God (§ 115 *Zusatz*). God, the absolute, is seen as self-identity, the all-embracing constant, the underlying

essence, whose eternal attributes are reflected in all the phenomena of the world. Here we can clearly see the influence of Spinoza's God on Hegel's theism. Neither thinker would accept a personal God, but both would welcome the "intellectual love of God" (*amor intellectualis Dei*) (*Ethics*, V, prop. 33) (cf. § 158 *Zusatz*).

How can one live a Hegelian life? Fairly easily, it would seem. Some philosophies, e.g., those of Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), Kant, or Kierkegaard, are notoriously difficult to live by. But others, such as those of Hegel, Aristotle, or John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), come much more naturally. To live as a Hegelian, we need only bracket our subjective or personal involvement in whatever issues we encounter, whether they be ordinary or monumental, and become instead their phenomenological observer, not from above, as it were, but from within, trying to stand in the middle among contradictory elements, trying to see all sides of an issue at once, so that we may come to satisfactory resolution of all our problems, not favoring any side or the other, and avoiding all conflicts of interest. In politics, this means justice; in religion, equanimity; in society, friendship; in life in general, serenity and contentment.

Humans in their conscious life as persons, each an "I," also represent each a self-identity, since the self-consciousness of each forms a center to which the entire variety of experiences may be referred, and which forms one constant factor in the equation of life. Human activities are thus reflections of inner human personality. This self-identity differentiates humans from animals, who seem to possess no such underlying ground of continuity, but live in each present experience with no thought of before or after. There is, moreover, in every logical idea, a constant element, the universal, which maintains its identity amid the indefinite variety of its particular manifestations. This constant is the underlying ground of our thought processes, gives them definition and stability, and functions as their essential reflection.

Hegel interprets the three laws of thought from traditional or Aristotelian logic in a manner quite in accord with his general method. These laws are as follows:

1. The law of identity states that everything must be identical with itself: $A = A$.
2. The law of contradiction (or non-contradiction), i.e., the negative expression of the law of identity, states that something cannot be at the same time both itself and not itself: $-(A \ \& \ -A)$.
3. The law of the excluded middle, i.e., the negative expression of the law of contradiction, states that either something or its opposite must be true: $A \vee -A$.

Hegel claims that these laws, as thus expressed, are merely products of the "abstract" understanding, i.e., partial and one-sided, allowing for no progress of thought (§ 115). They form hard and fast concepts corresponding to a world in which there can be no change, no interrelation of parts, no variety, and above all no life or thought. Instead of such "abstract" identity, Hegel seeks "concrete" identity, i.e., an identity which exists within diversity and whose significance is due to this very diversity, with which it is brought into contrast. The formula which expresses the law of identity should thus be $A = A'$, i.e., "A differs from A', yet in spite of this difference is one with A'." The usual equation, $A = A$, expresses merely an absolute, meaningless, tautologous identity, stripped of all differences, and without significance or value. Hegel thus defines identity as that which reflects its own self in every changing variety of manifestation, and in such a manner that the reflection of self is different from it, yet so intimately connected with it as to be the same. It is a paradox as thus expressed; but with Hegel, truth lies in paradoxes.

The idea of identity, if it is to have any true significance, implies the correlated idea of difference; and in this progress of thought Hegel proceeds to difference (*Unterschied*) as the second category of reflection (§ 116). Difference appears in its most basic form as immediate difference, which means simple diversity or variety (*Verschiedenheit*) (§ 117). By diversity he means that various objects are each individually what they are, and that the only connection between them is external. When we compare externally related objects, we identify them to the extent of affirming their likeness or equality (*Gleichheit*), and failing so to identify them signifies that we deny any likeness or equality between them. At this point (§ 118), Hegel brings out most clearly his idea of the relation between identity and difference, and he places considerable emphasis on it. He asserts in his characteristically paradoxical manner that objects which are judged to be alike are such only by virtue of their underlying difference, and that objects which are judged to be unlike are such only by virtue of their underlying identity. The one side reflects its light on the other (§ 119). Thus, if we say that a triangle differs from a tree, the assertion has no point, because these two objects have nothing obvious in common by which thought may bring them together; their differences are not illuminated by the light of any identity. But, if we should say, "A man is a man," this assertion could be tautologous and insignificant, as this identity is not manifestly illuminated by any light of difference, or it could suggest difference and thus be meaningful, as in the title of the 1795 poem of Robert Burns: "A Man's a Man for A' That." The thought becomes significant because the phrase "for a' that" implies difference, which at once

reflects its meaning on the original assertion, which, without such contrast, would remain a meaningless tautology.

Again, if we contrast a beech to an oak, or electrical to steam power, elements of likeness and unlikeness seem significant because these objects represent ideas which are fundamentally connected as species of the same genus, so that the meaning of one is reflected in the light of the other. Difference, in such cases, appearing against a background of identity underlying all species of the same genus, is diversity, and may be appropriately called specific difference, "difference of reflection, *difference in itself*, or *determinate* difference" - "Unterschied der Reflexion, oder *Unterschied an sich selbst, bestimmter* Unterschied" (§ 118). Such differences within the context of common characteristics serve to separate and distinguish one species from others. Cognate species admit of comparison. Their differences are always significant because, however distinct the several species may appear, they all belong to one common genus. Similarly, however distinct the various individuals within a species may appear, they all belong to that one common species. Thus, the idea of mere diversity or variety develops into a significant difference, i.e., determinate or specific difference, as we consider the members or components of defined groups.

But can reflection be posited? Or does it just appear? What is the relationship between identity and difference? Is there an identity of identity and difference? An identity of difference *simpliciter*? An identity of differences? A difference between identity and difference? The answers to these questions are implicit as the dialectic moves toward realizing the ground (*Grund*) of identity and difference reflected into each other.

There remains another aspect of the idea of difference, namely, opposition (*Entgegensetzung*) (§ 119). Hegel's usual term for "opposition" is *Gegensatz*, but here he uses *Entgegensetzung*, which has the same meaning, but stronger connotations. Kindred elements arrayed over against each other in the same area of being are seen as positive and negative; yet in the typical Hegelian manner of viewing such opposites, they are also seen as constituent elements of the same essence or phenomenon. As contradictories, positive and negative create a polarity. Their opposition can only be resolved in a higher unity according to the logical demands of dialectical movement. The traditional law of the excluded middle is seen as true only in, by, and for the "abstract" understanding, but not in, by, or for reflective reason, which wants to see all things as "concrete," i.e., in the full light of all that they are and all that they imply, including the resolution of their inherent contradictions. Nevertheless, reflective comments at this stage are only second-order expositions of ideas, and do not yet go to

the heart of the matter.

Here we might ask whether the positive and the negative - or indeed any pair of opposites - are most usefully seen as two separate things or as a single thing expressed in two poles. That is, would it be more advantageous for the dialectic if we say "The positive and the negative are ..." or "The positive-and-negative is ..."?

Sein is described in the reflective, binary language of *Wesen*. The truth of the idea of essence, for Hegel, lies in the opposition of positive and negative, which finds universal expression in the fact that everything has its significance only in connection with whatever confronts it as its other. For every positive there is a corresponding negative, else there would be no positive. Similarly, for every negative there is a corresponding positive, else there would be no negative. These terms, "positive" and "negative," do not express any absolute difference. They are essentially equivalent. Either could be named the other, with no consequences. They imply no value judgment, e.g., honorific for "positive" and derogatory for "negative." The two in the last analysis are found to spring from the same root. Since they may, under all circumstances, be transposed with their meaning in no sense altered, we may agree, for instance, to designate any distance east as positive and any distance west as negative; or we might just as well call any distance west positive and any distance east negative. The significance of terms lies not in themselves, but entirely in their relation to one another (§ 120).

In the idea of opposition we must distinctly understand that whichever term is seen as positive must not be conceived as opposed to just any other, but only to its natural complement, i.e., to that which is properly its negative by virtue of some common basis underlying them both. In other words, positive/negative must be an obvious relation, like man/woman, not like triangle/tree. According to a crude conception, the world might seem to be composed just of a multitude of different and unrelated things, each wholly independent of every other. That conception, however, would be most erroneous. All aspects of the cosmic process must be seen as contributing to a systematized whole, so that each one is related to its particular other in one and the same underlying system. Thus the North Pole is opposed to and yet connected in an essential relation with the South Pole, as are positive and negative electricity, and as are every acid and its corresponding base. "Opposite" may therefore be defined in general as that which embraces both itself and its corresponding other within one and the same area of determination. Hegel calls this shared area of determination their "ground" or "reason for being" (*Grund*). This is the third of the categories of reflection, and is the basis of the first

two. Hegel defines *Grund* as the unity of identity and difference (§ 121). It is the determining factor which renders objects sufficiently alike so that we can observe their differences, or sufficiently unlike so that we can note their resemblances. The idea of ground contains the truth of all that attaches to the complementary ideas of identity and difference. It is the unity underlying diversity, the essence underlying specific difference, the connecting bond which unites every element of being with its corresponding opposite, or other, within a single system.

Grund may be seen as a process, with *Wesen* and "self-relation" (*Beziehung auf sich*) as its two poles. The one-way movement from *Wesen* to *Beziehung auf sich* is "identity" (*Identität*). The one-way movement from *Beziehung auf sich* to *Wesen* is "difference" (*Unterschied*). The never-ending oscillation between *Identität* and *Unterschied* is the process called *Grund*. *Identität* and *Unterschied* are the two complementary aspects of *Grund* (§§ 115, 116, 121).

Ground, for Hegel, is nearly equivalent to Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason (*Satz vom zureichenden Grunde*), namely, "Everything must have its sufficient ground" or "Everything must have a sufficient reason why it exists." This means, among other things, that the true or essential being of any determinate object is not to be conceived merely as a constantly underlying fact which always preserves its strict identity, nor solely as the underlying source of variability which produces manifest differences. Such being is neither merely positive nor merely negative, but must be conceived as the union of both, so that each manifestation has its being in its other, which, however, falls within the domain of its own essence, as the two opposites thus become one within their ground and through it. This relation may be partially illustrated by analogy to two circles which lie entirely outside each other and therefore are seen as disconnected, but at the same time also lie entirely within a third circle in the same plane, and as such may be seen as connected because they both lie within the same defined area.

From another point of view, essence as ground is not to be conceived as merely the "abstract" reflection into itself, i.e., as shining merely in its own light, but as a reflection into its other, i.e., as receiving illumination from that which by the very nature of things stands over against it, and yet at the same time is connected with it as its necessary complement. Every truth has its obverse; and this must always be recognized if we are to attain knowledge in its fullness. *Grund* and whatever depends on it must be regarded, therefore, as one and the same content, i.e., the same matter of fact. *Grund* is a simple reference to itself; and what is grounded combines reference to self

with reference to its other. Such reference involves mediation, or relativity, i.e., the process of explaining a given thing by reference to something else with which it is essentially related.

The principle of sufficient reason asserts, again among other things, that all phenomena are related in an all-embracing system in such a way that every phenomenon must be referred to some other as comprising at least part of its sufficient ground. There is throughout a complete interrelation and interdependence. The essence of anything cannot be revealed by showing merely what it is in itself in a purely "abstract" sense; rather, we must show what it is in reference to something else, which is related to it as its other. A single phenomenon may even have a plurality of "others." To know anything we must know it in reference to all possible relations which it may sustain with all "others" by which its own essential being is mediated.

An excellent example of what Hegel means by "ground" is in the third part of Hegel's Logic, the theory of the concept, or active and universal reason. There the idea of ground attains its complete expression insofar as it presents a content which is determined in and for itself and hence may be seen as self-originating and self-constructive (§§ 159, 193). Thought has become rational not only in itself but also for itself. Such must be the essential ground of all things, some form of superintending or overarching reason freely working out its own purposes. On this interpretation, Leibniz and Hegel agree about the meaning of sufficient ground. Leibniz particularly emphasizes the role of final causality in connecting phenomena with their ground, and in the self-activity of universal reason, he allows the fullest scope to the play of final causes. But, at the present stage in the development of Hegel's idea of ground, ground cannot yet be seen as having attained this capacity of determining itself. Only when we reach the final stage of Hegel's Logic does the concept of self-directing and self-determining ground emerge in its complete form. The Logic is the "science of self-determination" (*Selbstbestimmungswissenschaft*).

Because there is no infinite regress, the absolute itself, containing all possible interrelations within it, is ultimately the ground or sufficient reason of everything. Nevertheless, *Grund* at this stage of its development must not yet be seen as the equivalent of final causality. It is not yet consciously active, nor does it produce anything, working purposefully toward some definitely conceived end. Hegel therefore declares being, *qua* existence, to issue or proceed from ground (§ 122). At this stage, existences are grounds and grounds are existences (§ 123), an idea which is quite removed from that of final causality.

Hegel was aware that the term "existence" (*Existenz*) derives from the

Latin infinitive *exsistere*, which means "to come forth, to arise, to appear, to come into being." Recall that the English infinitive, "to exist," derives either from the Greek *ek* + *histêmi* or the Latin *ex* + *sistere*, which both mean "to stand out." It thus follows that existence is only that which stands out from its ground, or which arises from its reason for being. As such, each separate existence, despite the fact that it may itself be a ground, is seen as having left its ground behind, just as determinate being left behind the process of becoming which produced it. One difference, however, between determinate being and existence is that the latter represents a deeper insight and a more advanced stage of development. We accept determinate being as immediately given, with no inquiry started as to its explanation or justification. Existence, on the other hand, we see as more nearly mediated, i.e., as referred to its appropriate ground, and thus, at least in part, accounted for and duly explained.

However, although having arisen from its ground and at least to some extent having left this ground behind, existence still contains its own ground within itself, so that this ground is not merely a phase in the process of mediation which has been passed through. *Grund* may now be seen as *aufgehoben*, i.e., suspended, and yet cancelled, preserved, and raised to a higher dialectical level as the more developed form of existence. This relation may be illustrated in our idea of the conservation of energy, whereby any given energy seems to be destroyed only to reappear in some changed form. The view is false which regards existence as related to its ground only externally, so that the world is seen as a collection of discrete objects, each with a separate existence, related to each other as ground and consequence, and wherein everything bears an aspect of relativity, conditioned by and conditioning something else. In such a world nothing would be either fundamental or final. Such a view must be remedied by the theory of the concept, which, as we will see, supplies an unconditioned basis of rationality and purposiveness for all that is contingent and relative.

An existent conceived as having absorbed its ground within itself is in a sense relieved of dependence on anything outside itself; since whatever seems to lie outside it, but yet is at the same time related to it, must be seen as falling within the area of its being. In other words, the circle drawn around any existent, marking or circumscribing the bounds of its being, is to be drawn with so generous a sweep as to embrace everything by which this existent is mediated, or to which it is related. Whatever exists in this sense, Hegel calls a thing (*Ding*) (§ 124). He very stoutly disclaims, however, any reference in this regard to Kant's thing in itself (*Ding an sich*), which he considers an empty and meaningless "abstraction," since, if we could imagine taking away

from a thing its specific characteristics and its relations to all else, then absolute emptiness would remain. Hegel's interpretation of the significance of the thing in itself is quite characteristic. He maintains that the thing in itself, if it is to have any meaning at all, is the thing, whatever it is, as a pure potentiality, with its specific characteristics as yet undeveloped and unrealized. Thus, the boy may be considered as the man in himself, in the sense that the boy is the father of the man. So also the patriarchal state is the state in itself and the germ of the seed is the plant in itself. In its developed form the thing is not really the thing in itself, but the thing for itself (*Ding für sich*), i.e., the thing whose specific qualities are no longer implicit, but have become explicit and fully developed.

Hegel variously characterizes the thing:

1. As possessing properties (§§ 125-126, 130).
2. As composed of material elements (§§ 126-130).
3. As a synthesis of matter and of form (§§ 128-130).

That which we call a thing is said to possess attributes or properties (*Eigenschaften*) (§ 125). These properties have a kind of internal connection. They do not constitute among themselves a diversity such as what we have already described for certain entities. The several properties of a single thing have no connection with each other except that which comes from comparing them with something external to them. Nevertheless, these properties are brought together by the very bond of all inhering in a single thing, which serves as their internal connection and a stable center of reference. A thing must have many properties, not just one, because, in addition to being different from other things, it must be different from itself too. Otherwise it would be static. For example, I am different from what I was a minute ago. So are you.

Since a thing is composed of material elements (*Materien*) (§ 126), its several properties may be seen as each inhering in their own material stuff and therefore possessing a quasi-independence from the thing itself (§ 127). From this point of view, a version of traditional substance/attribute metaphysics, the thing is conceived as only the quantitative total of these various qualitative stuffs, i.e., we might describe a given thing, say, a beet, as composed of so much red stuff, so much sweet stuff, so much fibrous stuff, etc. Such may be a sufficiently correct account of certain things, especially inorganic compounds. Common salt may be reduced to its constituent material elements, sodium and chlorine; gypsum (hydrous calcium sulfate) to calcium, sulfur, hydrogen, and oxygen; sulfuric acid to sulfur, hydrogen, and oxygen; etc.

But when we consider organic nature and the more complex types of being, such austere analysis into elements falls short of a true or adequate account of what a living organism really is. All parts or components may be revealed; but the vital bond is lacking, i.e., that which gives meaning and specific characteristics to the material substrate, whatever that might be. This bond is the form as distinct from the matter of being. In this connection, we would do well to note that the word "form" (*Form*), as Hegel uses it, signifies not the complete form which might be conceived as imposed on a thing from without, but rather the active formative principle which, like the architectonic principle of the plant, operates from within, producing out of its own material its particular form and qualities. In other words, Hegel takes his theory of form more from Aristotle than from Plato. To arrive at the true conception of a thing, we must regard it hylomorphically, as the synthesis of matter and form (§ 128). A thing is not a mere meeting point of a number of possibly related material elements, each of an ultimate nature. The fundamental material, or elements, from which all things in the universe are made, and in which they are constituted, Hegel and Aristotle conceive as reducible to just one kind of matter, and they insist that the specific differences among various things arise from the variety of formative principles or agencies at work on and within this fundamental matter. But to say that form - the constructive principle - operates externally upon matter, or that matter is independent of form in any sense, would do violence to Hegel's and Aristotle's conception. Form and matter must not be separated even in thought, except hypothetically or heuristically, since it is in their unity that a thing has its essential being (§ 129).

Form, operating as a principle within matter, produces varied results which seem to be essential properties of the thing. The totality of these properties represents the shining forth of the essence of the existent itself. This shining forth of the thing's characteristic features constitutes its appearance (*Erscheinung*), i.e., its phenomenal manifestation (§ 130).



Appearance, or the Phenomenal World (§§ 131-141)

Hegel's theory of the thing unites two seemingly contradictory points of view. On one hand, a thing may be seen as one and individual or, as we would say, a single thing. On the other hand, however, a thing may be regarded equally well as the sum of its many parts and properties, coexisting and correlated in a unified system. The thing is thus both one and many, the unitary ground and a variegated manifestation. Thus a plant is a single thing, but at the same time a complex of many components, since into its composition are brought together light, heat, water, ammonia, potassium, starch, and an indefinite number of other materials which are coordinated into the single system which constitutes the essential being and life of the plant. Such an assemblage, which composes the properties of the plant in their "concrete" manifestation, is the shining forth of their inner essence centered in the one ground which forms their underlying unity. Such a shining forth of an inner nature in its outer manifestation is *Erscheinung*, the actual revelation of the essence of a thing (§ 131). The total of these manifestations gives us the world of phenomena. This is the world of scientific description and interpretation; of inductive investigation, observation, and experiment; of exact measurement and computation; of relations and coordinations; of uniformity and law; and of everyday life.

Essence, for Hegel, consists of two principal moments or factors: reflection into self (*Reflexion in sich*) and reflection into something else (*Reflexion in Anderes*). The former represents the central core and organizing principle of being; the latter, all the correlated elements associated with being. Reflection into self is what constitutes the essence of a thing, e.g., in the case of a plant, it is what constitutes the plant as a single thing, its central, unifying ground or architectonic principle. Reflection or shining forth into something else refers to all that contributes to the being and life of the plant, and to all its several parts and distinctive properties. This second moment of essence constitutes its phenomenal manifestation.

We may observe, however, that there can be no real separation between essence and its external appearance, between ground and its manifestation, or between the Kantian noumenon and its phenomenon. For Hegel, unlike for Kant, there is no noumenon behind any phenomenon; rather, all reality is phenomenal. Hegel thus defines *Erscheinung* as essential manifestation. It is not mere show

(*Schein*) as distinguished from substance; nor is it unreality as distinguished from reality; rather, it is the complete revelation of all that is essentially immanent within. It is misleading to speak of phenomena as though they were only passing shadows with no corresponding substance underlying them. But at the same time it is at least equally misleading to speak either of substance underlying phenomena or of phenomena representing substance, since, for Hegel, phenomena and what some philosophers call "substance" or "noumena" are one and the same.

The word *Schein* is inherently self-contradictory. It designates simultaneous being and non-being in the same object of perception. Hindus are used to thinking of *maya* in this way. Yet *maya* and *Schein* are not quite identical. The truth of *Schein* is the flickering back and forth between *Schein* and *Wesen*, which is reflection. To see something as *Schein* is to see its essence.

We will see in the subsequent development of the dialectic that every phenomenon in the universe expresses a reality, but at the same time is this reality; thus the category of phenomenal appearance (*Erscheinung*) must necessarily lead to that of actuality (*Wirklichkeit*), the third stage in the development of the category of essence. *Erscheinung* and *Wirklichkeit* are treated separately for convenience of exposition, but not in reality or in thought. Hegel's position regarding them directly opposes Kant's. Kant insists that phenomena have only subjective significance and posits an "abstract" something lying behind phenomena, beyond the range of our cognition, the nebulous *Ding an sich*. Hegel, on the contrary, maintains most firmly that all phenomena are so bound up with their immanent essences that in knowing any outer manifestation we must also know its inner essence or ground (§ 132). We cannot separate one from the other. Thus to say that we know only phenomena not only does violence to the essential nature of phenomena themselves, but also is in fact nonsense.

The theory of phenomena, as Hegel develops it, may be presented in four pairs of correlative terms. Due to the fundamental principle of reflection which lies at the base of the category of essence, phenomenal manifestations should naturally fall together in pairs, depicting each facet both in its own light and in light reflected on it by its other. These pairs of correlates are:

1. Form and content (*Form und Inhalt*) (§§ 133-134).
2. The whole and its parts (*das Ganze und die Teile*) (§§ 135-137).
3. Force and its expression or phenomenal manifestation (*Kraft und Äusserung*) (§§ 136-138).
4. The inner and the outer (*das Innere / das Innerliche und das Äussere / das Äusserliche*) (§§ 137-141).

As to the relation of form to content, while we may refer all phenomena to their underlying material as the ground of their subsistence, yet a deeper insight recognizes the formative principle immanent in the matter, so that in the last analysis the phenomena of the world must be referred to the activity of this inner constructive principle. This principle may be called simply the form of phenomena, but it really means that which produces the form rather than just the form itself. It is an active principle. We must not lose sight of this idea of the essence of phenomena, i.e., a fundamental dynamism. However, Hegel uses the word "form" in two senses, which we should keep distinct in our minds: (1) It denotes the immanent, constructive, architectonic principle, and thus is synonymous with "the law of appearance" (§ 133). (2) It signifies that which determines, negatively and from without, the bounds of phenomenal manifestation by assigning definite limits, such as external form, as would the ceramic mold of a bronze casting.

Form must be conceived as a dynamic, constructive principle if it is to be seen as one with its content. Phenomena or appearances (*Erscheinungen*) are what they are by virtue of the inner workings of the fundamental laws of their being. For instance, that which makes a plant what it is, i.e., the total of its elements and properties, its content in fact, cannot be separated from its form, the immanent architectonic principle which coordinates these parts into one complex whole. The form, therefore, is the content, and the content is the form. Separate them, and they lose their significance. Form without content is empty. Content without form is so indeterminate that it cannot be grasped as an object of knowledge. A genuine work of art - or indeed any determinate thing - is one in which form and content are identical. The style is the artist. Hegel says that the *Iliad* has no poetic content if we regard it apart from its form. Poetry is not mere form, but form and content applied to each other. This is true of all great literary, artistic, and musical creations. A further illustration may be drawn from discussions about the relation between formal and material logic, i.e., the form of our judgments and inferences vs. their significance as determined in the light of actual experience. Form in this connection, without material significance, is barren and without value. In logic the form gives significance to the content, and the content in turn determines, enriches, and illuminates the form. There can be no real distinction between formal and material fallacies. They must be seen in the last analysis, apart from verbal and superficial distinctions, as one and the same.

But content must be conceived not only as form which has developed from within, but also as that which has been determined to a certain extent externally by other forms with which it stands in some essential

relations (§ 134). Thus a phenomenon may be seen as composed of externally related parts, each having its particular form. Yet all parts which are coordinated by some common bond constitute an inherent unity. This idea leads us to the second pair of correlates - the relation of the whole (*das Ganze*) to its parts (§ 135).

When Hegel says *das Ganze*, he typically means not "the *entire* whole," but only "the whole concept as it has been presented *so far*." The idea of what we call the whole of anything has its significance in the relation that the parts sustain, not only to each other, but also each to the coordinated whole. The whole disappears when we divide it into its components. This is especially true of organic life. A living body cannot be divided into its separate parts and then restored at will to its original form and functions. Its analysis is its death. Only dead bodies can be thoroughly dissected. Questions of organ and tissue transplantation and biomedical research aside, the meaning of all these parts, still today as in Hegel's time, lies in their service to an organism and their coordinated functions in reference to each other and to the whole. An eye is an eye only as long as it is a member of a body. An organ severed from an organism and discarded becomes at once a meaningless and worthless thing.

Hegel complains that psychologists sometimes speak erroneously of the "parts" of the soul or of the mind, as though to endow such "parts" with quasi-independence, and as if the soul or mind even had "parts," as the brain does. By this protest he emphasizes a truth which some psychologists endorse, namely, that mental phenomena must be seen as unified complexes within the variety of functional manifestations. He rejects phrenology and other theories of separate mental faculties. He argues that there is no "separate" faculty of memory, reason, imagination, etc., just as no other organ in the body is independent or "separate" from the life and function of the others and of the organism which unifies them all.

We may say in general, therefore, that the form, or formative principle, is essentially a principle of organization, uniting the many into one and producing a symmetry of parts, a harmony of functions, and a congruence of relations, so that we may conceive the world of phenomena, whether of nature, mind, or spirit, as a whole, a world of order and law.

Hegel conceives of form not only as the dynamic bond which cements the relation of the whole to its parts, but also as a dynamic formative principle. The mutual relations of the several parts of any complex system, one to another and all to the whole, must therefore be mediated, i.e., created by the output of some energy. Hegel calls this dynamic principle "force" (*Kraft*), whose work is to express external

manifestations (*Äusserungen*). This correlative pair, force and its expression, is necessary to complete the idea of an enduring dynamic basis (§ 137). Any phenomenon from the standpoint of its reflection into self - i.e., regarded simply in its own light - presents as its most evident characteristic a central, essential unity. The phenomenon appears as an undivided whole. But from a different standpoint, which we dare not overlook, the phenomenon seems immediately to dissolve into a heterogeneity of interrelated, coordinated parts. This is its reflection into something else, or the illumination of its central unity by the light reflected from each of its components and their various functions. Thus, what breaks the one into the many and unifies the many as the one must be some rudimentary force, to produce the specification of parts, but at the same time also to hold them together in their comprehensive unity within a single system or organism. The separate parts of any animal or plant develop through successive differentiations and integrations, divided as many yet combined as one, and this is attained by the concerted action of the vital force which constantly operates within each organism and constitutes it as what it essentially is.

Force, *qua* mere force, without the additional considerations which will be described later under the category of the concept, must be seen as just a blind force working without purpose or intelligence. As thus conceived, it requires for its activity a special medium, as ordinary magnetic force requires ferromagnetic metal. Moreover, it becomes active only by some special fact, such as the presence of some other force, on which it depends. Every force seems to depend on some other, and so on *ad infinitum*. From this point of view, force is essentially finite, because it is necessarily dependent and restricted (§ 136).

To speak of God as force - albeit writ large - is nevertheless an impoverished notion of the superabundance of the divine attributes. Such a conception of God was a key error of Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), insofar as, for Hegel, force must be complemented by final cause, i.e., a deliberate, self-determining, and purposeful divine activity.

Hegel also insists with characteristic consistency regarding his method and general point of view that the idea of force must not be divorced in our thoughts from its outer manifestations. The very essence of force is to manifest itself. Force and its expression are one and the same. It is therefore misleading to suggest that force in itself is unknowable. Force is knowable, but only in its expression, and this expression is what force itself really is.

The fourth and final pair, the inner in relation to the outer, follows

logically from the idea of force and its expression. Force is essentially the inner, and its expression is the outer (§ 138). Inner and outer are thus identical (§ 139). Mere externality or mere internality are empty and meaningless "abstractions," nothing more.

It is customary but wrong to see the essence of a thing as only inner. We must remember that the very nature of essence is to reveal itself in some kind of external manifestation. To illustrate the error, Hegel (§ 140; *EL*, p. 210; *HL*, p. 197; *LBD*, p. 208; *Enz.*, p. 139) cites Haller's "Die Falschheit menschlicher Tugenden" ("The Falseness of Human Virtues"):

Ins Innre der Natur dringt kein erschaffner Geist,
Zu glücklich, wann sie noch die äussre Schale weist!

No created spirit penetrates the inner reality of nature,
It is only too happy just knowing the outer shell!

These words of Haller may be contrasted to the indignant response of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) in a poem known sometimes as "Allerdings: Dem Philister" ("By All Means: To the Philistine") and sometimes as "Allerdings: Dem Physiker" ("By All Means: To the Physicist"):

"Ins Innere der Natur -"

O du Philister! -

"Dringt kein erschaffner Geist."

Mich und Geschwister

Mögt ihr an solches Wort

Nur nicht erinnern;

Wir denken: Ort für Ort

Sind wir im Innern.

"Glückselig! wem sie nur

Die äussre Schale weis't!"

Das hör' ich sechzig Jahre wiederholen,

Ich fluche drauf, aber verstohlen;

Sage mir tausend tausend Male:

Alles giebt sie reichlich und gern;

Natur hat weder Kern

Noch Schale,

Alles ist sie mit einem Male;

Dich prüfe du nur allermeist

Ob du Kern oder Schale seist.

"The inner reality of nature" -

Oh, you Philistine! -

"No created spirit penetrates."

As for me and my brothers

We do not need
To remember such words;
We think: from place to place
We are in the inner.
"A blessing! Happy is he to whom
Nature shows just its outer shell."
I've heard that repeated for sixty years
And I curse it, but secretly;
I say to myself a thousand thousand times:
Nature provides everything richly and gladly;
Nature has neither kernel
Nor shell,
It is all things all at once;
But, above all, test yourself
To see whether you are kernel or shell.

Thus, as we seem to be outwardly, so we are inwardly. What we are, we do; and what we do, we are. If our morality is only a matter of inner intention but never bears fruit in any external word or deed, then that inner purpose, however noble, loses its significance and worth. The understanding seeks to separate the inner from the outer, but thus conceived, they become merely empty "abstractions" (§ 140).

Hegel mentions a tendency of ignoble minds to belittle great and heroic deeds by insinuating that external actions may not correspond to noble internal motives: "If historical heroes had been actuated by subjective and formal interests alone, they would never have achieved what they did. If we duly respect the unity between the inner and the outer, we must admit that great men willed to do what they did, and did what they willed" (§ 140 *Zusatz*; *EL*, p. 213; *HL*, p. 200; *LBD*, p. 210; *Enz.*, p. 139).

From any point of view, the distinction between inner and outer is resolved in a higher unity into which they are merged as one and the same. Through the manifestation of force, every inner is necessarily established (*gesetzt*) as outer. Their distinction is only a necessary conceptual moment in the expression of their absolute identity. We speak of the relation of inner to outer as though they were opposite sides of a ratio, but their relation is in fact a unity in which the seemingly contrasted terms merge into one. But their distinction emphasizes the dynamic process, which mediates the manifestation of essence, yet this in no way contradicts their basic unity within a single system. The identity of inner and outer, of force and its manifestation, constitutes the category of actuality (*Wirklichkeit*), the final and most complete expression of essence (§ 141).



15

Actuality, or the Real World (§§ 142-159)

Hegel defines actuality as the unity of essence and its manifestation, or the unity of inner and outer (§ 142). In this he closely follows Aristotle, for whom actuality (*entelecheia* or *energeia*) is the existence of something which has its essence or goal (*telos*) fully within it rather than as only potentiality (*dunamis*). For both Hegel and Aristotle, it would be incorrect to conceive of the inner alone as actual, and the outer as merely phenomenal, fleeting, or unreal. The actual is the essence as it reveals its innermost being through external manifestation, or (in Kant's terminology, which Hegel does not entirely accept) the "noumenal" as it discloses its nature in the phenomenal. It is false also to regard any expression of the actual as the result of transition from some preceding state of dormant being to an outer manifestation via the mediation of some force acting externally. The actual is not something produced, as if by a machine. It is not to be seen as a product. Rather, it is self-producing. It is not only the result of a process of development, but also the energizing force which underlies that process. For Hegel's system in general, the complete cosmic process is the expression of reason, the creative, constructive, and sustaining force of the universe. But this schema is also the essential characterization of the actual or the real. Thus these two points of view are in fact one and the same. Their significance is summed up in Hegel's formula: "The actual is rational, and the rational is actual" - or alternatively: "The actual becomes rational, and the rational becomes actual."

It is therefore absurd to draw any distinction between the unreality of thought and the reality of objective phenomena. It is misleading to say that, while an idea may be good or true, it cannot be realized in actual experience. Such a diremption of the world of ideas from the world of reality, Hegel insists, can arise only in the sphere of the "abstract" understanding - the separating or analyzing function of the mind,

which is devoid of synthesizing capacity and unifying power.



There is a popular misconception - depicted in Raphael's famous painting, "The School of Athens" (detail above) - that Plato recognized ideas and only ideas as truth, while Aristotle, on the other hand, rejected the otherworldly or separate *chorismos* of ideas and recognized only worldly or manifest entities as actual. A more accurate conception of the relation between Platonism and Aristotelianism is that, while the actual is a fundamental principle for Aristotle, nevertheless, his actual is not just the immediate brute fact, but the Platonic idea (*eidos*) as well, which serves to interpret and explain the given content of both perception and thinking. Yet Aristotle characterizes the *eidos* as *dunamis*, i.e., mere potentiality, and insists that it must be known only as it reveals itself, or becomes actual, in its manifestation, i.e., as *energeia*. Accordingly he defines reality as *entelecheia*, i.e., the self-realization of essence in phenomena, or of ideas in entities. (Cf. Wilhelm Windelband, *A History of Philosophy, Volume I: Greek, Roman, Medieval*, translated by James H. Tufts [New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958], pp. 139-140.) Aristotle

thereby reconciles the opposition between Eleatic and Heraclitean philosophies. Hegel's position is basically the same as Aristotle's, since both fundamentally recognize the necessary unity of the complements: potentiality and actuality. From this point of view, the whole dialectical movement (*Bewegung*) may be defined as a constant process of transition from the potential (*möglich*) to the actual (*wirklich*).

With more careful scrutiny of the idea of actuality, we find that its primary and most basic aspect is potentiality or possibility (*Möglichkeit*) (§ 143). The potential or possible, according to Hegel, is an essential moment in every actual phenomenon. But it is not to be confused with the barren possibility of mere fancy. In the world of the imagination, all things are possible. The moon might fall into the earth. Julius Caesar might not have crossed the Rubicon. King Charles I of England might have been exiled instead of beheaded. Napoléon might have been killed at the Battle of Waterloo. Earthlings might hitchhike the galaxy like Douglas Adams's character, Ford Prefect. All such imagined possibilities are not real potentials, but only useless delusions. Hegel calls them formal or empty possibilities, i.e., they have only the form or facade of reality (§ 143 *Zusatz*). Yet any possibility to which some real meaning is attached, and which may even be called significant rather than merely formal, must always be seen as the logically prior stage of every development which, through its very process of unfolding, reveals the necessity to which this potential must have been subjected in order to push itself forth into actuality. Such possibility or potentiality may also be appropriately called real, actual, and necessary.

Schelling gave primacy to potentiality (*Möglichkeit*) over actuality (*Wirklichkeit*), while Hegel - like Aristotle - put actuality ahead of potentiality. This rather humorous difference between Hegelian and Schellingian thought may seem like asking, "Which came first, the chicken or the egg?" insofar as neither potentiality nor actuality can be meaningful without the other, as nearly every philosopher since Aristotle has known. Actuality must be ever-dynamic, admitting of further possibility, else it is dead; and potentiality must always be capable of becoming actual, else it is just empty and vain.

At this point we may be reminded of the conundrum that Aristotle presents in *Metaphysics*, Theta, Chapters 8-9, namely, whether there are or could be any cases in which actuality would not logically precede potentiality. In *Metaphysics*, 1051a 15-20, he suggests a privative theory of evil, i.e., that anything "evil" or "bad" (*kakos*) has no reality of its own but instead is a defective actualization of a potential which, if it had achieved its full actuality, would be "good." For example, "since the potential of health is the same as the potential of sickness" - "hê autê gar dunamis tou hugiainein kai kamnein" (*Metaphysics*, 1051a 8), when this potential is fully actualized, the organism is healthy, but when it is only partially or deficiently actualized, the organism is sick. Yet the actual organism precedes all its potentialities. In its modified state, however, of either sickness or health, its potentiality may in a sense be said to precede its actuality.

By thus interacting, potentiality (*Möglichkeit* or *dunamis*) and actuality (*Wirklichkeit* or *energeia*) are, paradoxically, internal to each other for both Hegel and Aristotle, so that together they comprise a "concrete" actuality or an actual entity (*entelecheia*).

Actuality, considered apart from its inner potentiality as its necessary ground, presents only its external face. Considering actuality only in this way, we are immediately confronted with contingency (*Zufälligkeit*) as its most distinctive feature (§ 144). Hegel uses the idea of contingency as it was established in medieval philosophy, i.e., as the opposite of necessity. An entity is necessary if and only if it must exist by its very nature, or if it cannot not exist, i.e., if its existence is identical with its essence; otherwise, it is contingent. An actualized potentiality in this world is necessarily phenomenal, finite, doomed to perish, and therefore contingent. Contingency is the primary external relation among phenomena (§ 145). For Hegel, some X is contingent if it is possible that X could be not-X; some X is necessary if it must be the case that X is not-X.

The relation of contingency may be such that one phenomenon depends externally on some other phenomenon as its condition (*Bedingung*) (§ 146). Contingency, as determinately expressed in such a "concrete" relation, is thus seen as the condition whose presence or absence determines either the existence or non-existence of the related phenomenon.

A phenomenon which fulfills the function of a condition is a special existence or an immediate thing, but it also has a vocation, as it were, to be destroyed in its primary form in order to preserve the actualization of something else. In this way it fulfills its destiny, although dying in its individuality. This phenomenon persists in its other, which was evidently designed by the nature of this phenomenon, and which is so near of kin that it may properly be seen as this phenomenon's own true self. In other words, the condition in the first phenomenon is *aufgehoben* in the second phenomenon. The essence of the first enters into the actuality of the second and is there preserved. However, when we look beyond just the external manifestation, i.e., see the external manifestation as the necessary development of an inner organizing activity (*Tätigkeit*) which is real possibility, or the potential of reality, then the potential, the process, and the resulting product may all be conceived as coming together to constitute the actual fact. This fact, or this actuality, embraces all the purely external relations of contingency, including all the conditions which contribute to it and are merged within it.

In such a process - wherein the potential becomes actual and to which some purely external conditions contribute as essential factors, thus

losing the external character of their relations - the development reveals an inherent necessity which expresses itself as a law of uniformity and universality. Hegel defines necessity (*Notwendigkeit*) in this context as the oscillating unity of the potential and the actual (§ 147). The development of the one into the other must occur, and must occur in one definite way rather than in any other way.

Necessity thus signifies more than that one thing has been derived from another. This idea of derivation does not exhaust the meaning of necessity. For Hegel, necessity comes in several "flavors": conceptual, external, internal, substantial, material, contingent, absolute, reciprocal, blind, sighted, etc. Necessity is one of most complex, evasive, widespread, and difficult motifs in Hegel's thought. Yet at the same time it is also one of the most important.

Whatever is merely derivative is a product, which is what it is, not through itself, but through something else. Whatever is necessary contains the additional idea that something must be what it is through itself and through the activity (*Tätigkeit*) of its own inner processes. Even if this something is derivative, it must still contain, as a vanishing element within itself, the antecedent from which it was derived. Whatever is necessary must be mediated (*vermittelt*) through that which belongs to itself, i.e., through the inner constraint of its own nature. Yet such an inner determination, having arisen from the very nature of a thing itself, even though through another and thus not yet in and for itself, Hegel refers to as merely posited or supposed (*bloss gesetzt*) (§ 149). Hegel says that any phenomenon, property, feature, condition, or process is not only presupposed (*vorausgesetzt*), but also supposed or established (*gesetzt*), when it can be shown as the outcome of the very nature of that to which it is referred, whether through itself or through another (§ 148). Whenever what is given in thought leads by the necessity of the thought process to a conclusion which depends on this given as its premise, Hegel typically describes this conclusion as *gesetzt*. Each phase of the dialectic is *gesetzt* in the sense that it follows naturally or logically from the very nature of the thought which precedes it. Paradoxically, this *Gesetzsein*, i.e., the state of being posited or supposed, is intimately associated with the necessity of the whole dialectical movement.

The contingent, as an external condition of a fact, is not only external to that fact and sustaining just a passing relation to it, but also an essential element of it. The condition and the fact exist together within a single system. It is the business of philosophy to reveal the necessity which, although at a far deeper level, nevertheless always attaches to the contingent.

The "abstract" understanding draws a sharp line between necessity and

freedom (*Freiheit*). When we see all phenomena, ourselves included, as necessary, then we at first seem to inhabit, as Hegel puts it, "a completely unfree relationship" (§ 147 *Zusatz*; *EL*, p. 222; *HL*, p. 209; *LBD*, p. 220; *Enz.*, p. 143). We must bear in mind, however, that any kind of freedom which is devoid of the element of necessity is nothing more or less than mere caprice. But there is a perfectly free activity (*Tätigkeit*) which recognizes its own necessity and the inherent law of its own being, and thus endeavors freely to realize this necessity and conform to this law. Such freedom is the only true freedom. Hence, for Hegel, freedom is the truth of necessity.

Regarding predestination or determinism: If we were to feel that we were under the spell of an inevitable, inexorable fate and not in the remotest degree dependent on our own exertions, then all our doings would seem paralyzed, and we would find ourselves out of harmony with the world system in which we participate. But on the other hand, to recognize that we are necessarily the architects of our own fortunes and the masters of our own fates is to inspire us with earnest desire and strong purpose to realize the best that is in us. Hegel holds that human individuality is so intimately involved in absolute universality as to be preserved, not destroyed, by it. This theme will be more fully developed in the exposition of the concept, which, in its highest expression, is the absolute idea or the divine reason to which we all owe our being, and which constitutes at the same time the universal charter of our freedom.

Necessity, then, is the binding which connects condition, fact, and activity together in a single system. Thus, the question naturally suggests itself: What is the fundamental nature of a system in which necessity links all its elements together? Hegel's answer to this question, as we might well surmise, is threefold. He views necessity under these three categories:

1. Substantiality (*Substantialität*) (§§ 150-152).
2. Causality (*Kausalität*) (§§ 153-154).
3. Reciprocal activity (*Wechselwirkung*) (§§ 155-159).

These categories express the possible ways by which any fact may be connected with its corresponding condition through some mediating activity. Substantiality is the immediate, primary form which necessity assumes in connecting every potential state of development with its corresponding actuality. When the actual is present as a fact, it appears, then disappears, because a fact, as a mere fact or a separate existence seen merely as a separate existence, has no permanence (§ 151). Such facts rise and fall. They are, then they are not. There is a perpetual ebb and flow, growth and decay, throughout all nature, as Alfred, Lord Tennyson laments in "In Memoriam A.H.H. Obiit

MDCCCXXXIII," prologue, lines 17-18:

Our little systems have their day;
They have their day and cease to be.

But, beneath all these ephemeral forms and evanescent properties, there still remains an absolutely constant basis, the fundamental substance, on whose surface all things appear in their brief moments of particularity, then sink again into the all-absorbing substrate from which they arose. Their fleeting existence marks them as accidents of being, in contrast to the stable essence of which they are just passing actualities (§ 150). They are the many; substance is the one. This difference corresponds to that between the whole and its parts, described above in Chapter 14 on the "Phenomenal World."

Hegel's idea of substance seems to bear the stamp of Spinoza (§ 151 *Zusatz*). There is, however, one radical departure, since Spinoza seems to ascribe no reality to the phenomenal world. Hegel interprets *Erscheinung* as, for Spinoza, merely *Schein* (illusion) with no separate individuality of its own, and for this he blames Spinoza's Judaism, which he mistakenly sees as a strain of oriental monism. Protesting the elimination of real individuality, Hegel introduces into his system a more nearly Leibnizian principle of individuality, in opposition to the Spinozistic.

Here Hegel also defends Spinoza against charges of atheism, claiming that Spinoza's infidelity is not toward God, but toward the world. Thus, according to Hegel, Spinoza's system is an acosmism and therefore a pantheism. In denying the reality of individuals in the world, Spinoza loses the world and with it himself at the same time, insofar as he is one of those individuals. Admitting the unreality of the "I" would follow logically from asserting the unreality of the world.

This passage in § 151 *Zusatz*, where Hegel criticizes what he sees as defects in Spinoza's system, reveals Hegel's desire to save his own system from any pantheistic drift. Even though he here disclaims most stoutly any profession of pantheism, the question remains open whether his system as a whole may not logically lead to pantheism. It is a most significant fact that Hegel himself did not judge his system as demanding a pantheistic interpretation. Moreover, in the third part of the *Logic*, he maintains that the absolute is more than just substance; i.e., in the theory of the concept, the absolute *qua* reason is subject as well as substance, a "concrete" person beyond empty or indefinite "abstraction." Without this qualification, Hegelian substance would be like that of Spinoza: "the universal might of negation ... only the dark, shapeless abyss ... in which all determinate content is swallowed up as radically null and void" (§ 151 *Zusatz*; *EL*, p. 227; *HL*, p. 215; *LBD*, p.

225; *Enz.*, p. 145). In saying this, Hegel here implicitly criticizes Schelling and Jakob Boehme (1575-1624) by explicitly criticizing Spinoza.

Hegel's idea of substance marks here a preliminary stage which must be further developed. Hegelian substance, seen as mere substance, is constant and abiding, but static. Its particular phenomenal manifestations occur in it, accord with it, emerge from it, and return to it, mirroring the standard neo-Platonic process of *proödos* and *epistrophê* or the constant systole and diastole of organic life. But substance *per se* lacks in itself the dynamic power to initiate action or to produce the results that flow from it. Whatever connects with it is still only accidental (§ 152). Therefore, thought must rethink the idea of substance to develop the idea of causality which is inherent within it. Substance becomes cause; the static passes over into the dynamic. The relation of substance and accident (i.e., between substance and any of its properties, attributes, expressions, manifestations, or phenomena) is analogous to the relation of the whole and its parts. Similarly, the relation of cause and effect may be seen as analogous to that of force and its manifestation, as described above in Chapter 14.

The German word for "cause," *Ursache*, indicates an original or originating element. The prefix *ur-* means "original," "primeval," or "primary." *Sache* means "thing," "matter," "affair," or "business." So "cause" - the "original thing" - in this sense is to be seen as "self-cause," *causa sui*. It possesses, from this point of view, the capacity of initiation, or of producing its effect as the necessary consequence of its own being and activity (§ 153). From one side, "cause" and "effect" are distinct terms. But this represents a finite, "abstract" grasp of their relationship, such as would result from mere understanding. From a more comprehensive point of view the two terms, which only seem distinct, in reality fall together as one. The cause reveals itself as cause only so far as it is manifested in the effect. The effect has significance as effect only so far as it is seen to be connected with its cause.

In a sense, we speak of rain as the cause of dampness in the earth, yet a deeper consideration reveals that the dampness is the rain itself, only in another form. The rain both causes and is the dampness. Moreover, this dampness contributes as an ancillary cause to produce more rain in the future. The effect, therefore, is the manifestation of not only the direct or efficient cause, but also the oscillating or reciprocal activity of cause and effect. The cause is preserved in the effect and the effect is potential in the cause. We might even say that, as a final cause, the effect is the cause of the cause. The ideas of cause and effect have no meaning except with respect to each other.

Although we may see the relation between a cause and its effect as a

transition from one state to another, with concomitant preservation of the former in the latter, there is nothing to limit this process or to render it satisfactory as a conclusive account of a situation. Cause leads to effect, and each effect in turn becomes a cause of another effect, and so on *ad infinitum*. So far so good, but conversely, the causal relation may be also traced back from any given effect to its cause, and from there to its cause, and so on backward *ad infinitum*. This is the classic problem of infinite regress. If we see it as another example of Hegel's "bad infinite," then what we said above in Chapter 9 about the bad infinite going forward applies here also, *mutatis mutandis*, to the bad infinite going backward. For Hegel, there is no Aristotelian first cause or prime mover to rescue us from the snare of infinite regress. In the Hegelian chain of causation, there seems to be no starting point and no end. Thus his theory of causality seems incomplete, and therefore unsatisfactory, at least for now.

But a natural complement to this theory of causality grows quite naturally out of its very limitations. This is reciprocal activity (*Wechselwirkung*), or the relation of action/reaction (§ 154). Thus causation finds, according to Hegel, its most complete expression in reciprocal activity, the immediate but mutually interactive relation between cause and effect (§ 155). Cause produces effect, yet the effect in turn reacts on its cause in such a way that the cause is as much a product of the effect as the effect is of the cause (§ 156).

This principle of interaction is well illustrated by the reciprocal relations which parts of a single organism sustain with one another. For example, the organs and cells of the human body are all related in a reciprocal manner, so that they function to act and react on one another in an indefinite variety of manifestations. Hegel also claims that the relations among the customs, character, and laws of a people are always complex and reciprocal (§ 156 *Zusatz*). The individual characters of citizens are in a sense outgrowths or expressions of their national character, but the national character and the nation's laws are also intimately affected and modified by the citizens' characters, customs, and habits. So we might say that drunkenness "causes" - or is a reason for - poverty, or conversely, that poverty "causes" - or is a reason for - drunkenness.

Thus there are instances, as these illustrations indicate, wherein the cause does not lead to any endless causal progression or regression. The causal series in such cases is no longer seen as a limitless linear extension in either direction, but as an arc which bends back toward itself, representing the reactive influence of each effect on its cause. With this connection established, the ensuing circular movement of causation always returns to its starting point. This circle discloses the

necessary self-sufficiency of reciprocal activity (§ 157). Cause and effect stick together as one, but in their mutual dependence they are nevertheless independent of everything else. The cause finds in the effect, not only its other, but its own real self. The cause is not separate from the effect, nor is the effect anything outside the cause or externally related to it. Together they are just one closed system.

From this perspective, cause must be conceived as having, at least to some extent, its own power of initiative action, self-direction, or self-construction. It can no longer be seen merely as the intrinsic, initiating force of some fundamental substance, but has risen in our thought to the higher dignity of proceeding from absolute spirit itself, i.e., from the self-thinking source which is subject as well as substance. Thus its underlying, natural, self-imposed necessity forms a smooth transition to the concept (*Begriff*), the actual expression of the most genuine freedom, namely, thought itself (§ 158).

The dialectically highest form of substance is cause. The highest form of cause is reciprocal activity. The highest form of reciprocal activity is that which freely but necessarily passes over into self-directed and self-determined action. These transitions create a natural and easy transition to the theory of the concept, the self-directing formative principle of reason, the underlying and essential principle of all being. This transition from essence to the concept may be expressed as moving from the idea of substance to that of subject, or from the idea of necessity to that of freedom (§ 159).



"... ist 'der Begriff' vielmehr das Prinzip alles Lebens und damit zugleich das schlechthin Konkrete. ... Der Begriff ist das den Dingen selbst Innewohnende wodurch sie das sind was sie sind, und einen Gegenstand 'begreifen' heisst somit sich seines Begriffes bewusst werden. ... 'Die Idee' ist 'die Wahrheit'; denn die Wahrheit ist dies, dass die Objektivität dem Begriffe entspricht."

"... 'the concept' is rather the principle of all life and thus, at the same time, the utterly 'concrete.' ... The concept dwells within things

themselves and is that through which they become what they are; thus to 'conceive' an object means to become conscious of its concept. ... 'The idea' is 'truth'; for truth means that objectivity corresponds to the concept."

- Hegel, *EL*, § 160 *Zusatz*, p. 236; § 166 *Zusatz*, p. 245; § 213, p. 286 (translation modified); *HL*, pp. 223, 232, 275; *LBD*, pp. 233, 242, 283; *Enz.*, pp. 151, 155-156, 182-183.



Part IV

The Theory of the Concept (§§ 160-244)

We have followed the dialectical movement through the various stages and categories of being and essence, and have found this development logically continuous and progressive. So far, its most complete expression has revealed a basic factor which is not only determining, but also self-determining. This factor, thought itself, or the concept *qua* self-determining thought, entails presuppositionless thought, because, if there were any axioms, then they would predetermine any ideas that thought might generate, and thereby would curtail thought's absolute freedom. Hegel's *Begriff* (which we translate by the word "concept" rather than the less robust term "notion") is nothing more or less than this complete expression of everything contained in being and essence. Hegel calls the concept the truth of being and essence. It is the root of all things, needing no support because it is self-supporting, requiring no further explanation because it is self-explanatory, and dependent on no external determination because it is self-determined.

We may speak not only of the concept (singular), but also of concepts (plural), the particular instantiations of the concept, or the "concrete" products of mediating thought. Thus we may well ask whether the dialectical connections between concepts are intuitive or otherwise obvious, and whether concepts become distorted as a result of our

trying to express them. To the former question, we answer yes, in ways which should become clear below. To the latter question, we answer no, because concepts are necessarily discursive or linguistic, else they would be mere impressions, feelings, or mental images (*Vorstellungen*). To feel or imagine something is to have in mind something which cannot be expressed in words and must therefore remain vague, immediate, and meaningless; but to think or conceive something is to have something in mind which not only can, but must be expressed in words, and therefore lends itself to clarity, precision, definition, and further development toward real knowledge.

Concepts contain their own negations within themselves. Therefore, fixing or determining a concept's definition in words, i.e., thinking discursively, entails the dissolution of that fixation or determination as well as its natural, dialectical movement toward a new concept. This does not mean that fixing or determining definitions is futile because the concept, thus defined, will not stop where we define it. Rather, this means that such fixing or determining cannot result in static categories. That is, to understand a concept fully implies that new concepts are discovered, formed, or created. Fixation or determination is thus necessary toward the dissolution of prior fixations or determinations, which moves the dialectic.

In our discussion of form and content above in Chapters 13-14, we saw that Hegel uses the word "form" to signify a constructive, naturally dynamic principle. By "concept," he means not only that which is the source of this dynamic principle, but also that which is at the same time a self-sufficient source. In other words, he has advanced from seeing form as just the principle of activity to seeing it also as the principle of *self*-activity.

Moreover, the concept is not a convenient pigeonhole for the understanding to use. It is not an arbitrary idea, a regulative approximation, a functional hypothesis, or a universal class or group of objects, such as the genera *homo*, *canis*, *equus*, etc. Such ideas of group or class are merely formal and are thus only the skeleton of thought. They are dead, empty, effete, wholly "abstract." The concept, on the contrary, is thoroughly "concrete," i.e., it is intentional thinking as an active, constructive, productive force. With more than merely subjective value, it is not just an idea in the mind. Genuine thought is a self-determining, self-active force. All other thoughts and forces are but shadows of reality. The concept, as genuine thought, may manifest itself externally, e.g., in the inventions of the technologist, the institutions of the state, the charities of the church, the works of the artist, or the deeds great and small of human beings who think, plan, and thereupon act.

For Hegel, the concept is the living spirit of all that is actual. It pervades and dominates all types of life and all phases of activity, from the simplest to the most complex, the lowest to the highest. In his absolute idealism, one of the main and most characteristic features of the concept is subjectivity - not mere immediate subjectivity, such as we find in Kierkegaard, but the full profundity of the self-conscious individual united with itself in all its depth. Hegel frequently emphasizes, against Spinoza, that the fundament of the universe should be subject, not just substance. Hence the concept is the self-liberation of the self, i.e., the very "I" itself (§ 159). It is quintessentially self-conscious. It is an intelligent force working both consciously and purposefully. There is no place in Hegel's system for such a force as Eduard von Hartmann (1842-1906) posits, which works intelligently but unconsciously, and therefore blindly, darkly, and without purpose.



16

The General Nature of the Concept (§§ 160-162)

The element of necessity, the basis of the ideas of substance and causation, is in the theory of the concept cancelled, preserved, and raised to a higher dialectical level as freedom, insofar as this necessity is seen as self-imposed. The self-determining power of the concept is thus to be seen as a purely free activity. It is neither merely *an sich*, having only the potentiality of activity, nor merely *für sich*, explicitly realizing its potential activity, but rather it is both *an sich* and *für sich*, possessing the self-sufficient power or capacity for fully self-determined activity, the activity which self-consciously cancels, preserves, and raises itself to a higher dialectical level, thereby sending its potential into the actual.

Thus the concept, as spontaneous and unconditional, may be seen as the final and most complete characterization of the absolute. The absolute, accordingly, is best defined as the concept itself. The concept

is not only the highest expression of the absolute, but its comprehensive definition as well. As the concept embodies the truth of all phases of both being and essence, we infer that all the characterizations of the absolute, which the successive stages of dialectical movement have manifested in the categories of being and essence, may now be consummated in the all-embracing concept. Therefore Hegel defines the concept also as the totality (*Totalität*) of all things (§ 160), the fullness of all content, and as both self-contained and all-containing. With all phases of all forms of activity comprised within it, it is the great unifying principle of the cosmos. As the alpha, the omega, and the *raison d'être* of all things, it must, therefore, be immanent in all things. Moreover, it contains and preserves within it all earlier determinations of thought. Any contradictions which may have been involved in earlier stages of development are overcome by being *aufgehoben* in its higher unity.

The dialectical movement from the standpoint of the concept is essentially a process of development (*Entwicklung*) (§ 161), a constant oscillation between the universal and the particular which results in their unification and reconciliation, namely, the mediated or "concrete" individual. This movement, in the category of being, we found to involve the transition from determinate being to its corresponding other. In the category of essence, we saw the movement mediated by the idea of reflection, which marks no transition from determinate being to any other, but rather an illumination of determinate being by the light of its other. The other thus serves as the complement or correlate of the original entity, and gives it its significance. But in the category of the concept, there is actual development between the entity and its other, such that the unity of the two is fully preserved, and the former finds in its other only what complements or completes it. As such, each unity of two "others" is the truth of the dialectical transition which created this unity in being, and of the dialectical reflection which created it in essence.

The evolution (*Entwicklung*) which is due to the activity of the concept is a self-development. The very nature of the concept is to manifest itself - in all the various phases of its possibilities. *Entwicklung*, the continuous unfolding of all that is potential in the concept, demands a single unifying principle amid its superabundant diversity of content, a principle which manifests itself progressively so that each succeeding stage is realized as more nearly complete than the one before. This principle manifests itself in time, producing the present cosmic order. Yet the truth of this principle in its fullness and in all the logically coordinated stages of its evolution must be seen as temporally unconditioned and indeterminate.

The nature of this evolution is primarily dialectical, i.e., each stage must be seen as the necessary complement of the one before, in the sense of overcoming its contradictions and supplying its defects. This is fundamentally a logical demand. As Hegel puts it, every given stage is *gesetzt* by that which precedes it, i.e., from whatever is contained in any particular phase, reason must necessarily infer the next. Thought, although free, is thus compelled by its own nature to develop its concepts from the simplest and most immediate to the ever more complex and ever more fully mediated. Each phase of dialectical development fails to satisfy the complete expression of truth and thus demands each fuller and more satisfactory phase which lies just beyond, which may to some extent correct its errors and supplement its defects, but which in turn will ask new questions which it cannot answer and create new contradictions which it cannot resolve.

Thus the onward dialectical movement proceeds not so much from one period of time to another as from the idea of imperfection to that of perfection, or from the idea of incompleteness to that of completeness. When the temporal process becomes complete, it furnishes a complete product. We cannot go backward, retreat, roll it up again into its closed potentiality, do a second take, or repeat the process at will. Movement in time is only from the bud to the full-blown rose or from the child to the adult; the rose cannot become a bud again, nor the adult a child. But in thought, as the concept, such reverse movement is always possible. Given certain premises, their conclusion must develop itself out of them. Given a conclusion containing its major and minor terms, we can discover their middle term and then work "backward" to the original premises. This conceptual process reverses the "forward" movement of deduction.

Moreover, development in time is naturally finite, just as the dialectical development of thought is naturally infinite. Development in time is gradual change from phase to phase. Dialectical development is the ever more nearly complete revelation of that which, despite its infinitely varied manifestations, is ever identical with itself: the absolute. Temporal development occurs within dialectical movement, but only as a moment in the larger process. (Cf. J.B. Baillie, *The Origin and Significance of Hegel's Logic*, Chapter 9; J.M.E. McTaggart, *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic*, Chapter 5.)

As the dialectical movement reveals the full significance of the concept, three important stages appear (§ 162), which are so related that either the first or the second, taken by itself, proves misleading and unsatisfactory, and has final significance only when it unites with the other as the *Aufhebung* that constitutes the third stage. These stages form the three divisions of the category of the concept:

1. The concept as subjective (*der subjektive Begriff*) (§§ 163-193).
2. The concept as objective (*der objektive Begriff*) (§§ 194-212).
3. The concept as the *Aufhebung* of subjective and objective, i.e., as the idea (*die Idee*) (§§ 213-244).

Hegel's fundamental thesis throughout is that the reality of thought consists in its productivity. He regards thought as the constructive, freely self-determining force which underlies the universe, fashions all creatures, and shapes all events. To fulfill this task, it must be both subjective and objective. If thought is merely subjective, then its primary function is paralyzed. On the other hand, if merely objective, separate from any subjective thought, then it is irrational and thus, for Hegel, unreal. The objective is not set over against the subjective; the subjective is immanent in the objective; and the very nature of the subjective is to strive to realize itself in the objective. Rebutting Kant's epistemology in the second preface to the *Science of Logic* and elsewhere, Hegel says that our thinking, when constricted by forms and categories, gets between us and the objects of thought, but when free, unites us with these objects (cf. *WL*, vol. 1, pp. 14-15; *SLM*, pp. 35-36; *SLdG*, pp. 15-16). The *Aufhebung* of the subjective and the objective is the concept in its true function, achieving its highest expression as the idea (*Idee*), supreme reason, or the absolute. Subjective or objective concepts are each indeterminate and incomplete, but in their *Aufhebung*, the world of thought and the world of reality, lives the truth of the concept: neither formal nor "abstract," but "concrete," dynamic, self-conscious, all-controlling, all-embracing, and free.



The Subjective Concept (§§ 163-193)

The subjective concept, as we have seen, is the concept regarded merely in one of its aspects, as constituting the sum of thought processes. These processes taken together form a system in which all

relations of thought are determined by the fundamental nature of thought itself. These relations divide naturally into three typical thought forms, and in this division Hegel follows traditional Aristotelian and medieval logic. These forms are as follows:

1. The concept regarded simply as formal, or the concept as such (*der Begriff als solcher*) (§§ 163-165).
2. Judgment (*Urteil*) (§§ 166-180).
3. Syllogism (*Schluss*) (§§ 181-193).

The primary type of thought, which Hegel calls the concept, regarded simply as concept, corresponds in some of its main features to the ordinary concept of formal logic. Hegel's system treats it without reference to its natural setting as one of the components of judgment and syllogism. This view of the concept is only provisional, and represents merely an "abstract" analysis of thought processes, preliminary to subsequent synthesis, which will represent their components as properly coordinated and unified. The concept, thus conceived as a provisionally separate thought element, is found to contain three essential factors, or in Hegel's terminology, phases or aspects (*Momente*) - universality, particularity, and individuality (*Allgemeinheit, Besonderheit, Einzelneheit*) (§ 163).

We should notice that Hegel does not divide concepts into three kinds, the universal, the particular, and the individual (*das Allgemeine, das Besondere, das Einzelne*), but regards each single concept as embracing in a unity all three of these coordinated aspects. Hegel evidently wishes to emphasize that, while the components of the inseparably paired categories of reflection, such as appearance and ground, cause and effect, etc., may each be considered and even understood in some limited way apart from their correlates, this not true about the components of these three categories of the concept (§ 164).

Universality, particularity, and individuality - even though conceptually intelligible each on their own as terms - cannot be either considered or understood apart from the concept in which they comprise together a dynamic triad. If they do not all three appear in this complete unity of thought, then the internal logic of the concept itself - and indeed, its very integrity - is fundamentally impaired.

A concept seen as representing only, for example, a universal, i.e., a class or group idea, would have to be only an empty idea of genus, insofar as it would contain little or no suggestion of the capacity of the genus to realize itself either in different species, which would represent its particularity and be its particulars, or in different single entities, which would represent its individuality and be its individuals. Similarly, a concept seen as representing only a species would imply not only some genus as the necessary universal of this species, but also

the necessity of the species to be actual in specific individuals. Moreover, a concept seen as representing only an individual would have no meaning unless it provided for that individual a full conceptual environment, i.e., a properly mediating context of species and genus. The relations among genus, species, and individuals thus represent clearly and adequately the three Hegelian moments of the concept: universality, particularity, and individuality. Any one of them necessarily implies the other two.

Particularity and individuality are related as "abstract" and "concrete," respectively. The particular is the "abstract individual." The individual is the "concrete particular." The universal is their union, and may be either "abstract" or "concrete." The so-called "concrete universal" is Hegel's gold standard for conceptual thought, and is probably unattainable by finite rational beings such as ourselves.

Hegel typically speaks of *das Einzelne* (the individual) rather than *der einzelne Begriff* (the individual concept). His discussion of *das Einzelne* contains his theory of reference or mediated relation (*vermittelte Beziehung*) and leads quite naturally toward our understanding of full mediation or "concreteness." In this connection, we might ask whether concepts can be conceived as categories, rules, or genera in their own right? Whatever our answer to this question, we must admit that, for Hegel, *das Einzelne* cannot be categorized, subjected to rules, or ultimately consigned to a genus, as *das Besondere* can.

Hegel criticizes traditional logic for, among other things, regarding its general term or class idea as a concept in only one aspect, universality, while neglecting particularity and individuality. Thus the purely formal logician, the literalist, often ignores particular instances which are not in accord with general ideas, or twists individual facts so that they may conform to preconceived theories. But it is the moment of individuality in the concept which constitutes the concept's actuality and distinguishes it from mere imaginative fancy. A singular object or an individual is always the most convincing proof, the clearest illustration, and the most nearly "concrete" manifestation of the universal. Nothing reveals the emptiness of thought as quickly as a succession of glittering generalities which allow no particular application, definite verification, "concrete" determinacy, or individual instantiation.

On the other hand, we must not overlook that if the significance of the individual is to be adequately interpreted, we must always be able to refer it unerringly to some universal. The work of scholars or scientists is not complete when they have just collected facts, however numerous or accurate these facts may be. Seekers of true knowledge must also relate facts to law and rise above the particular results of

empirical or speculative investigations in order to appreciate the universal that facts embody. Hegel illustrates this relation of the individual to the universal by showing that only when the world came to recognize every human, whether Greek or barbarian, bonded or free, male or female, as having each an infinite and universal nature, did the real significance of humans for themselves and for society become adequately understood and properly valued (§ 163 *Zusatz* 1). To recognize humans as persons and not just things - i.e., as individuals and not just particulars - is simply to recognize that the principle of personality is in reality a principle of universality. Hence the universal is not merely the generalized aggregate of whatever traits some number of individuals may have in common; rather, it is the active principle which specifies and determines individuals, bringing them together into a unity with itself, i.e., a unity into which particulars, qua "abstract," cannot be brought. As Hegel says, "... things are what they are through the activity of the concept immanent in them and revealing itself in them" (§ 163 *Zusatz* 2; *EL*, p. 241; *HL*, p. 228; *LBD*, p. 238; *Enz.*, p. 153). Thus every human individual, via particularities of character and conduct, reveals the universal nature of humanity.

Corresponding respectively to universality, particularity, and individuality in the concept are the three fundamental categories of essence: identity, difference, and ground. Thus the universal is naturally self-identical, i.e., homogeneous throughout, without distinction as to any particular or individual varieties which may embody or illustrate it. Yet the necessity of the concept compels it to resolve itself into particular species and specific individuals, which it does through a process of differentiation. In each of these particular or individual manifestations the universal is always present. Moreover, the universal can manifest itself as identity amid all difference or unity amid all diversity only within whatever can be the common ground of such identity or unity, e.g., a plurality of species or a series of individuals.

When the universal falls under the natural compulsion of thought and thus becomes more specific by manifesting various aspects of its particularity, then the concept has developed into the form of judgment (§ 165). To judge is to make the complete nature of the concept definite, specific, or determinate.

Defining, specifying, or determining the concept, which is the main function of judgment, is a process of breaking up the homogeneity of the purely universal features of the concept and thereby showing that the concept admits of varied manifestations as some number of particular instances of the universal, each as a distinct species within

the all-inclusive genus. Specifying or determining these particulars and their distinguishing characteristics in detail would require a set of judgments whose total, when complete, would exhaust the full significance of the universal concept as such. The German word for "judgment," *Urteil*, which literally means "original division," signifies most strikingly this primal breaking up of the concept into its particular manifestations, which, again, is the role of judgment (§ 166).

Judgment, expressed in words, naturally shapes itself as: "The individual is the universal." This asserts an underlying identity between the universal, as such, and its particular manifestation(s) in some "concrete" individual instance(s).

It is here, in his discussion of judgment, argument, and syllogism, that Hegel comes as close to either traditional or modern logic as he ever does. Indeed, if Hegel's Logic seems to resemble any other system of logic, then such resemblance is probably deceptive and not worth pursuing. This is because the aims of logic for Hegel, on the one hand, and for most other logicians of all eras, on the other hand, are quite different. While logic in general is concerned to formalize the structures of valid arguments, to clarify the semantics of sound arguments, to define the features of meaningful propositions, etc., Hegel wishes also to include under the "big tent" of Logic the aim of describing the logical structure of thought itself, the universe, and the absolute, all under the aegis of spirit (*Geist*). Thus his Logic has little in common with Aristotelian or medieval logic or with the logics of his younger contemporaries, e.g., the algebraic logic of George Boole (1815-1864) or the inductive logic of John Stuart Mill, and it certainly has hardly anything in common with the *Principia Mathematica* (1910-1913) of Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) and Bertrand Russell or with subsequent formal systems of symbolic logic.

Unlike in standard predicate logic, there is no traditional, logical conjunction for Hegel. As we saw above in Chapter 5, Hegel prefers "both/and" to "either/or." This means that, in Hegel's rather idiosyncratic dialectical logic, the whole is hardly ever just equal to the sum of its parts, nor is it only occasionally greater, but in fact it is *almost always* greater than the sum of these parts, because it contains and is their truth, i.e., their reconciliation or *Aufhebung*, not just their aggregated total. *Aufhebung* is essential to Hegel's Logic, yet is scarcely even evident in any other kind of logic.

Nevertheless, Hegel's idea of the function of the copula accords with other logics in a few ways. The copula does not signify that the subject and predicate of a proposition have been brought together merely by a juxtaposition of thought, and thus connected by a convenient thought

form. Rather, its function is to emphasize that two seemingly distinct elements, expressed as subject and predicate, are in reality identical, and that their fusion into one is demanded by the copula which connects them in judgment (§ 169). Subject and predicate are not two independent extremes, nor is any predicate a general quality, outside its subject, with a separate existence somewhere in our minds. Instead, it is an essential phase of the subject itself.

We must remember that judgment is merely an expanded form of the concept. An obvious unity attaches to the very nature of the concept. This unity is not lost when the concept puts itself into its more explicit form: judgment. The seemingly separate terms which the copula connects have no genuinely separate existence apart from their connection (§ 168). When we say, "This rose is red," we mean that this particular rose participates in - or is a specific instance of - the universal red. Conversely, the universal red, in this conjunction, manifests itself in the specific shade of red which characterizes this particular rose.

In general, the subject and predicate in every judgment so blend together that the particularity of the subject partakes of the universality expressed in the predicate, and the universality of the predicate partakes of the particularity expressed in the subject. The identity of subject and predicate, thus blended, is what Hegel calls the specific or determinate content of the predicate (*der bestimmte Inhalt des Prädikats*) (§ 170). It is what constitutes the judgment's primary significance.

The relation in which subject and predicate become one is not due to our thinking, which would impose this connection externally on phenomena. On the contrary, this relation exists in the very nature of phenomena themselves, and any thought which we may have about them is only our discovery of relations which already exist. If the concept is the constructive force immanent in all phenomena, then judgment is the explicit and determinate manifestation of the indwelling potentiality of the concept in certain specific instances. Moreover, as an actual manifestation, it is subjectively revealed as what it is in its objective reality.

Thus Hegel distinguishes between a judgment and a proposition (*Satz*) (§ 167). A proposition contains an assertion about a given subject, not in any universal relation to its predicate, but with regard to some single state or action which is the result of a contingent relation between subject and predicate, as in so-called narrative judgments, e.g., "Caesar crossed the Rubicon" or "It rained last evening." But in judgment proper, the relation between subject and predicate is free of any such troublesome or accidental element of contingency.

In § 171 *Zusatz*, Hegel divides judgments into three types, which correspond to the three main divisions of the *Logic*:

1. Judgments of being (§§ 172-173).
2. Judgments of essence (§§ 174-177).
3. Judgments of the concept (§§ 178-180).

These three types of judgments form a series of progressive development. The distinctions among them are due in each case to the logical significance of the predicate. For example, there is a marked difference in logical value between these two judgments: "The rose is red" and "The statue is beautiful." The former expresses a simple perception, while the latter expresses a more complicated thought process, a subjective appraisal of value based on comparing the object of perception with that which we believe it ought to realize, i.e., its ideal or its concept. Hence, these three types of judgments resolve into four:

1. Corresponding to the category of being is the qualitative judgment (*das qualitative Urteil*) (§§ 172-173).
2. and 3. Corresponding to the category of essence are two judgments: that of reflection (*das Reflexionsurteil*) (§§ 174-176) and that of necessity (*das Urteil der Notwendigkeit*) (§ 177).
4. Corresponding to the category of the concept is the conceptual judgment (*das Urteil des Begriffs*) (§§ 178-180).

Hegel describes a qualitative judgment, or a judgment of being, as one which ascribes a universal quality to a particular subject, yet does not necessarily so characterize all such subjects of the same class. For example, when we say, "The rose is red," we correctly ascribe the universal quality of redness to the rose in question, but not to all roses, or to "rose" in general. Thus, "The rose is red" implies that some roses may exist which are not red. For every affirmative judgment of this kind there must be a possible negative judgment which parallels it. The predicate belongs only to the specific subject under consideration, not to the universal which is manifested in this subject.

It is therefore proper to characterize a qualitative judgment as correct (*richtig*) or incorrect, but not as true or false (§ 172). To affirm a judgment as true means that its predicate is essential to the underlying concept to which the subject must be referred. Hegel says, "... in the judgment of the concept ... the predicate is, as it were, the soul of the subject by which the subject, as the body of this soul, is determined through and through" (§ 172 *Zusatz*; *EL*, p. 250; *HL*, p. 237; *LBD*, p. 247; *Enz.*, p. 159).

If, instead of starting with an affirmative judgment and inferring necessarily a corresponding negative judgment, we start with a

negative judgment, such as "This rose is not red," then we are constrained just as necessarily to infer the implied affirmative, since the negative statement that the rose is not red implies some other color. Insofar as the subject in such cases is not a universal, the negative either expresses an empty identity, e.g., "The rose that you see has the color that you see," or is a so-called infinite judgment (§ 173) in which an absolute incompatibility is set forth, e.g., "A circle is not a tree." The indeterminate or indefinite (*adioristos*) judgment which we find in Aristotle is the same as the infinite judgment which we find in Boethius (ca. 480 - ca. 525), Kant, and Hegel.

In standard logic, an infinite judgment would be a *reductio ad absurdum* or an irrelevant negation. But Hegel claims that it may possess some significance as it describes certain "concrete" relations whose nature can only be thus determined. For example, death is the infinite negation of life, since death totally negates life. Disease, on the other hand, is merely a simple negation of life, insofar as certain functions are only temporarily impaired, i.e., contingently negated. This simple negation is itself negated and at once overcome when health returns and normal physiological functions resume; but no infinite negation can ever be negated or overcome.

For Hegel, a judgment of reflection is one in which the subject no longer appears as a special case or a particular instance, but is related to something else which is implied in the predicate (§ 174). Such a relation is true not only for the particular subject in question but also universally, for all others of the same class, e.g., in the judgment: "This plant is edible," which signifies a universal relation between all plants of the same kind as the subject and a certain effect which they may have on a specific part of the whole universal system to which they belong, namely, in this case, human gustatory and digestive processes. This is a judgment of reflection because only in the light of something else brought into relation with this plant can the adjective "edible" be applied to it. Its edibility arises only from its being brought into relation with human appetite.

This type of judgment in general resolves into three varieties:

1. The singular judgment (*das singuläre Urteil*) (§ 175).
2. The particular judgment (*das partikuläre Urteil*) (§ 175).
3. The universal judgment or the judgment of all-ness (*das Urteil der Allheit*) (§§ 175 Zusatz).

A singular judgment such as, "This plant is edible," implies that there may be other plants also which are edible, as well as some which are not. This would then be a particular judgment. Moreover, in some cases, the nature of a particular judgment may be such that, upon

further investigation, we may enlarge its meaning so that it embraces the universal too. This development mirrors the natural progress of empirical knowledge from the singular to the particular and then from the particular to the universal. For instance, from the singular judgment, "This metal conducts electricity," we advance to the particular judgment, "Other metals conduct electricity," and finally we reach the universal judgment, "All metals conduct electricity," which is indeed part of the definition of "metal." These judgments represent widening circles of verifiable knowledge, not mere empirical (and thus falsifiable) generalization. Given the universality of the definition, therefore any counterexample, i.e., in this case, a metal which did not conduct electricity, would be meaningless.

Thus the subject merges its seemingly individual characteristics with those common to other members of the same species, and in this way the same predicate applies in a particular judgment as it first applied in a singular judgment. Furthermore, there are some predicates which, as empirical investigation reveals, may advance not only to particular, but also to all-embracing, universal judgments. Such cases have no negative instances; therefore, in them, the individual is to be seen as an epitome of the whole class. As Hegel puts it: "When we say 'all plants,' 'all humans,' etc., this is the same as saying 'planthood *per se*,' 'humankind *per se*,' etc." (§ 176 *Zusatz*; *EL*, p. 253; *HL*, p. 241; *LBD*, p. 250; *Enz.*, p. 160). In other words, the two sentences, "All metals conduct electricity" and "Metal conducts electricity," are materially equivalent. Any property of an individual, which at the same time belongs to every other member of that individual's species, is necessarily an attribute or a defining characteristic of that species. It is universal because it is necessary, and it is necessary because it is universal. The judgment of reflection which expresses a universal relation between a predicate and its subject as a whole must also be a judgment of necessity (§ 176). Thus the transition from the judgment of reflection to the judgment of necessity is natural.

Hegel discusses the judgment of necessity (§ 177) under its three aspects as:

1. Categorical (*das kategorische Urteil*).
2. Hypothetical (*das hypothetische Urteil*).
3. Disjunctive (*das disjunktive Urteil*).

The predicate in a categorical judgment expresses the essential nature of the subject, i.e., it represents the subject in terms of the most basic of the categories of actuality *qua* necessity, namely, substantiality, which we discussed above in Chapter 15. In a judgment of simple assertion, which is characteristic of categorical judgment, e.g., "Iron is a metal," the idea of "metalhood" or "metalness" denotes the

substantial or essential nature of iron. Yet categorical judgments lack completeness, insofar as they do not include aspects of particularity, i.e., of definite or specific description. In their most simplistic form, they are just tautologies, conveying no useful information.

When we posit the specification which renders a universal statement more particular or a general statement more definite, we have the hypothetical form of judgment: "If A is B, then C is D." In it, the subject only under a specified condition leads to its necessary consequent. This condition gives the subject its particular aspect. In hypothetical judgments the posited (*gesetzt*) relations are those of cause and effect, the second of the three categories of actuality *qua* necessity.

But when the subject, as a genus, is completely determined through exhaustive division into its component species, we have the disjunctive judgment, typically in this form: "A is either B or C or D or ..." The "either/or" mirrors the reciprocal activity of the third category of actuality *qua* necessity. In these judgments, the predicate is semantically coextensive with the subject. Two examples would be: "A primary color is either red or blue or yellow" and "A body is either in motion or at rest." All possibilities are covered in each case. In other words, a genus is always at least equal to - if not also greater than (because, typically but not always for Hegel, disjunctions are inclusive [OR] rather than exclusive [XOR]) - the sum of its several species. Hence the genus is expressed in its totality, and the totality of any genus is its concept. This marks the transition to the judgment of the concept.

In judgments of the concept, the subject conforms more or less to its ideal, i.e., its concept. Available predicates for this type of judgment include value terms such as good, true, beautiful, wise, perfect, etc., which can be used just as long as all possibilities are represented (§ 178). Each one may imply a norm which the subject may, in affirmative judgments, adequately embody, or, in negative judgments, fail to embody.

What happens when one concept implies another? What is logical implication for Hegel? Is it only a psychologistic sort of implication? The judgment of the concept divides into three classes:

1. The assertoric judgment (*das assertorische Urteil*) (§§ 178-179).
2. The problematic judgment (*das problematische Urteil*) (§ 179).
3. The apodictic judgment (*das apodiktische Urteil*) (§ 179).

An assertoric judgment simply declares the brazen statement that the subject either is or is not in accord with its ideal. Such a judgment is subjective in the worst sense and may be challenged by anyone who

holds another opinion (§ 179). Thus emerges the second form, the problematic judgment.

A problematic judgment is qualified by "may be," the modal copula, which naturally also implies the possibility that the subject "may not be" what it is supposed to be. But if we reinforce the relation between subject and predicate with a subsidiary statement, either expressed or implied, indicating the ground of their connection (§ 180), then we have the third form, the apodictic judgment.

An apodictic judgment asserts that the relation between subject and predicate is such that it must be true. It is no longer a matter of opinion, discussion, dispute, or argument, but of necessity. When the reason which reinforces the cogency of a judgment is fully elaborated, we naturally change over to the syllogism (§§ 171, 180). For example, the judgment that a certain law would prove harmful to the best interests of the community can be shown to be an apodictic judgment, i.e., necessarily true, if we can show that it is irredeemably unjust.

Our judgment would then appear as follows: "This law, being obviously unjust, must necessarily prove harmful to the best interests of the community." Expanded or reworked into the formal structure of a syllogism, it would run as follows:

All unjust laws are harmful.

This law is unjust.

Therefore, it must prove harmful.

Whenever a judgment under challenge reveals its own ground as its justification, we have a syllogism. The statement that X must be true is justifiable only when it can be shown that there is somewhere in the world a sufficient reason or ground, e.g., a deduction, a verifiable observation, a repeatable experiment, etc., to warrant such a statement (§ 184). We may be reminded here - anachronistically with regard to Hegel - of the classic article by Alfred Tarski (1901-1983), "The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics" (*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 4, 3 [March 1944]: 341-376), in which he famously proclaims: "The sentence 'snow is white' is true if, and only if, snow is white." Hegel is often interpreted as advocating a coherence theory of truth, but in fact he manages to synthesize at least four theories of truth - a coherence theory, a correspondence theory, a pragmatic theory, and a consensus theory - into one overarching or comprehensive theory of truth. That synthesis is more evident in his *Phenomenology of Spirit* and in the third part of his *Encyclopedia*, "The Philosophy of Spirit," than in his *Logic*.

But back to the syllogism: A syllogism is a judgment which constitutes its own proof (§ 181). It is the expanded form - or the intrinsic formal

structure - of the apodictic or necessarily valid judgment. It always has three terms, with the middle term mediating (§ 185).

In an apodictic judgment, we have an individual subject whose particular characteristics warrant our referring it to its universal. In its elaboration, as expressed by the three terms of the formal syllogistic structure, the individual and the universal are brought together by means of a common term, the traditional middle term of formal logic, in such a way as to create a logical unity. In the major and minor premises we have separate judgments, their point of articulation being the middle term. This separation of the major and minor terms in the premises is completely overcome in the conclusion, so that thought returns to the unitary concept which holds the major and minor terms together in one judgment. Thus Hegel defines the syllogism as the unity of judgment and the concept (§ 181). That is, the separate judgments of the premises coalesce in the single concept which comprises the conclusion. The propositions in the two premises are the result of analytic thought. However, the fusion of the major and minor terms in the conclusion is synthetic.

The syllogism should not be seen as an arbitrary or artificial grouping of judgments together in thought. We do not, properly speaking, construct syllogisms. The syllogistic process is rather the universal mode in which the phenomena of the universe manifest themselves. It is, moreover, for Hegel, an accurate description of the endless activity by which the absolute constantly manifests the divine or absolute essence. He means by this that all being, essence, actuality, and activity are manifestations of a universal through certain particular or specific characteristics which this universal reveals in and as determinate "concrete" individualities. The syllogism is just a specific expression of the general process which provides for this varied interplay of the universal, the particular, and the individual in their many interrelations.

Yet the universal, the particular, and the individual are, all three, each individuals. Every concept as a universal manifests itself in individual instances through particular characteristics which differ according to their various species. Conversely, every individual reveals its full significance only when referred to its corresponding universal via its particular characteristics. Thought naturally binds together into one these three ideas of universality, particularity, and individuality, which is precisely the syllogistic process. Reason thus naturally expresses itself in the form of syllogisms, and the goal and essence of reason is to manifest itself dynamically as the constructive force of the universe (§ 182). Hence the syllogistic principle informs and to a large extent defines the active processes of all nature, existence, logic, and

Geist.

In studying Hegel's philosophy of syllogistic logic, it is well to keep in mind Aristotle's contribution to this science, especially the three figures of the valid syllogism which he presents in the *Prior Analytics*. Aristotle invented - or, in Hegel's view, discovered - the syllogism, or at least the philosophical interpretation of it, and his teachings on logic held sway in the Western world for over two thousand years, until symbolic, quantified, modal, and other mathematical logics arose in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Unlike these modern formal logics, Hegel's Logic has never been a rival to Aristotle's, mainly because Hegel and Aristotle have different philosophical goals. While Aristotelian logic tries to formalize thought processes, Hegelian logic tries to describe thought *as it actually occurs*. Hegel's basic project with respect to logic is to describe conceptually what humans really and already do when they think. We might then say that, in this sense, Aristotle's logic is "artificial" or merely formal while Hegel's is "real" or phenomenological (§ 187). We might ask what the relation of Aristotelian logic is to Hegel's theory of the concept. We might also ask whether Hegel's Logic is actually about logic or whether it is just part of an attempt to figure out what *Sein* is. Aristotle's logic, as he presents it in the *Organon*, is narrowly about logic *per se* and its forms. He considers "being" (*ousía* and *to on*) elsewhere.

Let "S" be the subject or minor term; let "P" be the predicate or major term; and let "M" be the middle term. Using this notation, the three figures of the possibly valid Aristotelian syllogism are:

First figure:

M is P.

S is M.

Therefore, S is P.

Example (mood AII, unconditionally valid):

All men are mortal.

Caius is a man.

Therefore, Caius is mortal.

Second figure:

P is M.

S is M.

Therefore, S is P.

Example (mood EAE, unconditionally valid):

No ducks are fish.

All trout are fish.

Therefore, no trout are ducks.

Third figure:

M is P.

M is S.

Therefore, S is P.

Example (mood AAI, conditionally valid upon the existence of M):

All dogs are carnivores.

All dogs are mammals.

Therefore, some mammals are carnivores.

The medievals added a fourth figure:

P is M.

M is S.

Therefore, S is P.

Example (mood AEE, unconditionally valid):

All Martians are furry invertebrates.

No furry invertebrates are Red Sox fans.

Therefore, no Red Sox fans are Martians.

Recall that Aristotelian validity is determined by the mood of a syllogism, not its figure, and that its mood is determined by the interrelations of categorical propositions: universal affirmative (A), universal negative (B), particular affirmative (I), and particular negative (O). While validity or invalidity is determined by form, truth or falsity is determined by content.

Hegel's syllogisms in general, and his three figures in particular, bear little resemblance to Aristotle's, either formally or semantically. They are not expressed as relations among subject, predicate, and middle term, but rather as relations among the particular (*das Besondere*), the individual (*das Einzelne*), the universal (*das Allgemeine*). Let "P" be the particular; let "I" be the individual; and let "U" be the universal. (Hegel uses the letters B, E, A for *das Besondere*, *das Einzelne*, and *das Allgemeine*, respectively.) Using this notation, the three figures of the Hegelian syllogism are:

First figure: I-P-U (E-B-A) (§§ 183-186, 189).

Second figure: U-I-P (A-E-B) (§ 186-187, 189).

Third figure: P-U-I (B-A-E) (§ 187, 189).

These are the figures as Hegel lays them out in the shorter *Logic*, §§ 183-189. But in the larger *Logic*, Part II, Book 3, Section 1, Chapter 3, Part A, Sections a-c, they are: First figure: I-P-U (E-B-A). Second figure: P-I-U (B-E-A). Third figure: I-U-P (E-A-B) (*WL*, vol. 2, pp. 311-325; *SLM*, pp. 667-679; *SLdG*, pp. 590-601). In the *Encyclopedia*, these three are called "qualitative," but in the larger *Logic* they are the figures of "the syllogism of determinate being" (*der Schluss des Daseins*). Moreover, in next section of the *Science of Logic*, Hegel adds to this syllogism a fourth figure, U-U-U (A-A-A), which contains only

universal terms (*WL*, vol. 2, pp. 326-328; *SLM*, pp. 679-681; *SLdG*, pp. 601-603). We will not try to resolve these discrepancies here, but will follow the shorter *Logic*, mainly because it is the later work.

Hegel discusses the syllogism under its three aspects as follows:

1. The Qualitative Syllogism (*der qualitative Schluss*) (§§ 183-189).
2. The Syllogism of Reflection (*der Reflexionsschluss*) (§§ 190).
3. The Syllogism of Necessity (*der Schluss der Notwendigkeit*) (§§ 191-193).

These three types of syllogisms may be briefly characterized as:

1. Something happens.
2. There is reflection on what has happened.
3. There is understanding of the relationship between the reflection and the happening, and this understanding is the idea of philosophy.

The first is *Werden* or transition. The second is reflection or synthesis. The third is truth as the inclusive disjunction of *Werden* and reflection.

In the qualitative (or determinate being) syllogism, the particular is what mediates. In the syllogism of reflection, the individual is what mediates. In the syllogism of necessity, the universal is what mediates (§ 191).

In the qualitative syllogism, the subject of the conclusion is referred as an individual to its predicate, which is a universal because of one or more of its particular qualities (§ 183). These qualitative characteristics are expressed by the middle term, which is of the nature of a particular. Thus, in this form of the syllogism, the subject of the conclusion, which is always the minor term, is the individual. The predicate of the conclusion, which is always the major term, is the universal.

The middle term, which does not appear in the conclusion but in each of the premises, is the particular. Hegel expresses all this in the formula I-P-U, which means that P, the particular, is the middle term between I, the individual as the minor term, and U, the universal as the major term. In similar formulas the same order is preserved to designate all possible permutations of syllogistic structure, i.e., the first letter always represents the minor term; the last, the major term; and the middle letter, naturally, the middle term. Thus, expanded into the form of a syllogism, the formula I-P-U becomes:

An individual has certain particular characteristics.
All such particular characteristics belong to a certain universal.
Therefore, the individual belongs to this universal.

Or symbolically:

I is P.
All P is U.
Therefore, I is U.

Here the first premise is the minor, and the second the major.
Reversing this order, the syllogism runs as follows:

All P is U.
I is P.
Therefore, I is U.

This is a syllogism of Aristotle's first figure, in which the middle term appears as the subject of the sentence in the major premise, and as the predicate of the sentence in the minor. In this syllogism, each premise must be seen in the light of some conclusion which has been previously mediated by some other middle term (§ 189). In other words, if the ground of each premise is fully expressed, then it necessarily reveals a syllogistic structure. If, therefore, we should assume that the major premise, "All P is U," is the conclusion of a subsidiary syllogism, then the middle term of that syllogism must be the individual (I). Putting it as the middle term between the particular as minor and the universal as major, the formula would then be P-I-U. If this formula should be elaborated fully, then the syllogistic structure would be:

Some individuals have particular traits.
These individuals all belong to a certain universal.
Therefore, these particular traits characterize this universal.

This is a syllogism of Aristotle's third figure, i.e., the middle term appears as the subject of the sentence in each of the premises. Its form is valid but its conclusion is true for Hegel if and only if the individuals examined are of such a number and such a type as to preclude the possibility of discovering any negative, exceptional, or falsifying instances; otherwise this third figure could prove or disprove only a particular statement. That is, it is true or false only empirically (§ 186).

Similarly, if we assume the minor premise of the I-P-U syllogism, "I is P," to be the conclusion of a subsidiary syllogism, then the remaining term - in this case the universal - would be the middle term, and the syllogistic formula would be I-U-P. Its expanded form would be:

The individual is the universal.
The particular is the universal.
Therefore, the individual is the particular.

This is a syllogism of Aristotle's second figure, i.e., the middle term appears as the predicate of the sentence in each of the premises. The

conclusion can have no truth value unless we regard the major premise as having the force of a judgment in the form: "Only the particulars in question are the universal." Otherwise, the second figure could prove only a negative conclusion. To enable it to have an affirmative conclusion, the major premise must always be somehow qualified, e.g., as above.

These Hegelian transitions from figure to figure may perhaps be seen more clearly in the following specific illustrations. The syllogism of Aristotle's first figure, corresponding in this case to Hegel's formula I-P-U, may be exemplified as:

This whale is a mammal.
All mammals are vertebrates.
Therefore, this whale is a vertebrate.

In this syllogism:

I = whale (individual).
P = mammal (particular species).
U = vertebrate (universal genus).

The following syllogism of Aristotle's third figure proves as its conclusion the above major premise, "All mammals are vertebrates." Its formula, P-I-U, is instantiated as:

Some individuals (I) are mammals (P).
The same individuals (I) are vertebrates (U).
Therefore, all mammals (P) are vertebrates (U).

But, unless we already understand the difference between species and genus, this form is invalid because some legitimate instantiations of it are false. Of course, all mammals really *are* vertebrates, which is to say, the set of mammals is a subset of the set of vertebrates, but that fact is beside the point. The relation between mammals and vertebrates is empirical and natural, not logical. That one individual happens to be member of each of two sets says nothing about the relation between these two sets beyond the fact that they may intersect - as they happen to do in this case. One may be a subset of the other, or not. We do not have enough information, just from the logical form, to decide this question. This flaw is illustrated well if we change a few words but keep the form:

Some individuals are whales.
The same individuals are gray.
Therefore, all whales are gray - which is false.

Let us consider a few other, analogous examples, which should make clearer the fallacy inherent within this form:

Some individuals (I) are women (P).

The same individuals (I) are pregnant (U).

Therefore, all women (P) are pregnant (U) - which is false.

Some individuals (I) are pregnant (P).

The same individuals (I) are women (U).

Therefore, all pregnant people (P) are women (U) - which happens to be true, empirically, but not logically.

Some individuals (I) are women (P).

The same individuals (I) are Americans (U).

Therefore, all women (P) are Americans (U) - which is false.

Some individuals (I) are Americans (P).

The same individuals (I) are women (U).

Therefore, all Americans (P) are women (U) - which is false.

The problem in all such cases is that we have to know beforehand which predicate is U and which is P. This distinction is not always obvious unless we already have a clear idea of the difference between genus and species - or among sets, subsets, intersecting sets, non-intersecting sets, etc. In other words, Hegel's critique of Aristotelian logic anticipates the set theory which would develop following the work of Georg Cantor (1845-1918), Richard Dedekind (1831-1916), and John Venn (1834-1923) after 1873.

The form under discussion is, in the usual notation of symbolic logic:

Some s is p .

If s is p , then s is q .

Therefore, p is q - which may be empirically true for some values of the variable, but not formally.

Or, in terms of set theory:

x is an element of A .

x is an element of B .

Therefore, A is a subset of B - which may be true in some accidental circumstances, but not logically.

The order in which properties or predicates (p , q) are specified makes a difference.

For Hegel, the conclusion of the Aristotelian third figure follows only if we assume that the individuals examined warrant inductive generalization on the ground that the possibility of negative instances has been eliminated. Yet Aristotle's syllogism of the second figure, proving as its conclusion the above minor premise, "This whale is a mammal," may be illustrated according to the form I-U-P as:

This whale (I) suckles its young (U).

Only mammals (P) suckle their young (U).

Therefore, this whale (I) is a mammal (P).

In these syllogisms, the judgments all express identity in spite of differences, as when we say, "The individual is the universal." But if in such judgments the element of difference were eliminated, then the subject and predicate in every case would be simply equated, and all the terms in the syllogism would become strictly identical, giving us the quantitative or mathematical syllogism (§ 188):

$$I = P.$$
$$P = U.$$

Therefore, $I = U$.

The truth of this syllogism is just the transitive property of equality, which limits the domain of the syllogism proper.

Since, in the qualitative syllogism, the individual appears under the aspect of its attributes, an indefinite number of syllogisms may be formed in reference to any individual, according to how we may choose to vary the several attributes which may happen to attract our attention. Thus we may say that a certain rose is red, or fragrant, or fading, or not yet full-blown, and so on indefinitely. If, however, we choose an attribute which is an essential property of all individuals within a given species, then we always have a syllogism of reflection; e.g., our concept of both this individual rose and roses in general is illuminated by light reflected on it by the attributes of that whole species. Such attributes may include relations as well as properties; e.g., we may fail to understand the essential significance of a certain tool until we discover the specific use for which it is intended, and this instrumentality or practicality reflects the nature of the tool itself.

Thus, in the syllogism of reflection, the quality which comprises the middle term is not just an attribute chosen at random, through caprice, or suggested by some passing circumstance; but rather, it should be an attribute that necessarily or essentially belongs to the species of the individual in question, as well as contingently or accidentally to that individual itself (§ 190). The significance of the species is thus reflected in its characteristic attributes, which all its individual members have in common. It is the bond of unity which holds together all individuals of the same class, group, or species.

The syllogism of reflection therefore may be divided into three subsidiary kinds (§ 190):

1. The syllogism of all-ness (*der Schluss der Allheit*).
2. The syllogism of induction (*der Schluss der Induktion*).
3. The syllogism of analogy (*der Schluss der Analogie*).

The primary form of the syllogism of reflection is the syllogism of all-

ness, whose purpose is to show which attributes are distinctive or common to all members of a class, group, or species. Hegel illustrates this by the traditional syllogism:

All men are mortal.

Caius is a man.

Therefore, Caius is mortal.

The weakness of this syllogism is that the universality of its major premise, "All men are mortal," depends on assuming that the conclusion is true. The major premise implies that an exhaustive induction has already been made. Thus the necessities of thought effect a transition to an inductive syllogism such as:

This man, and this man, and so on indefinitely, are all mortal.

This man, and this man, and so on indefinitely, are all men.

Therefore, all men are mortal.

The formula for this syllogism would be "U-{I, I, I, ...}-P," wherein the middle term (I) is indefinitely repeated, and is the sum of that indefinite number of cases. But passing from individual instances, however numerous they may be, to the universal, which necessarily transcends our experience, our reason rests on assuming that whatever is observed to be an essential property common to a number of individuals will likewise obtain in all other individuals which resemble them sufficiently to be seen as members of the same class, group, or species.

This gives us the third form of the syllogism of reflection, which expresses some underlying analogy as warrant for a previous inductive generalization. In the syllogism of analogy, inference is based on the principle that, if some things of a certain kind possess a certain well-marked quality, then the same quality will be found in other things of the same kind. An individual instance may be seen as a typical case and therefore as representing or even epitomizing its kind, insofar as it partakes of the nature of a universal. Moreover, the common bond which unites things of the same kind, and by virtue of which they are what they are, cannot be just the result of fortuitous coincidence of similar qualities, but it must be a necessary and essential characteristic of the very nature of these things themselves, as members of their class, group, or species. This makes a natural transition to the syllogism of necessity, which Hegel divides into three kinds (§ 191):

1. The categorical syllogism (*der kategorische Schluss*).
2. The hypothetical syllogism (*der hypothetische Schluss*).
3. The disjunctive syllogism (*der disjunktive Schluss*).

In the categorical syllogism the individual is referred to its appropriate

universal by means of an intermediate particular, or the species to which it belongs. Such a syllogism would be as follows, in the form I-P-U:

A certain individual belongs to a particular species.

This species belongs to a certain genus.

Therefore, this individual belongs to that same genus.

In the hypothetical syllogism, the universal or genus is seen as the ground of the particular or species. This syllogism is nothing more or less than the standard *modus ponens* argument from traditional logic.

In the disjunctive syllogism, some universal is exhaustively resolved into its mutually exclusive components, e.g., "A primary color is either red or blue or yellow," as we saw in the above discussion of the disjunctive judgment. Such a statement in the form "A is either B or C or D or ..." serves as the major premise of the disjunctive syllogism, which, for Hegel, since it represents the exhaustive manifestation of the full "concrete" essence of the universal, is the highest type of syllogism. Its minor premise shows which B, C, D, etc., are either present or absent, and its conclusion expresses this presence or absence as thus determined. Note especially that, in the Hegelian disjunctive syllogism, the disjunction is always exclusive (XOR). Hence when it appears in the following form, it is inconclusive:

A is either B or C or D.

A is not B.

Therefore?

Since A cannot be both C and D, this minor premise does not provide enough information from which to draw a conclusion. A is either C or D, but which one? Thus Hegel would accept only these two forms of the disjunctive syllogism:

A is either B or C or D.

A is B.

Therefore, A is not C and not D.

A is either B or C or D.

A is not B and not C.

Therefore, A is D.

The disjunctive syllogism naturally passes over into the second category of the concept, objectivity. An exhaustive manifestation of a universal not only shows the sum of its thought relations, i.e., its purely subjective aspect, for then its manifestation would be partial and not exhaustive, but also furnishes scope for its external actualization in the real world. The concept is a totality. Thus another key function of the disjunctive syllogism is to represent a given object

of thought in its totality (§ 192). Moreover, there is no such thing as a totality which is not realized in all its "concrete" fullness (§ 193). The concept, therefore, as a fundamental constructive principle, is not a force operating *in vacuo*, but in the "concrete" system of things, persons, events, life, and the infinite wealth of possibilities.



18

The Objective Concept (§§ 194-212)

As we have seen, Hegel regards the disjunctive syllogism as the point of transition from the subjective to the objective concept. Let us examine this statement in more detail, in order to clarify the essential relation of the subjective to the objective. The disjunctive syllogism is the subjective concept expressed in its highest and most complete form. Its syllogistic structure shows that the subjective concept is essentially an active process of thought, which is the meaning of the syllogism in general. Its disjunctive character indicates that this process is a complete unfolding of the significance of the concept. Gathering these characteristics into a single statement, we find that Hegel sees the subjective concept in its highest expression as an active force, revealing its various phases through a process of mediation which gives full leeway to realize all its possibilities. The subjective concept thus naturally contains within itself the ground of its objectivity.

The "transition" from the subjective concept to the objective does not fully or correctly express Hegel's meaning. It is not a "transition," properly speaking, insofar as the objective lies within the subjective as a potential moment of the subjective. A fundamental principle of Hegel's whole system is that the syllogistic process is not only an act of consciousness, but also the way that the universe actually works. Because the subjective concept contains implicitly the categories of being, essence, existence, substantiality, causality, etc., the subjective is the program of cosmic evolution, while the objective is the

historical evolution itself. Either would be incomplete without the other.

This active process, the essential significance of the subjective concept, necessitates a result. This product, which is naturally a result of mediation, is nevertheless immediate, and this immediacy is characteristic of objectivity. Hegel describes an "object" as "independent, "concrete," and "complete in itself," and as that whose completeness constitutes "the totality of the concept" (§ 193; *EL*, p. 268; *HL*, p. 256; *LBD*, p. 265; *Erz.*, p. 170). Only one object could perfectly fulfill this description, namely, the absolute, or God. Universal totality, i.e., the universe in its progressive unfolding in space and time, represents, embodies, and indicates this one all-inclusive object. Within this totality, Hegel recognizes the plethora of separate and independent spatio-temporal objects - the many - but also asserts that their reality is created and guaranteed only insofar as they partake of the nature of the unifying absolute - the one - which is the ground of their existence and whose essential nature and reality are independent of space and time.

Hegel (§ 193) attacks Kantian criticism of Anselm's, Descartes's, and Spinoza's versions of the ontological argument for the reality of God. Kant says in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, A592-A602, B620-B630, that the thought of a thing or a being does not necessarily imply its existence. But Kant - like Anselm's original opponent, Gaunilo (11th century) - fails to grasp that God is not a "thing" or a "being" which could be capable of "existence." Rather, God is just the necessary *condition* by which any particular "being" could ever come into "existence." Anselm, Descartes, Spinoza, Hegel, and Heidegger all knew this. Heidegger would later make this distinction quite clear with his idea of the "ontological difference" between beings and being. Moreover, one of the most common German euphemisms for "God," *das höchste Wesen*, is usually mistranslated into English as "the Supreme Being," but really means "the Supreme Essence." Hegel claims that the highest expression of the subjective concept of God is an altogether unique thought, of such a nature as to combine the concept of God and the reality of God into one. Hegel makes similar points against Kant in § 51, as we saw above in Chapter 5.

Questions which naturally suggest themselves at this point include whether Hegel's system is pantheistic and whether human individuality is lost, either completely or partially, in the universality of God. If humans are only spectators for a brief time, each seeing only an extremely limited portion of the great world evolution or the external manifestations of God, i.e., each seeing only a tiny facet of God, then Hegel's whole system, as the product of human intelligence

(*Geist*), would contradict and nullify itself by eliminating human individuality as any kind of real factor in the system. The tough question of whether the system leads logically to pantheism is beyond the scope and purpose of this book; nevertheless, we may remark that Hegel himself stoutly denies pantheism and even more stoutly maintains that individuality is not suppressed in universality, but rather is *aufgehoben* as a more fully self-conscious aspect of *Geist* (cf. § 151 *Zusatz*).

We have seen that the warrant for the concept of objectivity is contained in the concept of the absolute, the ultimate truth. So also, the warrant for the concept of human personality, Hegel says, is only in the concept of the all-embracing absolute, or God. Hegel's idea is similar to that of St. Paul: "In Him we live and move and have our being" (Acts 17:28). In this context, Hegel attacks Leibnizian pluralism, claiming that its absolute is not the one single whole which it should be, i.e., is not truly unified, because it is only the universal aggregate of individuals (§ 194).

The concept of objectivity, as Hegel develops it, is manifest in three forms (§ 194 *Zusatz* 2):

1. Mechanism (*der Mechanismus*) (§§ 195-199).
2. Chemism (*der Chemismus*) (§§ 200-203).
3. Teleology (*die Teleologie*) (§§ 204-212).

In the mechanical type of objectivity, objects are related only externally, without any natural affinity toward each other, except perhaps gravitational. They are immediate, and each indifferent to all the others.

In the chemical type, objects have a fundamental tendency to change, react, blend, and unite with others, so that their real significance is in their union with others.

In the third type, teleological relations express the unity of mechanism and chemism. Like a mechanical object, teleology is, in a sense, a self-contained totality, insofar as a purpose has always some complete effect as an end in view. However, at the same time, a purpose is also subjected, as in chemism, to differentiation, outside influence, and change in order to realize the end in view.

Within either mechanism, chemism, or teleological relations, all activity proceeds syllogistically.

Hegel divides mechanism into three kinds:

1. Formal mechanism (*der formelle Mechanismus*) (§§ 195-196).
2. Differentiated mechanism (*der differente Mechanismus*) (§§ 196-197).
3. Absolute mechanism (*der absolute Mechanismus*) (§§ 197-199).

Formal mechanism has two essential characteristics: First, objects have the concept within them only as potential, since the subjective concept is primarily outside them. Second, objects remain independent, immediate, and resistant, and are related to each other only externally (§ 195). We may speak figuratively of mechanical memory, which associates ideas only externally or automatically and which mostly omits thought as such. Hegel writes, "Action ... is *mechanical* when ... one's own spirit and will are not in one's actions, so that even within one's own self they remain external" (§ 195; *EL*, p. 274; *HL*, p. 262; *LBD*, pp. 270-271; *Enz.*, p. 173). The relation between mechanically connected objects is characterized by pressure and impact, which operate basically as a pair of external forces, as in classic billiard ball causality.

Differentiated mechanism involves affinity. That is, an object's center, which was formerly only within itself, has now shifted also into its other, for which it "feels" a certain "desire" (*Begierde*) or "gregariousness" (*Geselligkeitstrieb*) (§ 196). Whatever is possible for any object to effect mechanically depends not only on its own native force, i.e., its own centrality (*Zentralität*), but also on the nature of the object upon which it acts, i.e., the centrality of its wholly external other. In other words, no object is fully self-centered. An object which is operated upon by some external force is affected by it not only according to the nature of this force, but also according to its own nature, e.g., a billiard ball made of ivory and another made of putty behave differently when subjected to precisely the same impact. When two objects are so related that the center of each must receive its complement from the center of the other in order to complete its meaning, the relation between them is differentiated mechanism. Hegel's illustrations of this kind of mechanism are gravitation, in which the result varies according to the relative centrality of each of the mutually attracted objects; the relation of desire; and the relation of social instinct (*Geselligkeitstrieb*), which unites the various members of a single society.

Every object may be seen as a system within itself. Hegel calls the center of such a system "abstract," because it refers to nothing outside itself. When two objects come into a mechanical relation, one to the other, the center of each becomes the relative center of the other. The center of any system of two objects and their relative centers is their absolute center (§ 197). Thus absolute mechanism is just the fully expressed form of differentiated mechanism. These relations of various kinds of centers may be illustrated by the mutual attraction of two masses, each of which is concentrated at a single point, i.e., its "abstract" center. Each of these two points has its relative center in the other, and both are referable to the absolute center which lies

between them. For example, the earth revolves around the sun as its relative center, but the absolute center of this system lies between the earth and the sun in such a way that both revolve around it. However, the absolute center is so near the sun's center that the difference is negligible; thus we typically speak of the earth revolving around the sun, not of the sun revolving around the earth, even though, from a relative standpoint, it happens. There may well be an absolute center of the system, but, as the special relativity theory of Albert Einstein (1879-1955) shows, since there no such thing as an absolute inertial reference frame, we cannot tell which of the two bodies is in motion and which is at rest, relative to the other.

Mechanical relations are dynamic. The dynamic always expresses itself in a syllogistic process, i.e., the mediation of two terms by means of a common or middle term. Thus a triad of syllogisms corresponds to the three possible mechanical relations (§ 198). Let "I" represent any individual object, "P" its particular or relative center, and "U" the universal or absolute center. The resulting syllogisms would be:

1. I-P-U, in which the relative center is seen as the mediating term between the individual object and its absolute center.
2. U-I-P, in which the individual object mediates between its relative and absolute centers.
3. P-U-I, in which the universal or absolute center mediates between the individual object and its relative center.

To illustrate these three syllogisms and especially their indivisible, inherent, and necessarily triadic structure and interdependence, Hegel proclaims rather jarringly that the relationships among the citizens of the state are analogous to those among the various spheroids in the solar system and thus can be analyzed triadically (§ 198). He does not mean by this that citizens are just numbers or cogs instead of humans in the eyes of the state. He means that the activities of individual (I) citizens striving each to fulfill their particular (P) needs and wants within the universal (U) state and its worldly instantiation as civil society are analyzable syllogistically, just as the solar system is. Just as the independence of the earth is mediated by the presence of other planets, the gravitational pull of the sun, and other physical factors; so the independence of each citizen is mediated by the presence of other citizens, the "gravitational" pull of the state, and other sociopolitical factors (§ 199). Yet citizens are "mechanical" only figuratively.

In mechanism, related objects preserve a quasi-independence; but when they lose their independence in the affinity which each has for its others, and when they so coalesce that the identity of each is merged in the product of their combination, then the relation is chemism (§ 200). In this way a natural transition occurs from the

mechanical relation to the chemical. The product thus formed is neutral, insofar as the singular striving of each component ceases when the process is finished and the product alone remains (§ 201). However, this neutrality, which we may regard as the mean, may be resolved by chemical analysis into the two original extremes. But the inverse process is independent of the former combining process. The product does not of itself separate into its components. The first process exhausts itself, and its activity ceases as soon as the product is created.

There is in these operations of chemical combination and chemical analysis no center of initiation. Although words like "chemism," "chemistry," "alchemy," etc., are all derived from several Greek nouns and verbs which describe various aspects of metals melting together to form alloys, Hegel uses "chemism" to refer to a force of mutual attraction, and not only within the strictly "chemical" domain. Chemical affinity thus seems to be a kind of general but selective attraction; yet there is no self-directing activity (§ 202). If there were, this attraction would have a longer life, and would not consume its energy in its own process. Chemical process, therefore, does not rise above conditioned and finite activity: "The concept *per se* is just the inner core of this process, and does not yet come into existence in its own being for itself. In the neutral product the process is extinguished, and that which sparked it falls outside it" (§ 202 *Zusatz*; *EL*, p. 279; *HL*, p. 267; *LBD*, p. 275; *Enz.*, p. 176).

Regarding the syllogisms of chemism, the process of making a neutral chemical product from two extremes (e.g., acid and base) can be regarded syllogistically. The processes that Hegel describes in the second part of the *Encyclopedia*, "The Philosophy of Nature," e.g., galvanism, combustion, neutralization, each follow the structures - or, if you will, the general "flowcharts" - that he lays out in the *Logic*. We might even take Hegel's philosophy of nature as showing either the *Logic* externalized or an immediate physical illustration of the *Logic*. In this connection, we should bear in mind that Hegel's knowledge of the natural sciences, even though it would be paltry today, was excellent and up-to-date in its time. He was particularly well-informed about chemistry and medicine.

The lack of spontaneous activity, of all initiative, indicates an extremely unsatisfactory situation. The very nature of thought demands a more fundamental relation than either mechanism or chemism could provide as the supreme principle of activity in the universe. Such a relation would necessarily involve purpose or finality, in which the concept or reason would be liberated. In this teleological relation we find an explicit and undisguised manifestation

of a supreme principle of intelligence in its free and conscious activity. In mechanism and chemism the concept is indeed present, but only "abstractly," not yet evolved. Now the concept, as an aim or an end (*Zweck*) comes into its own existence on its own terms (§ 203). In lower relations, the concept was imprisoned, as it were, behind bars of objectivity. But in the teleological relation these bars are now burst asunder, the objectivity is overcome, and the subjectivity of the concept is completely asserted.

Hegel says that the idea of an end to be achieved negates immediate objectivity (§ 204). It also recognizes the opposition between subject and object, and the overcoming of this opposition. Thus, when we have a purpose in mind, its subjective character is antithetical to the purpose conceived as objectively actualized. But when this purpose in mind proceeds into action, and the objective end is actualized, then all difference between the end in view and the end achieved is overcome, and there is a unity and reconciliation of the subjective and the objective.

One difference between efficient and final causality is this: The efficient cause appears as passing into its other, the effect, thereby losing its essential priority in the effect by sinking into a sort of dependency. The aim or end of final causality, on the other hand, necessarily contains in its own nature the determining and significant factors of the whole process and result. Yet in the simple causal relation, the effect seems to emphasize its natural otherness as regards its cause.

By *Zweck*, Hegel does not mean only the purposes which are ever present in consciousness, and which we achieve by means of objects external to us (§ 205). There is also an inner design, an immanent finality in things themselves, as both Aristotle and Kant also emphasize. We may see purely external design, the adaptation of means to ends, in various phenomena of utility, but there is more than just this. Hegel illustrates the teleological relation of the subjective to the objective with the case of appetite or desire. There is subjective desire, on the one hand, and the object which may satisfy it, on the other. But the two are separate, and therein consists their contradiction. Only in the complete satisfaction of desire through the attainment of its object is this contradiction overcome and are the two extremes, subjectivity and objectivity, reconciled. The teleological relation is a syllogism in which subjective design merges with its external object by means of a middle term which is the unity of both (§ 206). The middle term is the means toward the desired result.

Hegel marks three stages in the development of the subjective design.

1. The subjective end (*der subjektive Zweck*) (§§ 205-208).
2. The end in process of being accomplished (*der sich vollführende Zweck*) (§ 206 *Zusatz*).
3. The accomplished or realized end (*der vollführte Zweck, der realisierte Zweck*) (§§ 206 *Zusatz*, 210).

The first syllogism of final cause is made up of these three terms:

The universal (U) = the end indeterminately desired.

The particular (P) = the end determinately desired, as a particular phase of this universal.

The individual (I) = the self whose activity makes this particular choice from various possibilities which this indeterminate universal embraces or implies.

Thus, for example, we might have the building of a house as an indeterminate end in view. This goal would be a universal with a yet indeterminate variety of particular modes of realization. The individual choice would then appear as the determining force, initiating the actual process of accomplishing the specific end (§ 207).

Second, this initiative activity of the individual throws itself immediately upon something objective which it appropriates as means toward bringing about the desired end. Here the middle term is the subjective power of the concept to bring together the subjective end and the objective material which is to be used in its realization (§ 208). In finite design, the mediating term of this process is twofold: (1) a combination of the active powers of the individual, and (2) the objective material upon which these powers work. Thus, in building a house, the materials for its construction must first be immediately appropriated by the constructive mind before they can become its instruments in the putting together of pieces to realize the complete architectural plan, which is an essentially mediating, i.e., syllogistic, process. Or, by Hegel's own illustration: "Whatever is alive has a body; the soul takes possession of it and thus immediately objectifies itself within. The human soul has much to do in this regard, to make its corporeality into a means. Humans must first possess their bodies in order to make them the instruments of their souls" (§ 208 *Zusatz*; *EL*, p. 284; *HL*, p. 272; *LBD*, p. 280; *Enz.*, p. 180).

All this is preliminary to actualizing the design by means of the objective materials and forces which have been both invaded and pervaded by the purposing mind. This brings us to the point where the end is at last achieved - the third and last stage in the process. While the subjective end rules these material processes and whichever mechanical or chemical forces are required, it does so without losing itself in them. It takes advantage of their activity and compels them to

serve it, while its controlling intelligence remains in the background (§ 209). Hegel calls this the "cunning" or "craft" of reason (*die List der Vernunft*). The cunning of reason consists here in the control or manipulation which reason exercises over objects while yet permitting them to obey their own mechanical or chemical bent. "Divine providence," says Hegel, "acts with absolute cunning as regards the world and its processes. God lets humans direct their particular passions and interests as they please; but the results accomplished are of *God's* plans, not ours; and God's aims are quite different from those which God's 'employees' have mainly intended to achieve" (§ 209 *Zusatz*; *EL*, p. 284; *HL*, p. 273; *LBD*, p. 281; *Enz.*, p. 180).

(Hibben and Luft disagree on how to translate *List* in this context. Hibben wrote in a footnote to the first edition: "Wallace in this connection translates the word *List* as cunning. When applied to the Deity, it is apt to leave an incorrect and rather disconcerting impression. The word 'craft,' which may also offend the sentiments of some when applied to God, seems, however, to be less objectionable in this respect, and has therefore been used in the above translation." For Luft, on the other hand, to bowdlerize Hegel in order to flatter God is not justified.)

The realized end expresses the complete unity of the subjective and the objective (§ 210); but, in finite design, the accomplished aim is no less fragmentary or defective than was the initial aim and means used in realizing it (§ 211). Hegel writes: "The end achieved is only an object, which may become the means or material for further ends, and so on *ad infinitum*" (§ 211; *EL*, p. 285; *HL*, p. 273; *LBD*, p. 281; *Enz.*, p. 181).

Infinite design, on the other hand, comprises within its own self the means to realize its ends. Its process is self-mediation. It is the self-determined concept, representing the complete unity of subject and object. This Hegel calls the idea (*Idee*) - a term which emphasizes the nature of that which is essentially and fundamentally reason itself (§ 212).

In mechanism and chemism the concept appears as *an sich*, i.e., implicit. In the teleological relation, it is *für sich*, i.e., explicit. But in the eternal purpose (*Idee*) it is both *an und für sich*, i.e., revealing itself by the light of its own nature in a manifestation completely self-determined and self-directed.



19

The Idea, or Eternal Reason (§§ 213-244)

Hegel identifies the idea with truth (§ 213). In the preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* he famously equates truth with "the whole" (*PhS*, p. 11; *PhG*, p. 21), with its own "self-movement" (*Bewegung ihrer an ihr selbst*) (*PhS*, p. 28; *PhG*, p. 40), and with an orgy in which no one is not drunk (*PhS*, p. 27; *PhG*, p. 39), and declares that truth is actual only as a system (*PhS*, p. 14; *PhG*, p. 24). Because, as he also says in this preface, "science" or "systematic philosophical knowledge" (*Wissenschaft*) exists only in and as the "self-movement of the concept" (*Selbstbewegung des Begriffes*) (*PhS*, p. 44; *PhG*, p. 57), thus the form and content of truth must be identical. By truth he means the complete correspondence of any object with its concept, or, in other words, truth consists in the fully interrelated mediation of subject, object, idea, concept, and every other aspect of any relationship.

It is only a formal truth, mere correctness, which consists solely in a reference to our consciousness. Truth in a deeper sense is the identification of subject and object. In this sense the absolute is the idea, or truth itself. Every particular object of knowledge represents a phase of the absolute, but a partial and imperfect phase. Every finite object fails to realize its concept completely, because of its finitude, and therefore is to that extent limited and defective. All objects are true only as far as they prove to be what they ought to be - and false as far as they fail in this, or to meditate themselves each in their respective conceptual contexts. The true X is the ideal X - i.e., the X which alone perfectly realizes the idea of X. So also the true state, the true work of art, the true man, etc., are each true only as so far only as they realize their respective ideals.

Hegel asks throughout the *Logic*, "What are we thinking about when we think about X?" For example, as soon as he moves from being to nothing, he stops, regroups, gathers his wits, and asks, "What is it that we are thinking about when we think about nothing?" Whenever he

reaches a new concept, he immediately isolates it and tries to fix or determine its meaning. The problem is that meaning cannot be fixed or determined in isolation, but must always be meaning-in-context. That is, meaning has no meaning in isolation, but can only mean anything in relation to other meanings. Concepts are quintessentially relational.

The idea, moreover, as we have already seen, is not merely the underlying substance of all things. It is essentially the subject/object duality unified and reconciled (§ 214). It is personal and conscious as well as intelligent, but at the same time also impersonal, objective, substantive, and universal. It is all in all, manifest as thought. All individuals find their truth in this one universal spirit which upholds all things by its wisdom, power, and love. Far from being a mere "abstract" conception, the idea is the most "concrete" of all possible manifestations, for it embraces the totality of all objectivity in full mediation. The categories of being, essence, and the concept find their truth only in this supreme category of the idea.

The mere understanding might criticize the theory of the idea as containing inconsistencies and contradictions, such as are expressed in the juxtapositions, "subject and object," "finite and infinite," "the ideal and the real," "the one and the many." Yet we must remember that the very nature of the dialectic is for the idea, insofar as it comprehends the totality of the universe, to involve contradictions. Nevertheless, these contradictions are all to be overcome, so as to create and present a more profound unity. The activity of the idea is eternal (§ 215). The cosmic process is fundamentally the manifestation of reason, i.e., the idea revealing itself in objectivity. The idea is an infinite judgment whose several terms constitute an independent totality, such that each term growing to the fullness of its own being passes over into its other, a more advanced form, thus providing a progressive evolution of this one, central, eternally self-complete and self-sufficient idea. No other category exhibits such a consummate level of totality in its two essential aspects of subjectivity and objectivity.

Hegel refers to the dialectical process of the manifestation of the idea as an absolute negativity (*absolute Negativität*), i.e., a process in which there is an antagonism of opposites, which is the first negative. Negativity is the first principle of "abstraction"; i.e., wherever a negation occurs, there exists an "abstraction." Yet negativity is what drives the dialectic. Thus this antagonism is overcome by means of the negation of the first negative, which is the second negative, the absolute negation, or the real affirmation.

The subjective concept opposes the objective concept, but this contradiction is overcome by the immanent dialectic which finds its

way back to a subjectivity which embraces objectivity. This reconciliation is more than just the unity of the subjective and the objective, or of the infinite and the finite. The idea is essentially a process which entails movement, whereas unity implies at least some kind of rest. Moreover, this is not a mere unity in which the finite and the infinite neutralize each other, nor the objective and the subjective, nor being and thought; but rather, in the absolute negating function of the idea - i.e., "the negative unity of the idea" (§ 215) or the overcoming of opposition by a more profound *Aufhebung* - the infinite overlaps and embraces the finite, subjectivity overlaps and embraces objectivity, and thought overlaps and embraces being. Thus the idea develops in a process of three distinct stages:

1. The idea as life (*Leben*) (§§ 216-222).
2. The idea as cognition (*Erkennen*) (§§ 223-235).
3. The absolute idea (§§ 236-244).

In this first stage the idea is revealed in its simplest state as immediate, i.e., without manifesting either the ground by which it is constituted or the relations which it is capable of sustaining.

In the second stage, the idea appears in its state of mediation or differentiation; i.e., it has become specified and definite by the manifestation of its particular characteristics and relations. In this stage the idea becomes conscious of itself. Its essential form is knowledge, both theoretical and practical. The process of knowledge leads to a final synthesis which embraces without compromise all the specific differences and separate individuals which have been revealed in the process of development.

This gives rise to the third stage of the idea, the absolute idea which, as the last term of the evolution, proves itself to be the first also, and the underlying basis of the process as a whole. In its journey back to the beginning, which occurs when the absolute idea has become fully determinate, it has thus become identical with itself. But its self is its whole self, from the simplest, most immediate phase all the way up to its most complex, most fully mediated phase. That which is thus identical with itself is being (*Sein*), and therefore, by virtue of the absolute idea now fully mediated with all its phases, the circle is complete. Being is in fact nothing, as we have previously discussed. But we must go back to being - not necessarily Aristotelian being (*to on*) or substance (*ousia*) - but being as whatever is given to us to be our world. Being is now mediated. Now we *know* - we have certain knowledge - that being is nothing, whereas at first we had only immediate intuitions or feelings that being was nothing.

The difference that makes the system's starting point the same as its

ending point is not a difference in the nature of either being or nothing, but rather a difference in the extent of mediation. At first our knowledge of the relationship between being and nothing was immediate, contentless, essentially meaningless, but now it is mediated, conceptual, and significant. Neither being nor nothing have changed *in themselves*, but they both have changed *for us*, and therefore we can say that they have indeed changed, insofar as they have each entered a new relationship, a relationship with us. To say that they have both changed and not changed is not a contradiction. Everything depends upon our point of view, our degree of knowledge, and our level within the dialectic.

There is no rest in the Logic. As soon as as we have gotten anything clear, we find that we have moved - or have been pushed - into something else. Nothing is static. No stage is absolute, not even the "final" stage of the absolute idea. Each stage is relative with regard to further stages, and the relativity of each stage becomes clear as soon as we reach the next stage. Because the Logic is a circle, the absolute idea is "relative" with regard to the next stage of the absolute idea in the circle - and the next. The absolute idea is not fixed, but ever-moving. Yet "absolute" still means "non-relative" for Hegel. Here is where the "method" really comes to the fore.

The absolute idea is source, ground, and consummation all in one. In its primary form, the idea is manifested immediately as life (§ 216). This is the initial point in objectifying the subjective concept. Since it is a beginning, we just accept it as immediately given. Starting with this datum of a living thing, Hegel then proceeds to analyze its nature. Every living thing is an individual, preserving its individuality through all the various changes of bodily growth, and the indefinite variety of its particular moods and activities. Moreover, all particular manifestations are to be referred to a central principle, the ground of their unity and the source of their being and activity. This central principle is naturally and essentially universal. Thus, a living body exhibits the universal principle of its being, its center *qua* soul, its particular activities, its phenomenal manifestations, and its self-preserved individuality amid all possible variations and outside influences. The living body thereby embraces most simply all three basic dialectical or syllogistic moments of the concept: individuality, particularity, and universality. The living thing itself is a syllogism (§ 217). All its components comprise a complex system exhibiting, as Hegel says, a negative unity (*negative Einheit*), i.e., a unity within difference, or a unity which combines within itself differentiated, opposed, but at the same time essentially related parts.

The defect of life consists in that its concept and its reality do not

correspond. In life, soul and body are both separable and inseparable. The concept of life is the soul, but the soul's reality is the body. In its simplest primary manifestation, the soul is poured out and diffused into corporeality. Therefore, the soul is in its earliest stage sentient only, not yet freely self-conscious. The process of life involves overcoming this preliminary stage of being and reaching the higher stage of self-consciousness. But this process must run through at least three stages before attaining self-conscious knowledge.

The first stage is the process of the living thing within itself (§ 218). Its corporeal parts are relatively external, presenting an evident distinction and antagonism among themselves in which they surrender to one another, assimilate one another, use one another, sometimes cooperate with one another, and generally persist by reproducing themselves at the cellular level. All these functions, however, are to be referred to the activity of the architectonic principle within. Thus the implicit unity of the living thing is preserved amid its indefinite variety of seemingly independent functions. This unifying process of the vital subject within its own limits appears in three forms: sensibility, irritability, and reproduction:

As sensibility, the soul is present in every part of the body, so that their independence and mutual exclusivity is only illusory, and they are in reality just aspects of one central, all-pervading subject.

As irritability, the living thing seems to break up into separate parts, a process of differentiation.

As reproduction, the living thing perpetually restores itself out of the inner differentiations of its cells.

In the second stage, the living thing exerts its power over inorganic nature, subdues it, and assimilates it into itself (§ 219). The result of this process is not a neutral product, as in chemism; rather, the living thing engulfs inorganic things to make them part of its own life. Nevertheless, inorganic nature, as subdued by the vital agent, surrenders itself in this process because it is potentially what life is actually. This accords fully with Hegel's fundamental systematic principle that there is only one elemental power in the universe, the power of *Geist*, which underlies inert matter as well as vital forces and activities, upon which all other powers depend, and to which all other powers are reducible, even though they are integrally preserved in themselves at all levels. When a living thing absorbs or adapts its corporeal parts, lifeless matter is raised to a higher level, at which its potential essence is actualized. Thus, even in its material elements, the living body may be said to find itself. When death separates the soul from its body, elemental forces of objectivity play unchecked at the lower mechanical and chemical levels. Even in life, these forces

constantly threaten to assert their lower functions, so that life is a perpetual battle to subdue, control, and elevate them.

These continuous or circular processes of assimilation result in the third stage in the development of life, a combination of particular organs and functions constituting the definite and specific order of the living thing, which Hegel calls a genus in itself (*eine Gattung an sich*) (§ 220). The living thing, seen as a genus, ranks as a universal. This universal particularizes or differentiates itself in a number of individuals by pairing and connecting a living subject with another of its own kind, yet essentially different. In other words, such an *Aufhebung* is possible only through sex.

The process of the genus brings it into an existence of its own. The sexual creation and perpetuation of a genus produces both a universal in itself and a problem for that universal (§ 221). First of all, such perpetuation is a bad infinite, i.e., an indefinite progression with no resolution. Second, as individuals create this universal, they at once subsume themselves under it and realize their true selves as individuals within it. Their being as individuals is dependent and finite, yet fulfilled and mediated. The being of each individual is not in the individual *per se*, or even in each propagating pair of individuals, but rather in the universal which these individuals create and which will survive them. Such individuals are implicitly the universal, but in their immediate existence they are only individuals. Yet this universal would not exist or have any meaning apart from the individuals which comprise it, even though these individuals die and the universal survives. Death shows that the universal is the power which upholds these immediate individuals. Mere animals never proceed so far in their generic life to have each a being of their own as individuals. They yield to the domination of the genus. Tennyson has given expression to this Hegelian idea in "In Memoriam A.H.H. Obiit MDCCCXXXIII," stanza LV:

"Are God and Nature then at strife,
That Nature lends such evil dreams?
So careful of the type she seems,
So careless of the single life."

However, there is in the process of life a constant struggle to overcome the immediacy which is the defect of life, so that the idea may come to itself and into itself, to realize its own truth in a free existence of its own (§ 222). What appears as a generic universal in a lower sphere extricates itself and manifests itself as the "I" or consciousness in its higher evolution. It is the process of the idea coming to consciousness of itself and existing in this higher form freely and for itself. In this consciousness, two judgments are involved:

(1) distinguishing itself in its pure nature as subjectivity, and (2) recognizing an objectivity seemingly external to itself (§ 223). Here is the "I," universal reason, and there is the "not-I," the objective world. The former is spirit, the latter is nature. The two are implicitly identical but not yet necessarily recognized as explicitly so.

Before this recognition can occur, spirit must first emerge on its own terms, not as an epiphenomenon of something else, or as an outgrowth of life or consciousness. Hegel writes of the conditions of its emergence: "The death of merely immediate individual vitality is the *emergence of spirit*" - "Der Tod der nur unmittelbaren einzelnen Lebendigkeit ist das *Hervorgehen des Geistes*" (§ 222; *EL*, p. 294; *HL*, p. 282; *LBD*, p. 290; *Enz.*, p. 187). This noteworthy sentence would be well compared with the end of the phrenology section in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, where spirit can emerge like a phoenix from the ashes of observing reason (*beobachtende Vernunft*) only after we reach the absurd conclusion of physical science, i.e., the *caput mortuum* of biology and medicine, the reduction of life and consciousness to their bare physical components (*PhS*, pp. 195-210; *PhG*, pp. 237-254; cf. Eric von der Luft, 'The Birth of Spirit for Hegel out of the Travesty of Medicine' in: *Hegel's Philosophy of Spirit*, edited by Peter G. Stillman [Albany: SUNY Press, 1987], pp. 25-42).

That the identity of nature and spirit should be only implicit is the mark of finitude. One specific duty of reason is to make their fundamental identity explicit. It is thus in the process of knowing or cognition (*Erkennen*), i.e., in the idea coming to self-consciousness, that the one-sidedness of subjectivity and objectivity is overcome. In this process there is both a rationalizing of the objective world, i.e., its translation into subjective thought, and an assertion of subjective ideals amid the objective phenomena of being, modifying and adapting them to reason's needs and standards (§ 225). The tendency of thought to rationalize the universe, i.e., to interpret it by reducing it to the simplest forms of description and formulating its fundamental laws, is the labor of science in its search for truth, and is, according to Hegel, cognition properly so called, or the theoretical activity of the idea. The task of cognition is to bring mere certainty (*Gewissheit*) up to the level of real truth (*Wahrheit*) (§ 224). To compel the phenomenal world to conform to the ideals of reason, and to realize the ascendancy of the good, is the task of the practical activity of the idea, i.e., willing. Thus cognition is of two kinds:

1. Theoretical knowledge, or cognition proper (*das Erkennen als solches*) (§§ 226-232).
2. Practical knowledge, or willing (*Wollen*) (§§ 233-235).

Erkennen can be either the infinite circular process between the

practical idea (*die praktische Idee*) and the theoretical idea or the infinite circular process between the non-practical idea and the non-theoretical idea. The practical idea, for Hegel, is not the same as *praxis* - a Greek term appropriated for political philosophy by the Left Hegelian August von Cieszkowski (1814-1894) and used extensively by Karl Marx (1818-1883). The practical idea is the concept determined in and for itself as action in general, but *praxis* is specifically revolutionary and is always informed by articulated theory. Marx's critical *praxis* or practical critique was strongly influenced by Hegel's dialectic of the absolute idea.

Finite cognition labors under the difficulty of being unable to overcome the opposition of subject and object. The reception of sense data by the cognizing subject seems to be an assimilation by the thought process of something which is in a way foreign to it. Its categories never enter into complete union with it. Therefore, while reason in general is active always and everywhere, finite reason, *qua* cognition, works only as the mere understanding (§ 226), and thus fails to reach the higher level of infinite or overarching reason in two particulars: (1) It presupposes an objective world already given and ready-made. (2) It views the perceiving mind as a *tabula rasa*, i.e., a passive receptacle for recording impressions made upon it by the data of sense perception. Yet the subject cognizing its object is the mind as an active force, not merely confronting the objective world, but in it, through it, and implicit in it.

Finite cognition, working even at the low level on which a ready-made world in opposition to the knowing subject is the presupposition framed by the perceiving mind, operates in two distinct forms:

1. The analytic method (*die analytische Methode*) (§§ 227-229, 231, 238-239).
2. The synthetic method (*die synthetische Methode*) (§§ 228-231, 238-239).

The analytic method examines every individual phenomenon to discover its various particular characteristics, separating the essential (*wesentlich*) from the inessential (*unwesentlich*), then referring it to its appropriate genus, cause, law, or other category which would represent its corresponding universal. But to actualize the "concrete" universal and to cognize it fully would require, among other factors, a mediated movement from the inessential to the essential (§ 227). In other words, to understand anything, we cannot understand it only as such, or as it is in itself, but we must also understand it along with its other, considered together as an oscillating pair with a common ground. But, as we said above in Chapter 9, an "other" has no meaning apart from its "something." Hence, the essential is to the inessential as

something (*Etwas*) is to its other (*Anderes*). It is the internally differentiated union that matters, not the poles in isolation from each other.

The synthetic method moves in reverse from the analytic method (§ 228). Its starting point is the universal, its activity is essentially constructive, and it works as an architectonic principle to produce all possible particular manifestations of itself, *qua* universal, in accord with its essential and universal nature, and as revealed ultimately in the organization and completed being of "concrete" individuals.

Among the factors at work in this constructive activity of the concept are these five:

1. The nature of the universal in its synthetic activity is given by definition (§ 229).
2. The particular manifestations of which the universal is in general capable are given by division (*Einteilung*) (§ 230).
3. "Concrete" individuality, which is always some determinate object, constituted by a nexus of complex relations, is a theorem (§ 231).
4. The process which supplies the necessities of mediating activity within the nexus of complex relations, and fuses these necessities into one, is construction (§ 231).
5. The process from which cognition derives and by which it knows the necessity of this nexus is demonstration (*Beweis*) (§ 231).

Defining, dividing, making theorems, constructing, and demonstrating are familiar thought processes in traditional logic. Hegel applies them to the actual dynamic processes which operate throughout the entire natural realm to produce all things, both animate and inanimate, each instantiated in particular or individual forms according to its universal.

Cognition proves that the relations which it perceives among the different aspects of the objective world are necessary. Definition posits determinacy in a universal as a characteristic (*Merkmal*) of that universal. Division determines the particulars within a universal. The theorem individualizes the concept. Construction creates syllogisms by providing their middle terms. Demonstration reveals the underlying necessity of the concept, and thus surpasses finite thought, which presupposes the world as simply given and its relations as contingent and variable. Accordingly, the current process of cognition, within the concept, is marked by progress toward appreciating existent relations as necessary. This necessity of reason is reached and first known by subjective agency.

The mere understanding once believed subjectivity to be a *tabula rasa*, a featureless receptacle, but now this inadequate construct must yield

to the higher construct of reason. Subjective thought must now be seen as active, a modifying and determining principle interpreting the crude data of sense perception. Hence subjectivity becomes cognition itself, which is necessarily active, and which, in manifesting its activity, determines both the means and the end of that activity. Thus the transition from theoretical to practical cognition, i.e., from cognition *per se* to willing, is a necessary development (§ 232), whose significance is that a true appreciation of the universal necessitates apprehending it as subjectivity, i.e., a self-moving concept which actively imposes modifications. This transition accents a basic principle of Hegel's whole system, namely, the recognition of reason as ultimately dynamic. In other words, the cosmic unifying force is spirit, not matter.

By willing, the subjective idea strives always to assert itself and to mold the world, which stands seemingly opposed to it, into a shape conformable to its own ends (§ 233). The ever-dominant end in the activity of universal reason is to realize the good. The dialectic reaches a level at which logical and ethical lines converge. Intelligence takes the world as it is, but the will proposes to make the world what it ought to be. (We may be reminded of Marx's eleventh thesis on Feuerbach: "Philosophers have only *interpreted* the world in various ways, but the point is to *change* it.") For Hegel, every "is" implies an "ought," every "ought" implies a "can," and every "can" implies a "will." But the finitude and impotence of the will is obvious, since contradiction persists between the world as it is and the world as it ought to be (§ 234). However, in the process of willing, the will abolishes its own finitude and overcomes this contradiction by discerning the difference between what is possible and what it not and thereby unifying the theoretical and the practical idea, i.e., that which is and that which ought to be. The idea thus gains deeper insight, recognizing that the discrepancies between the real and ideal are merely superficial, that essentially they are in accord, and that the world reveals the purpose of its immanent concept.

In this way, cognition purges the idea of all finitude. The idea has now become infinite, speculative, and absolute (§ 235). As the absolute idea, it is the unity of the theoretical idea, which takes the world as it is, and the practical idea, which strives to make the world what it ought to be. Moreover, because cognition entails life, the absolute idea is also the unity of cognition and life. It naturally embraces all phases of its own development. In life, regarded just as immediate living being, the idea seems *an sich*, i.e., implicit; in cognition, it appears *für sich*, i.e., explicitly conscious of itself; but in the absolute idea, it is both *an und für sich*, i.e., self-contained and all-inclusive. All movements of its development are within its own sphere of

determinacy. The idea has no need of support; it does not rest; it acknowledges no dependence on anything outside itself; and in its development there are no contingent factors or external conditions. Hegel identifies the highest form of the idea with Aristotle's *noêsis noêseôs* (§ 236 *Zusatz*). Because it is necessarily both cognitive and active, therefore its true content, i.e., that which it thinks about and acts upon, is necessarily the entire system.

The *Encyclopedia* sections on the absolute idea (§§ 236-244) are especially elliptical and would benefit from comparison with the richer treatment of this topic in the *Science of Logic*. If we could expand, elaborate, and de-theologize the absolute idea, then we might be able to simplify it enough to understand it better without doing violence to it. For example, Hegel in the shorter *Logic* does not call the absolute idea a "beyond" (*Jenseits*), but in the larger *Logic* he does. Calling the absolute idea a *Jenseits* might mean that it is an unreachable goal, perhaps even an otherworldly asymptote, and might suggest theological overtones. But Hegel is careful to note that an idea conceived as a *Jenseits* is one-sided. Thus the absolute idea is a "beyond" in a merely secular, everyday, and penultimate sense.

The absolute idea is the consummation of its own development, but is not the result of this process, because, although it is the last term of the series, it is also the first term, the ground and origin of the whole process which - paradoxically - it culminates. Because it is the unity of the subjective and the objective idea, it is identical with absolute truth (§ 236). It exists in three spheres, corresponding to the three main divisions of the *Logic* (§ 241). The third sphere develops in and as the concept, which absorbs, transforms, assimilates, and unifies the first sphere (being) and the second sphere (essence). The absolute idea is the direct beholding (*Anschauung*) of both itself and nature in their essential unity and freedom, but, insofar as it directly beholds (*anschaut*) anything, it is one-sided, in need of further development, mediation, and purification (§ 244).

Method means everything. It is not external, but lends determinacy and systematic totality to the concept (§ 243). Which method we use determines how and whether we apprehend or internalize truth. Both the analytic and the synthetic methods are penultimately required but, because they are finite, ultimately insufficient. The speculative method, on the other hand, the union of these two, is infinite and is the basic method of the dialectic. It resolves into three phases: (1) the immediate beginning, from which all negations are possible (§ 238); (2) the posited judgment of the idea, i.e., the progression (*Fortgang*) which negates the beginning, becomes its determinacy, and is manifest as reflection (§ 239); and (3) the end of the progression, in

which differences and contradictions are subsumed in the concept as the good infinite (§ 242). The progression moves from "abstract" to "concrete," self to other, universality to individuality, and difference to identity (§ 240). The end vanishes (*verschwindet*) into the beginning, the last into the first.

The system is a circle of circles which leads back to its beginning, but which, insofar as it is a circle, can have no beginning. Yet its movement back to its beginning confirms the beginning as the beginning. It matters not whether we visualize this circle of circles as a spiral, a curlicue, a spring, a helix, a Slinky-like configuration, a twisted loop, a nest of interlocking spheres, or any other plausible model. The point is that it turns back upon itself and begins again, thus constituting itself as foundationless, eternal, without beginning or end, a perfect ring.

The final move into totality is not just another move within the Logic, because, if it were, then it would generate just another logical concept. The final move is - and must be - a move beyond, away from, or out of the Logic. In other words, it cannot be "the final move." There can be no "final" move. In the "final" freedom of the concept, there is no transition (*Übergehen*) (§ 237). Nor is there any transition at the "final" stage of totality. At the end of the Logic, the circle collapses, but that collapsed circle is fulfilled being (*erfülltes Sein*). There is nowhere else for it to go.



Part V

The Transition from the Logic to the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit

The book which contains Hegel's shorter *Logic* is called *Encyclopedia* for etymological reasons. The word "encyclopedia" derives from three Greek words (*en* + *kuklos* + *paideia*) which together mean "education in a circle" or, more figuratively, "the whole circle of learning," i.e., "all the arts and sciences interrelated." Hence any exposition of Hegel's *Logic* would be incomplete without at least mentioning the relation of the shorter *Logic* to the two other disciplines, the philosophy of nature (*Naturphilosophie*) and the philosophy of spirit (*die Philosophie des Geistes*), which are the topics of the second and third parts, respectively, of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. At first glance, it might seem that Hegel arranged these three sciences in serial order of development, so that the philosophy of nature would represent an advance beyond the *Logic* and the philosophy of spirit the completion or consummation of the two preceding disciplines. But such a view would be erroneous and misleading. The fact is that each of three completes and consummates the other two.

Careful students of the *Logic* cannot fail to be impressed with its fundamental theory, that supreme reason, the absolute idea, is the

creative and sustaining principle of everything, and not just a principle of "abstract" thought. In its highest form as self-thinking thought, it is the logical idea (*die logische Idee*) (§ 236), the idea of Logic, the truth of Logic, the absolute idea with respect to Logic, the ideal of thought, or the ideal version of the way that thinking functions, i.e., the entire process which got us here to this heavily mediated stage in the first place. It is the whole movement (or the ever-moving whole) of determinate steps culminating in the absolute idea. The logical idea is transparent (*durchsichtig*) in the sense that it enables us to see that content has form.

Our exposition will have failed its purpose if it has not left such an impression on readers' minds. From the principle, fundamental and essential to Hegel's system, that the rational is the real, the real is the rational, and the laws of thought are the laws of being, it follows that both nature and spirit must be seen as existing - indeed, thriving - within the scope of all-embracing reason, the idea. Insofar as the idea constitutes the totality of all being, it must comprehend the complete spheres of both nature and spirit.

Moreover, the transitions from the idea to nature, and from nature to spirit, are not, properly speaking, "transitions," but developments (*Entwicklungen*) or movements (*Bewegungen*). They all occur within the absolute idea, the fully "concrete" and universal phase of the idea. "Transition" (*Übergang*) has a peculiar significance for Hegel. It typically means an advance from an incomplete stage of development to a higher, more nearly complete stage. This is the case in every step of progress from the simplest immediate being to the most complexly mediated concept and the most nearly "concrete" phases of the idea, short of the absolute idea itself. The idea appears at any stage of development which becomes self-sufficient. It not only fills gaps, completes lacunae, mends defects, removes barriers, overcomes limitations, and resolves contradictions, but also, in its own natural fullness, is incapable of either supplementation or deterioration, i.e., it cannot be either increased or decreased, perfected or corrupted. Thus, to speak of any "transition" from the idea to nature would imply that the idea needs nature as a necessary complement or addendum in order to supply its defects or overcome its contradictions. For Hegel, the idea does not *become* nature; it *is* nature. From this point of view, his philosophy of nature may be seen as an attempt to rationalize nature, i.e., to show that, throughout all natural processes, beneath all natural forces, and forming the essence of all natural laws, there is an omnipresent, immanent reason.

Again, the transition from any given stage of development to a higher, complementary, and more fully mediated stage is always brought

about through the inner drive and expansion of thought. Each transition is always established (*gesetzt*) as necessary. Thought is such that it must ever proceed toward perfection. But from the idea to nature, or from nature to spirit, there is no such transition. On the contrary, Hegel insists that the entire system of nature is just the result of the free activity of the idea, for example in § 244, where he says the idea freely resolves itself into its own absolute truth and reflects itself as nature; or, in other words, Logic is nature. That is, without a transition from the idea to nature, the idea simply reveals itself in and as nature, i.e., reveals itself as itself.

We have seen that the idea is inexorably active, not only as a knower, but also as a will. Its whole tendency, *qua* dynamic, is to reveal its own activity as the free manifestation of itself. The absolute idea, however, does not exhaust or lose itself in self-revelation as nature or spirit. Supreme reason, the absolute idea, or God, is in and through all works, yet transcends them. Hegel unequivocally expresses this in the larger *Logic*: "... objective thinking is the *content* of pure science. ... this content alone is absolute truth ... Logic is to be grasped as the system of pure reason, as the realm of pure thought. *This realm is truth* ... this content is the *presentation of God, as God is in the eternal divine essence before the creation of nature or any finite spirit*" (*WL*, vol. 1, p. 31; *SLM*, pp. 49-50; *SLdG*, p. 29). The very essence of spirit, divine or otherwise, is to reveal itself. Such revelation must comprehend both nature and spirit; yet the absolute "I," though omnipresent, is not absorbed in the revelation.

But could it be possible that this revelation itself is illusory, a passing shadow with no corresponding substance? The dialectical movement from beginning to end might seem to confirm this view, since all finite beings and relations lack self-sufficiency and permanence in their various developmental stages, and since only in the absolute idea does thought find itself adequate. "Things seen are temporal, but things unseen are eternal" (2 Cor. 4:18). Then is the whole cosmic spatio-temporal process a fleeting show? Is the human spirit just a flashing ray of Plato's sun? Are humans lost in the dark cave and the void cosmos, perchance returning again in other bodies before being reabsorbed in primeval light? On the contrary, Hegel's philosophies of nature and spirit endeavor to ground all the essential manifestations of being on firm ontological foundations. Nature cannot be a mere seeming, because the absolute idea is immanent in it. So also, finite spirit is not outside the infinite, but within its being and power. Insofar as the absolute idea is necessarily free, active, and immortal, and insofar as the human spirit participates in this idea, human freedom and immortality are thereby assured.

By way of summary, we may state that the problem of the Logic is solved in the absolute idea, the fundamental, self-explanatory principle of reason which is able to justify all lower categories, regarded merely as particular phases of its own self. The complete method of the Logic cannot become fully clear until we reach the stage of the absolute idea. In unfolding the dialectical process which eventuates in the absolute idea, we discover that reason is the principle of activity as well as the principle of knowledge. The absolute idea, therefore, as the ultimate expression of reason, reveals nothing but itself in cosmic processes and, despite the spatio-temporal contingencies of the universal system, demonstrates its own eternal nature and purpose as alpha and omega, the ground and end of all. The enduring and abiding aspects of the cosmic order are those which participate in the absolute idea, and which are fully revealed in the human spirit, disclosing human affinity with absolute spirit, and stirring within the human breast intimations of divinity and immortality.



Appendix A

A Glossary of the More Important Philosophical Terms in Hegel's Logic

Hegel's terminology presents special difficulties, not so much because the words are difficult in German, but rather because the precise, technical, systematic denotations which Hegel has given them are frequently difficult to render adequately in English. Geraets, Harris, and Suchting confronted this thorny problem head-on, sometimes with irreconcilable but learned differences of opinion among them, and offered many reasonable solutions (*EL*, pp. xiii-xlvi, 336-352). Michael Inwood's *A Hegel Dictionary* remains a valuable tool in this area mainly because of its comprehensiveness. In *Hegel, Hinrichs, and Schleiermacher on Feeling and Reason in Religion: The Texts of Their 1821-22 Debate* (Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen, 1987), pp.

167-213, Luft offered some suggestions, as did Howard P. Kainz in his translation of a few selections from Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), pp. xi-xviii. Scarcely any two Hegel translators agree. Controversy persists, perhaps more so with Hegel's work than with any other German-to-English philosophical corpus.

(*das*) *Absolute* = the absolute; that which is unconditioned but conditions all things; that which is complete within itself, all-embracing, all-determining, the infinite, the eternal, God. Its highest expression is the concept or the absolute idea.

(*die*) *absolute Idee* = the absolute idea; sometimes identifiable with Yahweh, but this is a controversial point.

(*die*) *absolute Identität* = absolute identity, complete identity, mere sameness, indefinite homogeneity; generally just an emphatic expression for the term "identity."

abstrakt = "abstract," one-sided, immediate, unmediated, unrelated, partial, incomplete; indicates an inadequate view of any object of knowledge. The category of being is always spoken of as "abstract," representing as it does the first rough draft of knowledge, and necessarily marking the beginning of that which is yet incomplete and undeveloped. Cf. *konkret*.

(*das*) *abstrakte Allgemeine* = the "abstract" universal; the unmediated, indeterminate, generally subjective absolute. Cf. *konkrete Allgemeine*.

(*die*) *abstrakte Identität* = "abstract" identity; an incomplete and colorless view of things.

allgemein = universal, general.

(*das*) *Allgemeine* = the universal.

(*die*) *Allgemeinheit* = universality, generality; not merely the summation of various marks common to a number of individuals, or generalization over them, by virtue of which they are seen as members of a single group or class, but also the significance of possessing a dynamic or synthetic essence which is the source and the active constructive principle of all its particular manifestations, their interrelations, and their mediation.

(*die*) *Allheit* = "all-ness," universality.

analytisch = analytic; refers to the loosely Aristotelian method which examines every individual for the purpose of discovering its various particulars, separating the essential from the inessential, and thereby defining its cause, law, or genus, i.e., its corresponding universal. Cf. *synthetisch*.

Anderes / (*das*) *Andere* = another, the other, the complementary aspect of any object of knowledge, whether recognized or not, the necessary correlate for the complete understanding of any phenomenon's significance. This other may be a cognate species of phenomenon, the end or purpose of its associated phenomenon, or some separate but essentially related phenomenon. It is the complete setting of the phenomenon, giving it depth, meaning, and fulfillment. In any process of development, the other at any stage is the very next stage, immediately beyond, for the moment contrasting to the first stage, but acting also as the impetus of any further dialectical movement. Cf. *Etwas*.

(*das*) *Anderssein* = otherness, "being-other-than."

(*die*) *Anschauung* / (*das*) *Anschauen* = (usually) direct beholding; (sometimes) intuition / intuiting; (rarely) perception / perceiving. This term is untranslatable as it is used in post-Kantian technical philosophical vocabulary. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, B72, Kant equated it with the Latin *intuitus*, which misled generations of scholars to accept it in English as "intuition," even though the common meanings of this English word bear little resemblance to what Kant meant. We might even do better to coin a new English word, "contuition," based on Aquinas's *contuitus*, which meant for him something similar to what *intuitus* meant for Kant, namely, a beholding, a view, a sight, a direct apprehension of an object. For Hegel, it means instant perception, a direct and immediate knowing, as opposed to a knowledge obtained by the mediating processes of thought. Cf. *Begriff*, *Vorstellung*.

an sich = in itself, implicit, potential, merely present; denotes what is implicit or potential, in contrast to *für sich*, which denotes the explicit or actual. The former often applies to being, the latter to essence, thus indicating that being is implicit while essence is explicit, or that being is explicitly what essence is implicitly, insofar as being and essence are two sides of the same coin. The compound of these two contrasting terms, *an und für sich*, refers to whatever is able to transform its potential into its own actual manifestation, i.e., capable of self-determination or self-direction. Cf. *für sich*.

(*das*) *Ansich* = the in itself.

(*das*) *Ansichsein* = "inherentness."

aufgehoben = the past participle that describes the new status of any position (*Satz*) which, through encounter with its opposition or alternative (*Gegensatz*), has been cancelled, preserved, and raised to a higher dialectical level.

(*der*) *aufgehobene Satz* = any position (*Satz*) which, through encounter

with its opposition or alternative (*Gegensatz*), has been cancelled, preserved, and raised to a higher dialectical level.

aufheben = to cancel, preserve, and raise to a higher dialectical level. This verb simultaneously expresses three distinct though related ideas: to destroy a thing in its original form, to restore it in another form, and to elevate it to a higher plane. It represents always a progress in thought and development.

(*die*) *Aufhebung* = either the process by which any position (*Satz*), through encounter with its opposition or alternative (*Gegensatz*), has been cancelled, preserved, and raised to a higher dialectical level, or the status of this new dialectical phase, once it has been achieved. It is sometimes rendered as "sublation," but really needs a circumlocution to translate it.

(*das*) *Ausschliessen* = exclusion, the act of excluding.

(*die*) *äusserliche Reflexion* = external reflection; the reflection which deals with and illuminates only external relations.

(*die*) *Bedingung* = condition; whatever is necessary to cause an effect. Cf. *unbedingt*.

begreifen = to grasp, to conceive, to comprehend. Cf. *vorstellen*.

(*der*) *Begriff* = concept; a nearly untranslatable term which "notion" renders very poorly in American English, but somewhat better in British English; the dynamic rational principle which underlies all thought processes; the supreme thought category; the fundamental law of being; the creative architectonic force of the universe; the truth of both *Sein* (being) and *Wesen* (essence); the deepest insight; more than just the source of determinacy and efficiency, also the central force of self-determination and self-specification, realizing its own subjective purposes through necessary manifestations in the objective world; the thinking grasp of the true significance of a universal without any adventitious aid from images, metaphors, narratives, etc., which the mind or imagination may create or use. Cf. *Anschauung*, *Erkennen*, *Idee*, *Sein*, *Vorstellung*, *Wesen*.

(*das*) *Beisichsein* = being with itself, being by itself, being at home with itself; being which is explicitly self-sufficient and self-contained. Cf. *Fürsichsein*, *Insichsein*.

(*die*) *Beschaffenheit* = character, condition, constitution.

(*das*) *Besondere* = the particular. The particular is significant mainly as the instantiation of some universal or the "abstract" of some individual. Cf. *Einzelne*.

(*die*) *Besonderheit* = particularity, "abstract" individuality. Cf.

Einzelinheit.

(die) *Besonderung* = particularization, particularizing. Cf. *Vereinzelung*.

bestimmen = to define, to determine.

(die) *bestimmende Reflexion* = determining reflection, the reflection which determines, i.e., regards seemingly external relations as really internal, or between coordinate sides of the same system.

bestimmt = determinate, specifically determined, specified, characterized, defined. Cf. *unbestimmt*.

(die) *Bestimmtheit* = determinacy; the actualization of the capacity expressed by *Bestimmung*; a state of definiteness; the specific and determinate character of any phenomenon or object of knowledge. Cf. *Bestimmung*.

(die) *Bestimmung* = determination, in the sense of definition or specification of being or qualities. Cf. *Bestimmtheit*, *Denkbestimmung*.

(die) *Bewegung* = movement. Cf. *Entwicklung*, *Übergang*.

(der) *Beweis* = proof, demonstration; the cognitive process which derives the necessity of a nexus of complex relations. Cf. *Definition*, *Konstruktion*, *Theorem*.

(die) *Beziehung auf Anderes* = relation to another; the fundamental relation of negativity. Cf. *Negation*, *Negativität*.

(die) *Beziehung auf sich* = self-relation, self-reference, relation to oneself; the usually immediate relation of something to itself, or within its own boundaries, from which it is seen as a closed system and, at least for the time being, isolated from any larger system to which it may be related.

Bleibendes / (das) *Bleibende* = permanence, permanent basis.

(das) *Dasein* = determinate being (*bestimmtes Sein*); being with a determinacy (*Sein mit einer Bestimmtheit*); being-there; existence; being determined in contrast to mere *Sein*, which is wholly indefinite and undetermined, and in contrast to *Existenz*, which is definite and determined, but implies reference to its source, its essential ground. *Sein*, *Dasein*, and *Existenz* are a series of successive stages in the progress of thought toward more precise determination and explanation as essence. Cf. *Existenz*, *Grund*, *Sein*, *Wesen*.

Daseiendes / (das) *Daseiende* = the being that exists, that which is there.

(die) *Definition* = definition; the cognitive process which determines the universal. Cf. *Beweis*, *Einteilung*, *Konstruktion*, *Theorem*.

(die) *Denkbestimmung* = category, "thought determination"; the most

general way of thought, which determines all further thought of more particular or specific content. Cf. *Bestimmung*.

(*das*) *Denken* = thinking.

(*die*) *Dialektik* = dialectic; the process of thought which generally characterizes the Hegelian method. It recognizes the contradiction that necessarily inheres in every finite statement, but at the same time it is capable of overcoming and resolving by an appropriate *Aufhebung* every such contradiction. In one sense, dialectic is the threefold process as a whole; in another, it is only the second or middle stage of this process, that of contradiction or opposition (*Gegensatz*).

(*die*) *Differenz* = differentiation. *Differenz* is a false cognate; *Unterschied* means "difference." Cf. *Identität*, *Unterschied*.

(*das*) *Ding an sich* = the thing in itself. Hegel rejects Kant's meaning, but typically uses this Kantian phrase in a peculiar way to refer to the thing in its germinal or potential state, e.g., the seed is the plant in itself, the boy is the man in himself.

(*die*) *Eigenschaft* = quality, property, attribute, characteristic, peculiarity, defining feature.

(*die*) *Einteilung* = division. Gives the particular manifestations of which the universal is capable. Cf. *Definition*.

(*das*) *Einzelne* = the individual, the singular; (*der*) *Einzelne* = the human individual, the particular man. Cf. *Besondere*.

(*die*) *Einzelheit* = individuality, singularity, "concrete" particularity. An individual object of knowledge has meaning only when we know its particular and differentiating characteristics and its mediating relations and thus can refer it to its proper universal. Cf. *Besonderheit*.

endlich = finite. Like the real and the ideal, the finite and the infinite are not irreconcilable opposites. Every finite thing has aspects of infinity. Cf. *unendlich*.

(*die*) *Entgegensetzung* = opposition. Cf. *Gegensatz*.

(*das*) *Entstehen* = originating, arising, coming into existence, coming to be.

(*die*) *Entwicklung* = evolution, development. The dialectical movement is essentially development, though it traces logical rather than temporal stages of that process. Cf. *Bewegung*, *Übergang*.

(*das*) *Erkennen* = knowing, cognizing, the act of cognition; one of the higher phases of the *Begriff*; the concept rising to the level of self-consciousness. Cf. *Begriff*.

(*die*) *Erkenntnis* = knowledge, cognition.

(die) *Erscheinung* = appearance, phenomenon, "shining forth"; the aspect of being which is revealed in the world of phenomena; not the same as its necessary complement, *Schein*, the mere appearance, shadow, or illusion. Cf. *Schein*.

Etwas = something, anything; any object of knowledge which possesses determinate being (*Dasein*). Every *Etwas* is positive by virtue of what it is, but negative insofar as it excludes from its own being its corresponding other. Cf. *Anderes*.

(die) *Existenz* = existence. Cf. *Dasein*, *Grund*, *Sein*, *Wesen*.

(die) *Form* = form; the active, constructive principle immanent in the underlying substance of things. Cf. *Inhalt*.

(der) *Fortgang* = progression; the movement of the speculative method from "abstract" to "concrete."

(die) *Freiheit* = freedom.

für sich = for itself, explicit, actual; signifying that which is present to itself on its own terms. Cf. *an sich*.

(das) *Fürsichsein* = being for itself; self-defining, self-determining, self-determined, and self-contained being; being which implicitly asserts but does not explicitly mediate or justify its independence, as opposed to *Beisichsein*, which mediates and justifies its independence. Cf. *Beisichsein*, *Insichsein*.

(das) *Ganze* = the whole, the entirety, all that there is, all that has appeared so far. Sometimes when Hegel says *das Ganze* he means *die Sache selbst* (the matter at hand, the thing in question, the central issue, the fact of the matter, the heart of the matter) and sometimes he means *die Einheit des Seins und Nichts* (the unity of being and nothing). The latter interpretation supports John Burbidge over Errol Harris (q.v. below in Appendix B).

(die) *Gedanken* = thoughts; i.e., as Hegel typically uses the term, merely ordinary or "abstract" thoughts, as opposed to concepts (*Begriffe*) or "concrete" thoughts.

(der) *Gegensatz* = opposition, alternative state of affairs (both properly); antithesis (less properly but more commonly). The middle stage of every dialectical triad and an essential factor in the resulting *Aufhebung*. Cf. *Aufhebung*, *Entgegensetzung*, *Satz*.

(der) *Geist* = spirit; nearly untranslatable, but better rendered as "spirit" than as the frequently encountered "mind."

gesetzt (from the verb *setzen*) = posited, supposed, established, constrained. Any object of thought is *gesetzt* if it is explicitly determined by the logic of its situation. When whatever is given in

thought leads to a conclusion, Hegel calls that conclusion *gesetzt*. Every dialectical phase is *gesetzt* by the very momentum of thought itself. Yet whatever is *gesetzt* must still be mediated in order to establish it as necessary. The term is often used to create a pun with *vorausgesetzt* ("presupposed"). Cf. *Voraussetzung*.

(*das*) *Gesetztsein* = the condition or state of being *gesetzt*.

(*das*) *Gleichgewicht* = equilibrium, balance.

(*die*) *Gleichheit* = likeness, equality.

(*der*) *Grad* = degree or intensity of qualitative variation, as the degree of heat or cold, etc.

(*die*) *Grenze* = border, limit, fence; the demarcation between any object of knowledge and its other. Cf. *Schranke*.

(*die*) *Grösse* = magnitude, determinate quantity.

(*der*) *Grund* = ground, reason for being; the unity of identity and difference; that which underlies all appearance; the basis of all existence; the reason for every phenomenon; the constant and permanent essence of all objects of knowledge. Cf. *Dasein*, *Differenz*, *Existenz*, *Identität*, *Sein*, *Unterschied*, *Wesen*.

(*die*) *Idealität* = ideality; the ideal; the truth of reality; an essential characteristic of the true infinite; the abiding constant which underlies the changing, unstable, or finite aspects of every determinate being. Whatever is truly real is so by virtue of some strain of ideality.

(*die*) *Idee* = the idea; the highest form of the *Begriff* (concept), manifesting its self-conscious, free, and self-determining essence, the consummation and source of all knowledge and all being. We might say that the *Idee* is the *Begriff* plus *Realität* or the *Begriff* plus *Objektivität*. Cf. *Begriff*, *Objektivität*, *Realität*.

ideel = ideal.

(*die*) *Identität* = identity; uniformity; sameness; homogeneity; that which, at first, shows no distinction or diversity within it, and has no relation to anything beyond itself. Nevertheless, identity may be mediated, so that there may grow identity in difference (*Unterschied*), and difference in identity, and so that the constant oscillation between identity and difference, or their mutually reflected unity, is ground (*Grund*). Cf. *Differenz*, *Grund*, *Unterschied*.

(*der*) *Inhalt* = content. It is fully mediated only when it is known as one with its form and its matter. Cf. *Form*.

(*das*) *Insichsein* = being within itself, self-contained being. Cf. *Beisichsein*, *Fürsichsein*.

(*die*) *Kausalität* = causality.

konkret = "concrete," complete, comprehensive, fully mediated; signifies an adequate view of things, knowledge of phenomena, or apprehension of concepts, embracing all possible considerations as to their nature, their origin, and the manifold relations which they may develop and sustain. Cf. *abstrakt*.

(*das*) *konkrete Allgemeine* = the "concrete" universal; a major, perhaps unreachable, goal or ideal of the dialectic; the fully mediated, internally differentiated, self-identical absolute; the ultimate unity of the subjective and the objective. Cf. *abstrakte Allgemeine*.

(*die*) *Konstruktion* = construction; the process which supplies the necessary mediating terms in a nexus of complex relations and fuses them into one. Cf. *Beweis*, *Definition*, *Theorem*.

(*die*) *List* = cunning, craft, slyness. Hegel uses this term to characterize how reason works out its ends in nature by bringing mechanical, chemical, and other forces under its control and swaying them at will.

(*das*) *Mass* = measure, standard, standard measure, type, archetype, ideal; the typical form to which each thing within its proper sphere roughly corresponds.

mit sich identisch = self-identical, identical with itself, completely homogeneous, i.e., presenting a sameness throughout and lacking any differentiation of parts or specification of functions.

mittelbar = mediate (adj.), mediated; in contrast to *unmittelbar* (immediate), anything is mediated if it is a product of a creative, dialectical, or developmental process. Immediate knowledge is given, simple, and unrelated; mediated knowledge is explained, developed, and interrelated. Beginnings are immediate; results are mediated. Cf. *unmittelbar*, *vermittelt*.

möglich = possible, potential.

(*die*) *Möglichkeit* = possibility, potentiality; not fanciful or unactualizable possibility, but only the possibility which could be actualized. Cf. *Notwendigkeit*, *Zufälligkeit*.

(*das*) *Moment* = phase, stage, dialectical level, configuration, aspect, moment, or factor; an essential element in any complex system or process. This is a technical term, which Hegel always uses systematically, as opposed to *der Moment*, which denotes the ordinary, non-technical sense of an indeterminate, usually short, portion of time.

(*das*) *Nachdenken* = thinking after the fact, reflective thinking,

meditation, meditative thinking (i.e., *besinnliches Denken* in the Heideggerian sense), contemplation, rumination, mulling over.

(*die*) *Negation* = negation; the process which demarcates any object of knowledge from its immediate other. Negation is the driving force of the dialectic, and thus, determination itself. Cf. *Beziehung auf Anderes*.

negativ = negative; refers to the difference or contradiction inherent within any object of knowledge. The significance of the negative lies only in relation to its complementary other, the positive. Any positive and its negative together are the ground of the being of that to which they refer. Cf. *positiv*.

(*die*) *Negativität* = negativity, negation; the quality of that which is manifest as the opposite of itself, thereby enabling something to confront itself *qua* its inherent and internal contradictions, i.e., its primary position or proposition (*Satz*) and its natural opposition or alternative (*Gegensatz*), aiming toward resolution, reconciliation, or mediated unity, and thus pushing the dialectic forward. Absolute negativity overcomes such negation by denying it on the next higher level. This second negation is really an affirmation, not simply of the *Satz*, but of the *Gegensatz* too, and hence is equivalent to their *Aufhebung*. Cf. *Aufhebung*, *Gegensatz*, *Negation*, *Satz*.

(*die*) *negative Einheit* = negative unity; a system of many different parts, all somehow united; unity amid diversity.

(*das*) *Nichtdasein* = "not-being-there," "being-somewhere-else," in subtle contrast to *Nichtsein*, *Nichtigkeit*, and *Nichts* (q.v.).

(*die*) *Nichtigkeit* = nothingness, i.e., the negative nature of any given thing. Cf. *Nichts*.

(*das*) *Nichts* = nothing; penultimately or progressively "abstract," with a constant - and constantly realized - potential to change over into being (*Sein*); the phase which is not yet reached in any process of development but may at any time become *Sein* through the process of becoming (*Werden*); not quite equivalent to *Nichtsein* (non-being). Cf. *Nichtsein*, *Sein*, *Werden*.

(*das*) *Nichtsein* = non-being; purely and completely "abstract," irrevocable non-existence or unreality with no potential for development and no possibility of ever changing over into being (*Sein*); not quite equivalent to *Nichts* (nothing). Cf. *Nichts*.

(*die*) *Notwendigkeit* = necessity. Cf. *Möglichkeit*, *Zufälligkeit*.

objektiv = objective (adj.). (1) in ordinary German, whatever is present to us externally; (2) in Kant's terminology, whatever is universal and necessary for all rational beings; (3) in Hegel's terminology, whatever is universal, necessary, essential, and mediated

through the subjective. Cf. *subjektiv*.

(*die*) *Objektivität* = objectivity; the stage in the development of being which explicitly manifests the subjective concept immanent within it. Cf. *Subjektivität*.

positiv = positive; a term whose significance lies only in relation to its balancing correlate, the negative. Cf. *negativ*.

(*die*) *Realität* = reality; the aspect of any determinate being that makes it what it is, and thus a necessary moment of that which is truly infinite and therefore ideal. Cf. *Idealität*.

(*die*) *Reflexion* = reflection, contemplation, rumination, deliberation; the fundamental process of thought by which any object of knowledge is revealed in its truth only when seen in its complete setting through all its relations to every part of its system and to the system itself. Such objects shine not so much in their own light as in the light from all else to which they are related.

(*die*) *Reflexion in Anderes* = reflection into another, reflection into something else; the process by which an object of knowledge shines in the light of another, i.e., is revealed in its truth via something else which is related to it as its other, complement, or natural correlate.

(*die*) *Reflexion in sich* = reflection into itself; the process by which an object of knowledge shines in its own light.

(*die*) *Reflexionsbestimmung* = category of reflection, reflective determination.

(*die*) *Regel* = rule; the usual or typical form which characterizes members of the same class, group, or species.

(*der*) *Satz* = position, proposition, situation, state of affairs, sentence, statement (all properly); thesis (less properly but more commonly). A statement which is true in certain circumstances but not universally or necessarily. In this respect, it differs from judgment (*Urteil*), which contains aspects of universality and necessity. Cf. *Gegensatz*, *Schluss*, *Urteil*.

(*das*) *Schein* = show, seeming, shining, shine, illusion. *Schein* does not usually mean "illusion" or "illusory being" for Hegel, but rather, "show" or "seeming." In footnote 4 on pp. 248-289 of *On Hegel's Logic*, John Burbidge favorably compares Hegel's idea of *Schein* to the Hindu idea of *maya*. Cf. *Erscheinung*.

(*der*) *Schluss* = syllogism, conclusion; not only the logical form of inference, but also any active process which unites any two elements through the mediation of a third. The syllogistic process thus determines being and existence as well as thought. Cf. *Satz*, *Urteil*.

(die) *Schranke* = the barrier, boundary, limit, or restriction which any determinate being may reach at any stage of its development, but which, by its own natural demand to develop further, this determinate being must transcend. Cf. *Grenze*.

(das) *Sein* = being; in the sense of pure being, indefinite, immediate, indeterminate, merely given, unexplained, unrelated, unanalyzed, and unanalyzable. *Sein* and *Nichts* (nothing) oscillate between each other, and are in fact the same. Cf. *Begriff*, *Dasein*, *Existenz*, *Grund*, *Nichts*, *Wesen*.

(die) *setzende Reflexion* = the reflection which posits; i.e., the phase of the process of reflection which regards something as self-illuminated, immediately given, and independent.

(die) *sich auf sich beziehende Negativität* = self-relating negativity; i.e., immediate negativity or mere determinacy, as yet unrelated to anything outside the negated particular, but identical with the immediacy or essence of that particular.

(die) *Spekulation* = contemplation, meditation, rumination, self-reflective thought.

subjektiv = subjective; not only that which pertains to individual or personal thoughts and interests in distinction from the whole body of facts in the world of phenomena, but also that which is at the same time immanent in these facts, and as such constitutes their very truth and their informing principle. Cf. *objektiv*.

(die) *Subjektivität* = subjectivity; an ambiguous term denoting generally the state of a reflective consciousness. Cf. *Objektivität*.

(die) *Substantialität* = substantiality. As the first aspect of necessity within actuality, it is the immediate, primary, but absolute formative principle and source of power in the universe. It is eventually revealed as subject.

(die) *Substanz* = substance.

synthetisch = synthetic; refers to the loosely Platonic method which starts with the universal, acts as an architectonic principle to construct all possible particular manifestations of the universal in accord with their essence, and reveals the universal in the organization and fulfilled being of "concrete" individuals *sub specie aeternitatis*. Cf. *analytisch*.

(die) *Tätigkeit* = activity, activeness, doing. Cf. *Wirkung*.

(das) *Theorem* = theorem; "concrete" individuality constituted objectively as a nexus of complex relations. Cf. *Beweis*, *Definition*, *Konstruktion*.

(die) *Totalität* = totality, systematic integration; the mediated aggregate of all properties and relations pertaining to any object of knowledge taken not as a mere sum, but as a systematic unity.

(der) *Übergang* / (das) *Übergehen* = transition, passing over; the movement of thought from any given stage of development to the next stage immediately beyond it and essentially connected to it by the inner necessity of the thought process itself. Cf. *Entwicklung*, *Bewegung*.

unbedingt = unconditioned; having no conditions attached to something's being or existence. Cf. *Bedingung*.

unbestimmt = undetermined, indeterminate; signifies a lack of any definite qualities or attributes - or mediation. Cf. *bestimmt*.

unendlich = infinite. Cf. *endlich*.

unmittelbar = immediate, unmediated; represented as an object of given knowledge but unanalyzed and unexplained; signifying that which is given as a totality without reference to any elements which constitute it or to any processes by which it is produced. Cf. *mittelbar*, *unvermittelt*.

(die) *Unmittelbarkeit* = immediacy. Cf. *mittelbar*, *unvermittelt*, *Vermittlung*.

(der) *Unterschied* = difference, distinction; more stark than diversity (*Verschiedenheit*); signifies a determinate or specific difference (*bestimmter Unterschied*) which demarcates a species. *Unterschied* exists only in relation to identity (*Identität*), because differences among objects of knowledge have meaning only in contrast to their underlying identity. Conversely, any identity which may be affirmed in any instance has meaning only in contrast to some underlying difference. If identity and difference are predicated without reference to each other, then arises a false or meaningless "abstraction" of each term in isolation. Cf. *Identität*, *Differenz*, *Verschiedenheit*.

unvermittelt = unmediated, not yet mediated; not yet recognized; not yet explicit; not yet determinate. Cf. *mittelbar*, *unmittelbar*, *vermittelt*.

(die) *Ursache* = the cause (of an effect) or the origin (of a process). Literally it means "original thing," "primeval event," or "ancient business." Its root meaning indicates that the cause as the primary essence must underlie its effect (*Wirkung*).

(das) *Urteil* = judgment. Its etymology signifies division into elementary parts, and Hegel indicates this significance in its basic function, i.e., to break up indefinite or incoherent universals into definite and coherent particulars and individuals. Like the syllogism, judgment applies to being and existence as well as thought. Cf. *Satz*, *Schluss*.

(die) *Veränderlichkeit* = alteration.

(die) *Veränderung* = "othering," alteration.

(die) *Vereinigung* = unification.

(die) *Vereinzelung* = isolation; (less frequently) individuation. Cf. *Besonderung*.

(das) *Vergehen* = vanishing, disappearing, passing out of existence, perishing, ceasing to be.

(das) *Verhältnis* = relation, relationship; especially what obtains between any object of knowledge and its correlate as mediated through reflection, such as the relations of causality or reciprocal activity.

vermittelt = mediated. Cf. *mittelbar*, *unvermittelt*.

(die) *Vermittlung* = mediatedness, mediation. Cf. *Unmittelbarkeit*.

(die) *Vernunft* = reason, as distinguished from *Verstand*, the understanding. Reason is the function of the mind (*Geist*) which overcomes, in a higher synthesis, the contradictions which the understanding observes but cannot reconcile. While it by no means ignores the differences among phenomena, reason nevertheless possesses the capacity to apprehend the integral unity which underlies all of these differences. Cf. *Verstand*.

(die) *Verschiedenheit* = diversity, variety, differentiation. Cf. *Unterschied*.

(das) *Verschwinden* = "withering away," disappearing, vanishing, disappearance.

(die) *Versöhnung* = reconciliation.

(der) *Verstand* = understanding, especially in contrast to reason (*Vernunft*). The understanding regards the various objects of knowledge as distinct, separate, isolated. Cf. *Vernunft*.

(die) *voraussetzende Reflexion* = the reflection which presupposes; i.e., the deep reflection which recognizes that the immediacy and apparent independence of a given object of knowledge must be referred to some "other" as its necessary presupposition or prerequisite.

(die) *Voraussetzung* = axiom, postulate, assumption, presupposition. Cf. *gesetzt*.

vorstellen = to think pictorially, to imagine, to represent impressions to oneself. Cf. *begreifen*.

(die) *Vorstellung* = mental imagery, representation, picture thinking; in distinction from *Anschauung* and *Begriff*, a generalized, vague, or stereotyped image of a class or group of objects or phenomena; an

immediate, one-sided, and usually shallow metaphor; a pictorial rather than a discursive or linguistic representation. Cf. *Anschauung*, *Begriff*.

(die) *Wahrheit* = truth. For Hegel, truth consists in the complete congruence of any object of knowledge with its own *Begriff*, which implies a mediating dialectical process wherein this object consummates in the totality of its relations. Cf. *Begriff*.

(die) *Wechselwirkung* = reciprocal activity, reciprocity. This activity is indeed very active, insofar as the word literally means something like "alternating effect" or even "flip-flopping action."

(das) *Werden* = becoming; the process by which nothing passes into being, and being into nothing. Cf. *Nichts*, *Sein*.

(das) *Wesen* = essence; the underlying principle of being, its manifold relations, and its ground. Cf. *Begriff*, *Dasein*, *Existenz*, *Grund*, *Sein*.

(die) *Wesenheit* = essentiality, essential being.

(der) *Widerspruch* = contradiction.

(die) *Wirklichkeit* = actuality; the "concrete" unity of essence and appearance. Cf. *Schein*, *Wesen*.

(die) *Wirkung* = Activity, effect. Cf. *Tätigkeit*.

(die) *Zufälligkeit* = contingency. Whatever is contingent does not have the ground of its being in itself, but in some other. Cf. *Möglichkeit*, *Notwendigkeit*.

(der) *Zweck* = goal, end, purpose, design.



Appendix B

An Evaluation of the Secondary Literature on Hegel's Logic

There have been so many books written about Hegel's dialectical

system that it is often difficult for new students and experienced scholars alike to know where to begin. This much, however, is certain: We must begin somewhere in the secondary literature; for, if anyone plunges headlong into Hegel's own text without adequate preparation, that reader is bound to be frustrated. Hence, the need exists for a comprehensive guide to those works with which we might introduce ourselves to Hegel's Logic. A brief one is offered in *EL*, pp. 361-363. A broader attempt at such a guide is offered here:

Angehrn, Emil. *Freiheit und System bei Hegel* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1977). A very well-organized analysis of how Hegel's Logic may achieve "conclusion" (*Abschluss*) or "concludedness" (*Abgeschlossenheit*). Insofar as it questions how freedom (*Freiheit*) is viable or even possible within categorical systematization (*Systematizität*), and insofar as it considers whether Hegel's system is closed and therefore relevant only to his own time or open-ended and therefore abidingly relevant to post-Hegelian times, including our time and beyond, Angehrn's work is an important contribution to the anti-foundationalist vs. foundationalist debate.

Baillie, James Black. *The Origin and Significance of Hegel's Logic: A General Introduction to Hegel's System* (London: Macmillan, 1901). A noble but not especially rigorous attempt at a readable genetic explanation of Hegel's Logic in its biographical, cultural, and philosophical context.

Baum, Manfred. *Die Entstehung der Hegelschen Dialektik* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1986). The word *Entstehung* in the title does not refer to how the dialectical process originates or arises within the system; but rather, it refers to how Hegel created the idea of dialectic in his own mind, influenced by the pre-Socratics, Plato, Aristotle, the neo-Platonists, Spinoza, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and others. Baum offers a clear historical account of how the young Hegel, from his earliest philosophizing to about 1805, conceived and developed the dialectic which he would later present in the *Phenomenology*, the *Science of Logic*, and the *Encyclopedia*.

Becker, Werner. *Hegels Begriff der Dialektik und des Prinzip des Idealismus: Zur systematischen Kritik der logischen und phänomenologischen Dialektik* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1969). Analyzes the whole dialectic from both a logical and a phenomenological standpoint, with special emphasis on sensation, perception, categorization, objectification, change, and judgment.

Beiser, Frederick C. *Hegel* (New York: Routledge, 2005). Arranged thematically; contains surprisingly little about the Logic, and what there is about the Logic is mostly under the aegis of metaphysics,

epistemology, or a basic discussion of dialectic. There is an interesting section about Hegel's relation to Spinoza.

Bencivenga, Ermanno. *Hegel's Dialectical Logic* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); *La logica dialettica di Hegel* (Milano: Mondadori, 2011). A critical, somewhat hostile, but always respectful appraisal of Hegel from a Kantian point of view.

Boer, Karin de. *On Hegel: The Sway of the Negative* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). Traces Hegel's use of and need for negativity and negation throughout his philosophy, from his challenging of Kant to his encounters with logic, art, culture, tragedy, time, nature, language, religion, metaphysics, politics, and history.

Bowman, Brady. *Hegel and the Metaphysics of Absolute Negativity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). A rich historical and systematic account of how Hegel revolutionized logic by developing, from Spinoza's idea that to negate anything is to determine it, a driving dialectical force of double negation in which the second negation does not merely cancel or neutralize the first, thus producing an equilibrium or a zero-sum game, but rather creates an asymmetrical or "upward" result because the second negation is conditioned by the first.

Burbidge, John. "Hegel's Conception of Logic," in: *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel*, edited by Frederick C. Beiser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 86-101. A brief outline of Hegel's plan for the larger *Logic*.

Burbidge, John. *The Logic of Hegel's Logic: An Introduction* (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2006). A brief but lucid general survey of the *Logic*, its genesis, structure, history, problems, interpretations, and controversies.

Burbidge, John. *On Hegel's Logic: Fragments of a Commentary* (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1981). A helpful guide through the *Science of Logic* with frequent references to the shorter *Logic*; as clear as can reasonably be, given the turgidity and difficulty of its text, it richly rewards careful study. Burbidge offers a "Left Hegelian" interpretation which may be fruitfully juxtaposed with Errol Harris's "Right Hegelian" interpretation.

Burbidge, John. "[Review]: *An Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel*, Errol E. Harris," *Idealistic Studies* 16, 2 (May 1986): 159-161. A gracious critique by a scholar who almost diametrically disagrees with Harris's book. Burbidge claims that Harris fails (1) to appreciate the significance of the difference in authority among Hegel's text, Hegel's remarks on his text, Hegel's students' *Zusätze*, and the *Science of Logic*; (2) to recognize that the development of the whole can be grasped by

studying the dialectic, movement, and *Aufhebung* of any part of the whole; and (3) to account adequately for individuation within unity, differentiation within substance, or relativity within the absolute.

Butler, Clark. *Hegel's Logic: Between Dialectic and History* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1997). A creative, nearly idiosyncratic interpretation of the *Science of Logic* which takes the Logic seriously as metaphysics, prefers Errol Harris to John Burbidge, sees most of the transitions as deductive, and argues that the Logic is "a rational reconstruction of the empirical history of speculative theology" (p. 4).

Caird, Edward. *Hegel* (Edinburgh: Blackwood; Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1883). A general introduction which is about half biography and half philosophical exposition. Of the book's nine chapters, the final three focus on the Logic, but concentrate too much on the principle of contradiction and provide an overly Christianized interpretation typical of the British Hegelians of the late nineteenth century.

Carlson, David. *A Commentary to Hegel's Science of Logic* (Basingstoke, England; Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). A clear and concise, even if perhaps overly formal, synopsis of Hegel's larger *Logic*. Because of its plain English and copious schematic diagrams, it can serve to illuminate the shorter *Logic* as well.

Cirulli, Franco. *Hegel's Critique of Essence: A Reading of the "Wesenslogik"* (New York: Routledge, 2006). A comparative evaluation of Hegel's theories of essence, ground, reflection, difference, subjectivity, and substance, with regard to Aristotle, Spinoza, Kant, Jacobi, Fichte, and Schelling.

Clark, Malcolm. *Logic and System: A Study of the Transition from "Vorstellung" to Thought in the Philosophy of Hegel* (Hague: Nijhoff, 1971). Traces the modification of *Vorstellung* from its "abstract," original, or immediate meaning as subjective opinion through successive stages of understanding and reason to its "concrete," fully mediated meaning in thought, reflection, imagination, memory, and judgment.

The Dimensions of Hegel's Dialectic, edited by Nectarios G. Limnatis (London: Continuum, 2010). Contains twelve useful articles, including Angelica Nuzzo on the beginning point of the Logic, Dieter Wandschneider on self-fulfillment, Tom Rockmore on circularity, Markus Gabriel on the absolute, Klaus Brinkmann on *Aufhebung*, and Limnatis on intersubjectivity.

Dove, Kenley Royce. "Phenomenology and Systematic Philosophy," in: *Method and Speculation in Hegel's "Phenomenology,"* edited by Merold Westphal (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities, 1982), pp. 27-39. Proceeding from his belief that Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*

constitutes a set of exercises to prepare for reading the *Logic*, Dove develops a useful heuristic device or "conceptual framework" to grasp Hegel's whole system; i.e., he sees every triad in the *Logic* as an instance of a dialectic of (1) contrast, (2) determination, and (3) individuality.

Doz, André. *La logique de Hegel et les problèmes traditionnels d'ontologie* (Paris: J. Vrin, 2007). An important commentary providing a metaphysical interpretation of Hegel's categories, with particular reference to Aristotle and Kant, and containing a short but useful German-to-French glossary of a few key terms.

Essays on Hegel's Logic, edited by George di Giovanni (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990). Among these papers and commentaries from the 1988 meeting of the Hegel Society of America, William Maker's "Beginning," Philip T. Grier's "Abstract and Concrete in Hegel's Logic," Errol E. Harris's reply to Grier, John Burbidge's "Where is the Place of Understanding?" and Stephen Houlgate's reply to Burbidge are especially useful.

Ferrarin, Alfredo. *Hegel and Aristotle* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Explores Hegel's dependence on Aristotle with regard to not only the *Logic*, but also Hegel's whole philosophical system, with particular attention given to the relation between Aristotle's *energeia* and Hegel's *Wirklichkeit*, both of which could be translated as "actuality."

Findlay, John N. *Hegel: A Re-Examination* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1958; New York: Oxford University Press, 1976). One of the main sparks of the so-called "Hegel Renaissance" that began in the English-speaking philosophical world in the mid-twentieth century. Findlay's chapter on dialectic and the three chapters on the *Logic* are clearly written, exegetically helpful, and well-integrated with his account of Hegel's phenomenology and his philosophies of spirit, nature, politics, law, history, art, religion, and ethics.

Fleischmann, Eugène. *La science universelle ou la logique de Hegel* (Paris: Plon, 1968). This study of both the *Science of Logic* and the *Encyclopedia* mainly addresses specific problems in the *Logic*, e.g., dualism, immanence, the syllogistic structure of subjectivity, the relation between the concept and reality, and Hegel's systematic philosophical method.

Füzesi, Nicolas. *Hegels drei Schlüsse* (Freiburg: Karl Alber, 2004). An analysis of Hegel's theory of the syllogistic interrelations among particularity, individuality, and universality.

Gadamer, Hans-Georg. *Hegel's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies*, translated by P. Christopher Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press,

1976). This Heideggerian reading of Hegel's entire philosophy includes a chapter on the Logic.

Grégoire, Franz. *Études hégéliennes: les points capitaux du système* (Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain; Paris: Beatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1958). Among the most eloquent and persuasive of the Christian, theocentric, or "Right Hegelian" interpretations of Hegel's Logic.

Harnischmacher, Iris. *Der metaphysische Gehalt der Hegelschen Logik* (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 2001). In the tradition of the Frankfurt school of Marxist critical theory, this book seeks to show, more or less against Hegel's own view of his Logic, that being does not depend on thought, nor are thought and being interdependent, but thought depends on being.

Harris, Errol E. *An Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel* (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1983). Follows in the footsteps of Findlay to show Hegel's fundamental holism, organicism, and Christianity in a straightforward presentation that is both accessible to undergraduates and provocative enough for professors and graduate students. Harris uses the *Encyclopedia* rather than the *Science of Logic* in most cases, yet contrapuntally integrates both. He explains soundly and in plain English the obscurities of Hegel's texts which can be resolved if and only if Hegel's aim is assumed to be defensible, but he does not gloss over the many real obscurities that remain, and confronts them with a sincere inquisitiveness and an almost Augustinian reverence. While his work is certainly a defense of Hegel, he does not defend Hegel when Hegel does not deserve to be defended.

Harris, Errol E. "[Review]: John Burbidge. *On Hegel's Logic: Fragments of a Commentary*," *Idealistic Studies* 13, 2 (May 1983): 166-171. Reveals basic differences between Harris's ontotheological and Burbidge's "subjective" (in the Hegelian sense), non-metaphysical approach to the Logic; e.g., Burbidge thinks that entire Logic is contained implicitly in any of its triads, while Harris believes that each triad can be understood only in terms of all those preceding it - in order - and that each new triad illuminates its nearest predecessor and thus also the ever-developing concept, which it always anticipates.

Harris, William Torrey. *Hegel's Logic: A Book on the Genesis of the Categories of the Mind: A Critical Exposition* (Chicago: Griggs, 1890). Along with Josiah Royce, Harris was the most important American Hegelian of the nineteenth century. This book provides detailed exegesis and does well to set the Logic not only in the context of Hegel's own thought, but also in the wider context of Western

philosophy in general. Among its most intriguing insights is Harris's identification of Hegel's *Begriff qua* "self-activity" with both Plato's *eidos* ("form") and Aristotle's *entelecheia* ("actuality," "self-fulfillment," "entelechy"). Nevertheless, like most books about Hegel or idealism from that era, it overemphasizes the personality of spirit.

Hartmann, Klaus. *Hegels Logik* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1999). Argues that, through determinacy, explanation, systematization, and the precise development of concepts, Hegel's theory remains relevant to hermeneutics and other late twentieth and early twenty-first-century philosophical movements.

Hegel, edited by Michael J. Inwood (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). Contains Terry Pinkard's concise and readable synopsis of the *Logic* (pp. 85-109).

Henrich, Dieter. *Hegel im Kontext* - 4th edition - (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1988) - [5th edition] - (Berlin: Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch, 2010). Contains important essays on, among other topics, the method, goals, structure, beginning, and presuppositions of Hegel's *Logic*, and on Hegel's ideas of reflection, contingency, and necessity.

Henrich, Dieter. "Hegels Logik der Reflexion," *Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 18: Die Wissenschaft der Logik und die Logik der Reflexion: Hegeltage Chantilly 1971* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1978): 203-324. A clear and insightful account of this key aspect of Hegel's theory of essence, by one of the preeminent Hegel scholars of the twentieth century.

Houlgate, Stephen. *Freedom, Truth, and History: An Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 1991). Chapter 2, "Thinking Without Presuppositions" (pp. 41-76) is clear and accessible preparation for reading Hegel's *Logic*.

Houlgate, Stephen. *The Opening of Hegel's Logic: From Being to Infinity* (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2006). Penetrating analysis of the logic of being (*Seinslogik*) in the *Science of Logic*, drawing from a wide variety of considerations, e.g., influences on Hegel, Hegel's contemporary philosophical environment, Hegel's influence on subsequent thinkers, and recent criticisms and reinterpretations of Hegel.

Hyppolite, Jean. *Logique et existence: essai sur la logique de Hegel* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1953), translated as *Logic and Existence* by Leonard Lawlor and Amit Sen (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997). A classic work on the problems of ineffability, reflection, speculation, categorization, and the absolute.

Inwood, Michael J. *A Hegel Dictionary* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992). A serviceable, detailed, and often illuminating glossary of most of

Hegel's major terms, ideas, works, and interests, although some of the descriptions are a bit too digressive and some of the definitions are difficult to locate, buried under other headings. For example, the definition of "bad infinite" is in the middle of a long paragraph on the third page of a four-page article on "infinity."

Inwood, Michael J. *Hegel* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983). Chapter VIII concerns the Logic and contains short but useful subchapters on the circularity of the system, the triadic structure, and self-referential thought.

Kaufmann, Walter. *Hegel: A Reinterpretation* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1966). This controversial quasi-biography indulges in a "posthumous psychoanalysis" of Hegel, yet still provides some fruitful insights into the workings of the philosophical system. Kaufmann is sharply critical of McTaggart, Stace, and other interpreters for whom structure, formality, deduction, and other "anatomical" features of the Logic are more important than its dynamics, interplays, mediations, processes, tensions, and other "physiological" features.

Lakebrink, Bernhard. *Kommentar zu Hegels Logik in seiner Enzyklopädie von 1830* (Freiburg: Alber, 1979-1985). This massive two-volume work is the standard commentary - at least from the Roman Catholic point of view - and contains plentiful references to Aristotle, Aquinas, Spinoza, Kant, and Heidegger.

Lucas, Hans-Christian. "The Identification of *Vernunft* and *Wirklichkeit* in Hegel," *The Owl of Minerva* 25, 1 (Fall 1993): 23-45. Relates two of the most important categories of the Logic to Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*.

Luft, Eric v.d. "The Cartesian Circle: Hegelian Logic to the Rescue," *The Heythrop Journal* 30, 4 (October 1989): 403-418. Uses a Hegelian method - not Hegel's own, but one inspired by Kenley Dove's "conceptual framework" (q.v. above) - to "try to determine a general philosophical truth about the way in which human beings come to their knowledge of God."

McTaggart, John McTaggart Ellis. *A Commentary on Hegel's Logic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1910). A respectable exegesis by the leading British Hegelian of his time, though perhaps with a bit too much emphasis on structure and formality, and not enough on dynamics, meaning, or the actual living impetus of dialectical progress. In other words, McTaggart, Stace, and others of this persuasion interpret Hegel's Logic "anatomically," whereas those more recent authors who tend to emphasize process over structure interpret it "physiologically."

McTaggart, John McTaggart Ellis. *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1896). A highly subjective and idiosyncratic, albeit classic, work; at once a defense and a critique of Hegel; an interpretation of Hegel's Logic as a type of mysticism without necessarily seeing Hegel himself as a mystic; and an exhortation to do philosophy, not necessarily dialectical or Hegelian philosophy, in the service of rational religion and the absolute.

Maker, William. *Philosophy Without Foundations: Rethinking Hegel* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994). Presenting his anti-foundationalist case in two parts, the first on Hegel himself and the second on Hegel's influence on various so-called "postmodernist" philosophies of the twentieth century, Maker offers a refreshingly original appraisal of Hegel's legacy, often with wry humor. Especially worthwhile are the discussions of philosophical self-determination and philosophical blasphemy.

Maybee, Julie E. *Picturing Hegel: An Illustrated Guide to Hegel's Encyclopaedia Logic* (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2009). By "illustrated" she means containing schematic diagrams of some of the dialectical relations. Even though her book is intelligently laid out and goes into quite a bit of helpful detail, it is over 600 pages in print, i.e., roughly four times as long as this Hibben/Luft e-book and roughly three times as long as Hegel's shorter *Logic* itself, and is written in a meandering, tedious style that is difficult to follow and even more difficult to endure. A secondary work on any complex text should simplify and clarify the presentation of that text, not make it more obscure than it already is.

Mure, Geoffrey Reginald Gilchrist. *The Philosophy of Hegel* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965). The chapter on the Logic (pp. 112-148) is a helpful synopsis.

Mure, Geoffrey Reginald Gilchrist. *A Study of Hegel's Logic* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1950). A very useful book. It should be the next book that the new student of Hegel reads after finishing this one. However, beware the sometimes misleading "British Hegelian" terminology, especially "notion" instead of "concept" for *Begriff*.

Nancy, Jean-Luc. *Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative*, translated by Jason Smith and Steven Miller (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002). A fanciful, digressive, extrapolative excursion through Hegel's whole philosophy, loosely based on Hegel's belief that the dialectic must be forever in motion. Nancy writes such un-Hegelian statements as: "Negativity makes all determinateness tremble ... it injects it with a shudder and an unsettling agitation" (p. 45).

Nancy, Jean-Luc. *The Speculative Remark: One of Hegel's Bon Mots*,

translated by Céline Surprenant (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2001). In keeping with the deconstructive fad started by Jacques Derrida (1930-2004), this book twists a single passage out of context from the *Science of Logic* and interprets it in a way which is cute and entertaining, but rather bizarre and not especially helpful toward trying to understand Hegel.

Noël, Georges. *La logique de Hegel* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1897). Serious misreading of Hegel which claims that Hegel was not a revolutionary thinker like Descartes or Kant and that he made up for his lack of originality by being an expert but eclectic amalgamator of the entire Western philosophical tradition since Aristotle. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, who understood Hegel very well, even though he twisted the dialectic for his own political purposes, found Noël's account of the Logic shallow, unconvincing, and overly idealistic. McTaggart, however, put Noël's book on the same high level with Hibben's among commentaries on Hegel's Logic.

Rademaker, Hans. *Hegels objektive Logik* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1969). A clear summary of the first two major divisions of the Logic, paying special attention to the conceptuality (*Begrifflichkeit*) between being and essence.

Rinaldi, Giacomo. *A History and Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel* (Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen, 1992). This extensive treatise adheres to Errol Harris's ontotheological reading of the Logic and considers, more historically than interpretatively, not only (in Part II) the Logic itself, but also (in Part I) some thinkers who influenced it and (in Part III) many who have been influenced by it in Germany, Italy, Britain, and America.

Rockmore, Tom. "Foundationalism and Hegelian Logic," *The Owl of Minerva* 21, 1 (Fall 1989): 41-50. Argues that, for foundationalists, infinity must be linear, i.e., what Hegel calls the "bad infinite"; while for anti-foundationalists, infinity must be circular.

Rockmore, Tom. *Hegel's Circular Epistemology* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986). An anti-foundationalist classic, difficult in spots, but covers all the main aspects of its topic from both historical and philosophical points of view.

Schäfer, Rainer. *Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 45: Die Dialektik und ihre besonderen Formen in Hegels Logik* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2001). A comparative study of the several versions of the Logic from 1801, when Hegel was a young adjunct at the University of Jena, until 1831, when he died in Berlin at the height of his fame as Germany's leading philosopher. Schäfer pays special attention to the original collaboration and eventual rift between Schelling and Hegel.

Stace, Walter Terence. *The Philosophy of Hegel: A Systematic Exposition* (London: Macmillan, 1924; New York: Dover, 1955). Written by an empiricist mystic who misunderstood Hegel and overemphasized the aspect of structure in Hegel's Logic, this book nevertheless became popular in its time because of its 14 x 20 fold-out diagram of the whole system, i.e., mostly a graphic representation of the table of contents in the *Encyclopedia*.

Taylor, Charles. *Hegel* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975). Five of the twenty chapters in this massive undertaking concern the Logic. Even though Taylor believes that the Logic fails because Hegel falls short of developing a definitive rational account of God, he nevertheless applauds Hegel for creating "an immense tissue of restless argument" (p. 349) which leaves nothing unchallenged as it drives toward showing that all reality is conceptually ordered through its own internal necessity.

Theunissen, Michael. *Sein und Schein: Die kritische Funktion der Hegelschen Logik* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1980). A detailed investigation of the phenomenological interplay between being and seeming.

Winfield, Richard Dien. "Conceiving Reality Without Foundations: Hegel's Neglected Strategy for *Realphilosophie*," *The Owl of Minerva* 15, 2 (Spring 1984): 183-198. One of the key documents in the anti-foundationalist movement in Hegel studies. Here Winfield discusses the relation of "categorical totality" to the "positive science" of nature and spirit.

Winfield, Richard Dien. "Conceiving Something Without Any Conceptual Scheme," *The Owl of Minerva* 18, 1 (Fall 1986: 13-28. Examines the dialectic of "something" (*Etwas*), substance, and determinacy.

Winfield, Richard Dien. *From Concept to Objectivity: Thinking Through Hegel's Subjective Logic* (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2006). A meticulous investigation of §§ 163-193 of the *Encyclopedia* and the analogous sections of the *Science of Logic*, with special focus on judgment and the syllogism.

Winfield, Richard Dien. *Hegel's "Science of Logic": A Critical Rethinking in Thirty Lectures* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2012). A polished transcription of a course that Winfield gave at the University of Georgia in the Spring 2009 semester. It is clearer and more accessible, but no less controversial or engaging, than his other works on the Logic. Like many books on the larger *Logic*, it can also illuminate the shorter, as vice versa.

Winfield, Richard Dien. *Overcoming Foundations: Studies in Systematic Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989). A collection


of Winfield's essays which show Hegel's anti-foundationalist Logic in its wider context of political and social philosophy.



About the Authors

John Grier Hibben was born in Peoria, Illinois, on April 19, 1861. He received his B.A. in 1882 from Princeton University, where he was both president of his class and valedictorian. After attending Princeton Theological Seminary from 1883 to 1886, he was ordained a Presbyterian minister in 1887. He received his A.M. in philosophy in 1885 and his Ph.D. in philosophy in 1903, both from Princeton University.

Hibben joined the Princeton University faculty in 1891 as instructor in logic, later taught psychology and Bible, became full professor of logic in 1897, and served as president of Princeton University from 1912 to 1932. Among his books are *Inductive Logic* (1896), *The Problems of Philosophy: An Introduction to the Study of Philosophy* (1898), *Hegel's Logic: An Essay in Interpretation* (1902), *Logic, Deductive and Inductive* (1905), *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment* (1910), *A Defence of Prejudice, and Other Essays* (1911), *The Higher Patriotism* (1915), and *Self-Legislated Obligations* (1927). He died in Woodbridge, New Jersey, on May 16, 1933.



Eric v.d. Luft earned his B.A. *magna cum laude* in philosophy and religion at Bowdoin College in 1974 and his Ph.D. in philosophy at Bryn Mawr College in 1985. From 1987 to 2006 he was Curator of Historical Collections at SUNY Upstate Medical University. He has taught at Villanova University, Syracuse University, Upstate Medical University, and the College of Saint Rose, and is listed in *Who's Who in America*.

Luft has written extensively in philosophy, religion, history, history of medicine, and nineteenth-century studies. He is the author, co-author, editor, or translator of over 600 publications, including *Hegel, Hinrichs, and Schleiermacher on Feeling and Reason in Religion: The Texts of Their 1821-22 Debate* (1987); *God, Evil, and Ethics: A Primer in the Philosophy of Religion* (2004); *A Socialist Manifesto* (2007); *Die at the Right Time: A Subjective Cultural History of the American Sixties* (2009); *Ruminations: Selected Philosophical, Historical, and Ideological Papers* (2010, 2013), and *The Value of Suicide* (2012).



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